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# THE FRENCH YELLOW BOOK

AN AUTHORIZED TRANSLATION BY

**The Times**

FOR THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT  
OF OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS  
PROVING

## HOW GERMANY FORCED THE WAR

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
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# FRANCE AND THE EUROPEAN WAR

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## FULL TEXT OF DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS

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*Authorised Translation by the Paris Correspondent of  
THE TIMES for the French Government*

OF THE

Documents Relating to the Negotiations which Pre-  
ceded the Declaration of War by Germany to Russia  
(August 1st, 1914) and to France (August 3rd, 1914).

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DOCUMENTS DIPLOMATIQUES

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1914

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LA GUERRE EUROPÉENNE

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I

PIÈCES

RELATIVES AUX NÉGOCIATIONS  
QUI ONT PRÉCÉDÉ LES DÉCLARATIONS DE GUERRE  
DE L'ALLEMAGNE À LA RUSSIE (1 AOÛT 1914)  
ET À LA FRANCE (3 AOÛT 1914)



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## INTRODUCTION.

IN this Yellow Book the French Government offers its contribution of diplomatic evidence upon the origin of the War and the negotiations which preceded it. The British, German, Russian and Belgian Governments have already taken a similar course in their respective White Papers, White Book, Orange Book, and Grey Book. Not all of these collections of documents are of equal value. The German White Book, in particular, is singularly incomplete. The French Yellow Book will be found to contain, not only the fullest record of the efforts made by the Allies to preserve peace and of the persistent determination of the German Government to thwart them, but a striking analysis of the psychology of Germany and of the deliberate policy of aggression pursued by Germany for months and years before the actual outbreak of hostilities.

This psychological analysis of the situation *ante bellum* constitutes the peculiar interest of these French documents. Though it may be held that the French despatches relating to the negotiations immediately antecedent to the War add but little to the information previously conveyed by the British, Russian and Belgian publications—an opinion which it would be easy to refute—a perusal of the opening pages of the Yellow Book should suffice to convince any impartial reader that the German attack upon the liberties of Europe was carefully premeditated and timed to take place at the moment of maximum advantage to the aggressor and of the greatest disadvantage to the Powers attacked.

Since the defeat of France in 1870-1871, it has been a main object of German policy to prevent the restoration of France to a position that would enable her, alone or with the help of allies, seriously to menace German hegemony on the Continent of Europe. For this purpose Germany formed the Triple Alliance. The alliance of France with Russia in the early nineties created, for the first time, a counterpoise to the crushing weight of Germany in European affairs, but it was not until England concluded with France, in 1904, the *Entente Cordiale*, and supplemented it in 1907 by the Agreement with Russia, that Germany became apprehensive lest her power to dictate her will to Europe should be curtailed. The German Emperor's visit to Tangiers on March 31st, 1905, the organisation of the panic in Paris which drove M. Delcassé, the French Foreign Minister, from office in the following summer; the Algier Conference of the spring of 1906, the Bosnia-Herzegovina crisis of 1908-1909, with the diplomatic defeat it involved for the Powers of Triple Entente; the Franco-German Agreement of February, 1909, in regard to Morocco, the Agadir *coup* of July, 1911, and the subsequent Franco-German Treaty of November, 1911, are the milestones that mark the path of Germany towards the final act of aggression. The defeat of Turkey by the Balkan alliance in the autumn of 1912, hastened the catastrophe.

The collapse of Turkey deprived Germany of an asset on which her statesmen had counted. Under German guidance, the young Turkish Committee of Union and Progress was preparing to place a million Turkish bayonets at the disposal of Berlin. Neither Germany nor Austria-Hungary imagined that the Turkish army would be so speedily discomfited by the prowess of the allied Bulgarian, Serbian, Montenegrin and Hellenic forces. The success of Serbia was, in particular, a severe disappointment for Berlin and Vienna. A Servia territorially enlarged and morally stimulated by a successful war, threatened to diminish the effective support which Austria-Hungary could lend to Germany in a European conflict. Hence the decision of Germany, in 1913, to increase her army by several fresh corps; hence, also, the successful attempt of Austro-Hungarian diplomacy to induce Bulgaria to attack Servia and Greece in the hope of weakening Servia, and of sowing lasting discord between the Balkan allies; hence the successful Austrian intrigue, to which the Powers of the Triple Entente weakly lent themselves, to create an aggressive Albania in the rear of Servia; hence, also, the pressure of Germany upon Austria to bring about an increase in the Austro-Hungarian army corresponding to the increase already effected in the German army.

It was supposed in Germany that France, with her stationary population, would not be in a position to reply to these Austro-German efforts. The reorganisation of the Russian army was known to be not complete, and it was presumed that Austria-Hungary and Germany would thus acquire a marked preponderance over those of France and Russia. The military predominance of the two central European empires would thus be re-established.

To the annoyance of Germany, France replied by reverting to the three years' service system despite the burden which it involved for the whole country. Russia likewise prepared for an even greater increase of her army. Germany seems therefore to have resolved to strike her blow before the Russian increase could take effect. It is significant that the German war tax on fortunes, which was intended ostensibly to cover the cost of the increase in the German army, was timed to be collected in July of the present year. This date indicates the approximate moment when Germany was determined to force matters to an issue.

The assassination of the Archduke Francis Ferdinand and of his Consort, the Duchess of Hohenberg, at Serajevo, on June 28th, provided the requisite pretext. Into the circumstances of this crime, many of which are still mysteriously obscure, the French Yellow Book does not enter. It reveals, however, with striking clearness, the means by which Germany and Austria-Hungary, in concert, utilised the crime for the purpose of compelling Russia to choose between utter humiliation and war. The psychological problem whether Germany believed that Russia in 1914, as in 1909, would quail before an ultimatum, is not, and may perhaps never be, solved. In view of the many miscalculations of German diplomacy, it is possible that the German Emperor may have counted upon a Russian surrender. The effects of such a surrender would have been scarcely less striking and politically remunerative than those of victory in the field.



The cohesion of the Triple Entente would have been undermined, its prestige destroyed, the confidence of its members in each other shattered, and France would have been immediately exposed to the exactions which Germany was determined to levy upon her.

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The Yellow Book opens with a despatch, dated March 17th, 1913, from the French Ambassador in Berlin, M. Jules Cambon, covering reports drawn up by the Naval and Military Attachés upon the new German Army Law. The Ambassador points out that the German Imperial Authorities were representing the reversion to the three years' service system in France as the cause, not as the consequence, of the increase in the German army, and were losing no opportunity of inflaming patriotic feeling. He observes that the Emperor daily "takes pleasure in recalling memories of 1813," when Germany rose against the military tyranny of Napoleon. M. Cambon adds, "If the movement which a century ago aroused the German people against the man of genius who aspired to universal domination, could find any equivalent to-day, it ought to be sought for in France, since the French people have no thought save to defend themselves against domination by force."

The report of the French Military Attaché at Berlin remarks that a member of the Reichstag—not an agitator—had gone so far as to represent the adoption of the three years' service in France as an intolerable provocation. "More moderate people," he adds, "both soldiers and civilians, concurrently support the thesis that France with her 40 million souls has not the right to rival Germany in this way." The report concludes, "by whatever pretext Germany may justify a European conflagration, nobody can prevent the first decisive blows from being aimed at France."

The French Naval Attaché reports that it would be folly to believe that the German Socialists would throw down their arms whenever France and Germany come to grips, "but," he observes, "it will be extremely important for the Imperial Government to persuade them, on the one hand, that we are the aggressors, and, on the other, that they may have complete confidence in the command and in the result." The Naval Attaché indicates also one reason for the adoption of a war tax on fortunes. "Presented in this form," he explains, "the war tax cannot displease the Socialists, who, following their usual tactics, will be enabled to reject the principle of the army law while voting the credits which ensure its execution." And again, "If we take note of the fact that the German Government is endeavouring to prevent this enormous tax from being paid in several instalments, and if, as is stated by some newspapers, the entire payment must be made before July 1st, 1914, we get a formidable hint. For nothing can explain such haste on the part of the military authorities to have a liquid war treasure of £40,000,000 in their chest."

The Government and people of France cannot accuse their diplomacy of having failed to understand the significance of German preparations.

A further document of supreme interest is an official and secret report, apparently drawn up by a German officer of high rank, upon the strengthening of the German army. The report reached the French Minister of War, "from a sure source," on April 2nd, 1913. The part of it dealing with general principles is illuminating. "Our new Army Law," runs one of its pages, "is but an extension of the military education of the German people. Our ancestors of 1813 made greater sacrifices. It is our sacred duty to sharpen the sword which has been placed in our hand, and to hold it ready for defence as well as to strike down our enemy. *The idea that our armaments are a reply to the armaments and policy of the French must be fostered among the people.* The people must be accustomed to think that an offensive war on our part is a necessity, if we are to combat the adversaries' provocations." . . . . "The war must be prepared from a financial point of view. There is much to be done in this direction. The distrust of our financiers must not be aroused, but nevertheless it will be impossible to hide many things. There need be no worry about the fate of our colonies. The final result in Europe will settle that for them. On the other hand, disturbances must be provoked in Northern Africa and in Russia. This is a means of absorbing the attention of the forces of the adversary. It is, therefore, vitally necessary that through well chosen agents we should get into contact with influential people in Egypt, Tunis, Algiers, and in Morocco, in order to prepare the necessary measures in case of European war. These secret allies would, of course, be recognised openly in time of war, and on the conclusion of peace they would be guaranteed the preservation of the advantages they had won. These *desiderata* can be realised. A first attempt made a few years ago gave us the necessary contact. Unfortunately, the relations established then have not been sufficiently consolidated. Whether we like it or not, we shall have to resort to preparations of this sort in order rapidly to bring the campaign to an end. Risings in time of war created by political agents require careful preparation by material means. They must break out simultaneously with the destruction of the means of communication. They should have a guiding head who might be found among influential, religious, or political chiefs. The Egyptian School is specially suited for this. More and more it gathers together intellects of the Mussulman world. By whatever means we must be strong, so that by a powerful effort we may destroy our enemies in the East and in the West. But in the next European war the small States must be forced to follow us or must be cowed. In certain conditions their armies and their fortresses could easily be conquered or neutralised (this might probably be the case with Belgium and Holland) so as to prevent our Western enemy from obtaining a base of operations against our flank. To the north we have nothing to fear from Denmark or from the Scandinavian States. We have the less to fear, and in any case we should arrange for the concentration of a strong army in the North capable of replying to any bad intention on this side.

"At the worst Denmark might be forced by England to abandon her neutrality, but by then the decision would already have been reached by



land and sea. Our Northern army, the strength of which might be greatly increased by Dutch Troops, would oppose an extremely active defence to any attack from this direction. In the South, Switzerland forms an extremely solid bulwark, and we can count upon her defending her neutrality against France with energy, and thus protecting this flank. . . . If the defensive organisation of Belgium were thrown against us, which would give obvious advantages to our Western adversary, we could not in any way offer Belgium any guarantee of the security of her neutrality. A vast field is therefore open for our diplomacy to work in the interests in this country. The plans made in this direction allow of the hope that the offensive might be taken immediately the concentration of the army of the lower line is completed. An ultimatum with brief delay, followed immediately by invasion, would enable us to justify our action sufficiently from the point of view of international law.

"Such are the duties of our army. They demand large effectives. If the enemy attacks us, or if we wish to tame him, we shall do as did our brothers 100 years ago. The aroused eagle will take its flight, and, seizing the enemy in its sharpened claws, render him harmless. We shall then remember that the provinces of the old German Empire, the County of Burgundy, and a large portion of Lorraine, are still in the hands of the Franks, that thousands of our German brothers groan under the yoke of the Slav. It is a national matter to give back to Germany what she formerly possessed."

A despatch from the French Ambassador in Berlin cites the opinion of General von Moltke, the chief of the German General Staff. "The commonplaces as to the responsibility of the aggressor," said General von Moltke, "must be disregarded. When war has become necessary it must be waged by ranging all the chances on one's own side. Success alone justifies it. Germany cannot, and must not, give Russia time to mobilise or she will be obliged to maintain in the Eastern Frontier a force which would leave her in a position of equality, if not of inferiority, in regard to France. Therefore, we must forestall our principal adversary. The moment there are nine chances out of ten that we are going to have war, we must begin war without waiting in order brutally to brush all resistance." "This explains," the Ambassador says, "exactly the state of mind in military circles. It corresponds to the state of mind in political circles."

Among the most important documents in the Yellow Book is the despatch (No. 6) from M. Jules Cambon, dated Berlin, November 22nd, 1913. It reproduces a report of a conversation between the German Emperor and the King of the Belgians, in the presence of General von Moltke, and warns the French Government that "the Emperor has ceased to be a partisan of peace." This despatch should be read in its entirety. It shows that the German Emperor has been brought to think that war with France was inevitable, and that he and Count Moltke strove to persuade the King of the Belgians of the irresistible might of Germany so as to lead him not to resist in case of a Franco-German war.

A long note prepared for the French Foreign Minister in April, 1914, on German public opinion in the light of diplomatic and consular reports, contains an admirable description of the German state of mind. It

analyses penetratingly the forces making for war and for peace in Germany, and concludes "it must finally be noticed that the partisans of peace, on the whole, 'believe in war,' because they can see no solution to the present situation. In certain contracts, especially in publishers' contracts, a clause enabling the contract to be cancelled in case of war has been introduced. . . . The Junkers (the Prussian landed nobility) represented in the Reichstag by the Conservative party, wish to avoid, at any price, the succession duties which are inevitable if peace is prolonged. At the last sitting of the Session which has just closed, the principle of these duties was voted. This is a serious blow to the interests and privileges of the landed nobility. On the other hand, this nobility is the military aristocracy, and it is instructive to compare the Army List with the Nobility List. War alone can make its prestige last and serve its family interests. . . . Finally, this social class, which forms a hierarchy of which the King of Prussia is the terminal Crown, sees with horror the democratisation of Germany and the growing force of the Socialist party. Not only are its material interests threatened by a formidable movement against agrarian protection, but its political representation diminished in every legislature. In the Reichstag of 1878, in a House of 397 members, 162 members were drawn from the ranks of the nobility; in the Reichstag of 1898 there were 83; in that of 1912, 57, of whom only 27 sat on the right, while there were but 14 in the centre, the 7 on the left, and 1 on the Socialist benches."

This note accurately diagnoses one of the principal causes of the War—the determination of Junkerdom to strike a blow in defence of its class interests and its predominant position in the Prussian State for the purpose of proving that its sword is the mainstay of Prussia-Germany. In the Junker class the spirit of Prussian militarism is embodied. It has inoculated the whole German nation with its ideas, and driven the youth of Germany to slaughter in defence of its privileges.

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The portions of the Yellow Book dealing with the diplomatic negotiations which preceded the War call for little comment. They cover ground mainly known, though they survey it from a different angle of vision. In a despatch dated July 2nd, the French Ambassador at Vienna, M. Alfred Dumaine, indicated with remarkable foresight the real intentions of Austria-Hungary. A despatch from M. Paléologue, French Ambassador to Russia, reports a significant warning given in July by M. Sazonof to the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador, who had hinted that Austria-Hungary might be forced to search on Servian territory for the instigators of the Serajevo crime. M. Sazonof said "No country has suffered more than Russia from outrages planned on foreign territory. Have we ever claimed to adopt against any country whatever the measures with which your newspapers threaten Servia? Do not tread that path. It is dangerous." Very illuminating are the reports from the French Ambassador in Berlin on his conversations with Herr von Jagow, the German Foreign Minister. Herr von Jagow assured the Ambassador

that Berlin had been completely ignorant of the terms of the Austrian ultimatum to Servia before the ultimatum was presented at Belgrade, and the Ambassador expressed surprise that the German Foreign Minister should thus undertake to support pretensions of which the extent and nature were unknown to him. Herr von Jagow replied testily, "It is only because we are talking between ourselves that I allow you to say that to me." The courage and frankness of M. Jules Cambon in dealing with the German Foreign Minister form, indeed, an outstanding feature of the diplomatic correspondence.

Scarcely less interesting was the attempt of Baron von Schoen, the German Ambassador in Paris, to compromise France in the eyes of Russia by dictating to M. Bienvenu-Martin, the acting-Minister for Foreign Affairs, a Note for the French Press stating that the Ambassador and the Minister had examined the means to be employed for the maintenance of peace in a friendly spirit and "with a feeling of pacific solidarity." M. Bienvenu-Martin avoided the trap, and informed the Press merely that he and the Ambassador had "sought for a means of action by the Powers for the maintenance of peace." A telegram from London on July 27th, 1914, contains the information that on that day Sir Edward Grey warned the German Ambassador that an Austrian invasion of Servia, after the Servian reply to the ultimatum, would prove that she was not merely seeking for a settlement of the question mentioned in the ultimatum but that she wished to crush a small State. "Then," added Sir Edward Grey, "a European question would be raised, and a war would ensue in which all the Great Powers would take part." Germany had thus clear warning of the consequences of encouraging Austria. On the same day in Berlin, the French Ambassador asked Herr von Jagow whether "he had pledged himself to follow Austria everywhere blindfold, and if he had read the Servian reply to Austria which had been presented to him that morning." "I have not yet had time," replied Herr von Jagow. Two days later, however, Herr von Jagow admitted that he saw in the Servian reply a possible basis of negotiation—which, however, he did nothing whatever to utilise. On July 30th, the French Ambassador at St. Petersburg reported M. Sazonof's conviction that Germany did not wish to speak to Vienna the decisive word that would safeguard peace, and added, "The Emperor Nicholas has the same impression from the exchange of telegrams which he has just had personally with the Emperor William." That evening, July 30th, M. Sazonof spoke very plainly to the German Ambassador. "The hour," he said, "is too grave for me not to tell you what I think. By intervening in St. Petersburg while refusing to intervene in Vienna, Germany is only seeking to gain time so as to allow Austria to crush the little Kingdom of Servia before Russia has had time to render help." But, in view of the Tsar's desire to avoid war, M. Sazonof proposed the formula given in the Russian Orange Book. The formula provided that, if Austria would declare herself ready to eliminate from her ultimatum the clauses which affected the sovereignty of Servia, Russia would undertake to stop all military preparations. At the request of Sir Edward Grey, M. Sazonof subsequently moderated even this mild proposal, but the German ultimatum to Russia cut off all possibility of successful negotiation.



On July 31st, the French Ambassador in Berlin reported a conversation with Herr von Jagow that is likely to stand in diplomatic history alongside of the German Chancellor's "scrap of paper" conversation with the British Ambassador. Herr von Jagow had previously declared officially to the Ambassador that Germany would not consider herself obliged to mobilise unless Russia mobilised upon the German frontier. On July 31st Herr von Jagow expressed the fear that Austria might mobilise completely in consequence of the partial Russian mobilisation which might bring about a total Russian mobilisation, and in consequence that of Germany. The despatch adds, "I pointed out to the Secretary of State that he himself had said to me that Germany would not *consider herself forced* to mobilise unless Russia mobilised upon the German frontier, and that such was not the case. He replied that that was true, but that the heads of the army insisted that all delay was a loss of strength to the German army, and that the words I recalled did not constitute a firm engagement on his side."

Though the French Yellow Book, thus summarily analysed, contains no dramatic incidents like the "infamous proposal" of Germany to England, or the final conversation between Sir Edward Goschen and the German Imperial Chancellor, it forms an invaluable contribution to public knowledge of the history of the great conflagration. Every page bears traces of the responsibility of Germany and Austria for the War, and supports with irrefutable evidence the conclusion that the responsibility for the world-wide catastrophe lies upon Germany and Austria, and upon them alone.

## Official Positions of Principal Persons mentioned in the Documents.

### FRANCE.

<i>President of the Republic</i> ... ..	Monsieur Poincaré.
<i>President of the Council and Minister for Foreign Affairs</i> ... ..	Monsieur Viviani.
<i>Minister for Foreign Affairs</i> (1913) ...	Monsieur Pichon.
<i>Minister for Foreign Affairs</i> (1914) ...	M. Doumergue.
<i>Minister for Foreign Affairs</i> (1914) ...	Monsieur Delcassé.
<i>Minister of Justice and Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs</i> ... ..	Monsieur Bienvenu-Martin.
<i>Minister for War</i> (1913) ... ..	Monsieur Etienne.
<i>Minister for War</i> (1914) ... ..	Monsieur Messimy.
<i>Minister of Marine</i> (1913) ... ..	M. Pierre Baudin.
<i>British Ambassador</i> ... ..	Sir Francis Bertie.
<i>Russian Ambassador</i> ... ..	Monsieur Isvolsky.
<i>German Ambassador</i> ... ..	Baron von Schoen.
<i>Austrian Ambassador</i> ... ..	Count Szécsen.

### GREAT BRITAIN.

<i>Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs</i> ...	Sir Edward Grey.
<i>Permanent Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs</i> ... ..	Sir A. Nicolson.
<i>French Ambassador</i> ... ..	Monsieur Paul Cambon.
<i>French Chargé d'Affaires</i> ... ..	Monsieur de Fleuriau.
<i>Russian Ambassador</i> ... ..	Count Benckendorff.
<i>German Ambassador</i> ... ..	Prince Lichnowsky.
<i>Austro-Hungarian Ambassador</i> ... ..	Count Mensdorff.
<i>Belgian Minister</i> ... ..	Count de Lalaing.
<i>Servian Minister</i> ... ..	Monsieur Boschkovitch.

### RUSSIA.

<i>Minister for Foreign Affairs</i> ... ..	Monsieur Sazonof.
<i>British Ambassador</i> ... ..	Sir George Buchanan.
<i>French Ambassador</i> ... ..	Monsieur Paléologue.
<i>German Ambassador</i> ... ..	Count de Pourtales.
<i>Austro-Hungarian Ambassador</i> ... ..	Count Szápáry.

### GERMANY.

<i>Imperial Chancellor</i> ... ..	Dr. von Bethmann-Hollweg.
<i>Secretary of State</i> ... ..	Herr von Jagow.
<i>Chief of General Staff</i> ... ..	Count von Moltke.
<i>Under Secretary of State</i> ... ..	Herr Zimmermann.
<i>British Ambassador</i> ... ..	Sir Edward Goschen.
<i>Russian Ambassador</i> ... ..	Monsieur Swerbeiev.
<i>Counsellor, Russian Embassy</i> ... ..	M. Broniewski.
<i>French Ambassador</i> ... ..	Monsieur Jules Cambon.
<i>French Chargé d'Affaires, Berlin</i> ...	Monsieur de Manneville.
<i>French Military Attaché</i> ... ..	Lieut.-Col. Serret.
<i>French Naval Attaché</i> ... ..	M. de Faramond.
<i>Belgian Minister</i> ... ..	Baron Beyens.
<i>French Minister, Munich</i> ... ..	Monsieur Allizé.
<i>Austro-Hungarian Ambassador</i> ... ..	Count Szogyény.

## AUSTRIA-HUNGARY.

<i>Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs</i>	...	Count Berchtold.
<i>Under Secretaries of State for Foreign Affairs</i>	...	{ Baron Macchio.
	...	{ Count Forgach.
<i>Chamberlain and Counsellor of State</i>	...	Prince Koudacheff.
<i>British Ambassador</i>	...	Sir Maurice de Bunsen.
<i>French Ambassador</i>	...	Monsieur Dumaine.
<i>Russian Ambassador</i>	...	Count Schébéko.
<i>German Ambassador</i>	...	Herr von Tschirsky.
<i>French Consul General at Budapest</i>	...	M. d'Aphier le Maugin.

## SERVIA.

<i>Prime Minister</i>	...	Monsieur Pashitch.
<i>French Minister</i>	...	Monsieur Boppe.
<i>Austro-Hungarian Minister</i>	...	Baron Giesl.

## TURKEY.

<i>French Ambassador</i>	...	Monsieur Bompard.
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## ITALY.

<i>Minister for Foreign Affairs</i>	...	Marquis di San Giuliano.
<i>British Ambassador</i>	...	Sir Rennell Rodd.
<i>French Ambassador</i>	...	Monsieur Barrère.
<i>German Ambassador</i>	...	Herr von Flotow.

## BELGIUM.

<i>Minister for Foreign Affairs</i>	...	Monsieur d'Avignon.
<i>German Minister</i>	...	Herr von Below-Saleske.
<i>French Minister</i>	...	Monsieur Klobukowski.
<i>British Minister</i>	...	Sir Francis Villiers.

## LUXEMBURG.

<i>Prime Minister</i>	...	Dr. Eyschen.
<i>French Minister</i>	...	Monsieur Mollard.
<i>German Minister</i>	...	Baron de Buch.

## SWEDEN.

<i>French Minister</i>	...	Monsieur Thiébaud.
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## NORWAY.

<i>French Minister</i>	...	Monsieur Chevalley.
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## DENMARK.

<i>French Minister</i>	...	Monsieur Bapst.
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## SWITZERLAND.

<i>French Consul General, Bale</i>	...	Monsieur Farges.
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## HOLLAND.

<i>Belgium Minister</i>	...	Baron Fallon.
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9.	M. de Manneville ...	Berlin, 4 July	German Government's pretended confidence in the friendly settlement of the Austro-Servian differences.	20
10.	M. Paléologue ...	St. Petersburg, 6 July	M. Sazonof warns the Austrian Ambassador that the Russian Government will not accept the assassination of the Archduke as a pretext for action on Servian territory.	21
11.	M. d'Apehier Maugin. le	Budapest, 11 July	Official optimism to order contrasted with the serious military preparations of Hungary.	21
12.	M. Dumaine ...	Vienna, 15 July	Official Austrian journals preach war to the knife against Pan-Servianism ; they regard Russia and France as not in a position to intervene.	22
13.	M. Dumaine ...	Vienna, 19 July	Transmission of a Consular Report.	23

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14.	Consular Report from Vienna.	Vienna, 19 July	Austrian political circles appear determined on aggressive war against Serbia, and military circles envisage the eventuality of a European conflict.	23
15.	M. Jules Cambon ...	Berlin, 21 July	The German Government, which has already sent preliminary instructions for mobilisation, declares categorically that it is unaware of the tenor of the Note which Austria is about to send to Serbia.	24
16.	M. Bienvenu-Martin	Paris, 21 July	Germany will strongly support the Austrian démarche, without trying to play a mediating part.	24
17.	M. Bienvenu-Martin	Paris, 22 July...	The French Government instructs their Ambassador at Vienna to give counsels of moderation in a friendly manner.	25
18.	M. Dumaine ...	Vienna, 22 July	Conciliatory attitude of Russia and Serbia. Reassuring indications given to foreign diplomats. Violent remarks of the German Ambassador.	25
19.	M. Paul Cambon ...	London, 22 July	Grave anxiety of Sir Edward Grey after a conversation with the German Ambassador. Counsels of prudence and moderation offered to the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador.	26
20.	M. Bienvenu-Martin	Paris, 23 July	Austrian Note to Serbia to be despatched at an early date. Contradictory impressions of diplomatists as to its contents and object. Pacific assurances given at Vienna.	27
21.	M. Allizé ...	Munich, 23 July	Pessimism in Bavarian official circles, particularly on the part of the Prime Minister who had knowledge of the Austrian Note to Serbia.	28

## CHAPTER III.

## THE AUSTRIAN NOTE AND THE SERBIAN REPLY.

*(From Friday, 24 July, to Saturday, 25 July.)*

22.	M. René Viviani ...	Reval, 24 July	In agreement with M. Sazonof M. Viviani asks M. Bienvenu-Martin to give instructions so that from London and from Paris counsels of moderation should be addressed to Count Berchtold, the presentation of the Austrian Note on the previous evening being still unknown.	29
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23.	M. Bienvenu-Martin	Paris, 24 July...	Instructions to this effect sent to Vienna where they only arrived after the presentation of the Note at Belgrade.	30
24.	Austrian Note ...	Vienna, 24 July	Text of the Austrian Note to Serbia communicated on the morning of July 24 by Count Szécsen to M. Bienvenu-Martin.	30
25.	M. Bienvenu-Martin	Paris, 24 July	Analysis of the Note. Count Szécsen was informed, when he brought it, of the painful impression which would not fail to be created especially in existing circumstances by the extent of the Austrian demands and by the short time given to Serbia to reply.	35
26.	M. Bienvenu-Martin	Paris, 24 July	Advice given by the French Government to Serbia to accept all that might be possible in the Austrian demands and to propose to submit the question to the arbitration of Europe.	36
27.	M. Bienvenu-Martin	Paris, 24 July	Information given to our Ambassadors regarding the warlike tendencies of the Austrian military party, Serbia's difficulty in accepting in their entirety the Austrian demands, and the menacing tone of the German Press.	37
28.	M. Bienvenu-Martin	Paris, 24 July	Baron von Schoen's démarche at the Quai d'Orsay to support, on behalf of his Government, the Austro-Hungarian démarche, to express its approval of the Note and to bring out the "incalculable consequences," which, by reason of the play of alliances, would result from the intervention of a third Power in the Austro-Servian conflict.	37
29.	M. Jules Cambon ...	Berlin, 24 July	Pro-Austrian and Chauvinistic manifestations in Berlin; pessimism in diplomatic circles.	39
30.	M. Jules Cambon ...	Berlin, 24 July	Herr von Jagow expresses approval of the Austrian Note, but denies absolutely having had foreknowledge of its contents. He hopes that Serbia will accept advice to make concessions from its friends. The official Press also ranges itself on the side of Austria.	40

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32. M. Paul Cambon	...	London, 24 July	Sir E. Grey explains to M. Paul Cambon his scheme for mediation by four Powers. Count Benckendorff's pessimism regarding Germany's attitude.	41
33. M. Paul Cambon	...	London, 24 July	Official intervention by Germany at Vienna seems to M. Paul Cambon the best means of preventing the conflict.	42
34. M. Bienvenu-Martin		Paris, 24 July	Sir E. Grey wishes to propose common action to Germany in Vienna and in St. Petersburg with a view to submitting Austro-Servian conflict to the mediation of the four Powers not interested in the question. Counsels of prudence given to the Servian Minister in Paris.	42
35. M. Jules Cambon	...	Berlin, 25 July	The Belgian Minister at Berlin sees in the approaching crisis the carrying out of Germany's prearranged warlike plans.	43
36. M. Bienvenu-Martin		Paris, 25 July	Summary of the situation. In Paris Baron von Schoen visits the Quai d'Orsay to deny the threatening nature of the previous evening's démarche. In London the Austrian Ambassador declares that the Austrian Note is not in the nature of an ultimatum. Sir E. Grey offers counsels of prudence at Belgrade and explains to the German Ambassador his scheme for mediation by four Powers.	43
37. M. de Fleuriau	...	London, 25 July	German Government refusing to intervene between Vienna and Belgrade, Sir E. Grey points out to Prince Lichnowsky that this attitude will help to bring on a general conflict in which En land could not remain inactive.	44
38. M. Paléologue	...	St. Petersburg, 25 July	M. Sazonof's conciliatory efforts; he asks Vienna to extend the time given to Servia for her reply.	45
39. M. Bienvenu-Martin		Paris, 25 July	French Government supports this demand for extension.	45
40. M. de Fleuriau	...	London, 25 July	British Government also associates itself with this démarche.	46

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41.	M. Jules Cambon ...	Berlin, 25 July	Herr von Jagow again categorically denies knowledge of the Austrian Note before its presentation. He replies evasively to the British Chargé d'Affaires' request to intervene at Vienna with a view to preventing a conflict and to extending the time limit of the ultimatum.	46
42.	M. Jules Cambon ...	Berlin, 25 July	Russian Chargé d'Affaires on his side makes this last demand at Berlin. He insists on the urgency of a reply from Herr von Jagow, which the latter seeks to postpone.	47
43.	M. Jules Cambon ...	Berlin, 25 July	On the Russian Chargé d'Affaires making new and pressing representations Herr von Jagow declares his opinion that the Austro-Servian differences are a purely local affair which must be limited to Austria and Servia, and which does not seem to him likely to lead to international difficulties.	47
44.	M. de Barrère ...	Rome, 25 July	Russian Ambassador at Rome requests Italian Government to intervene in order to secure extension of the ultimatum.	48
45.	M. Dumaine ...	Vienna, 25 July	Austrian Government eludes Russia's demand for delay made at Vienna by the Russian Chargé d'Affaires.	48
46.	M. Boppe ...	Belgrade, 25 July	Summary of Servia's reply to the Austrian Note.	49
47.	M. Jules Cambon ...	Berlin, 25 July	The news of the Austrian Minister's departure from Belgrade results in Chauvinistic demonstrations at Berlin. Financiers believe in war.	49
48.	M. Dumaine ...	Vienna, 25 July	The French Ambassador in Vienna fails to receive in time instructions to associate himself in the step of his Russian colleague owing to delay of the telegram of instruction from Paris.	50
49.	Servian Note ...	Belgrade, 25 July	Text of Servia's reply to Austria-Hungarian Note.	50



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## CHAPTER IV.

*From the rupture of Diplomatic Relations (25 July, 1914) to the Declaration of War (28 July, 1914) between Austria and Serbia.*

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50.	M. Bienvenu-Martin	Paris, 26 July	Summary of the situation on the night of the 25th brought about by the refractory attitude of Austria-Hungary. Impression made in different capitals and efforts to prevent the aggravation of the dispute which would be caused by Austro-Hungarian military measures against Serbia. Sir E. Grey still hopes to avoid conflict by the intervention of four disinterested Powers.	54
51.	M. Barrère ... ..	Rome, 26 July	Italy will take part in efforts to maintain peace, but desires to remain neutral if war breaks out.	55
52.	M. Barrère ... ..	Rome, 26 July	Russia hopes for a peaceful solution; Italian opinion shows itself hostile to Austria.	56
53.	M. Bienvenu-Martin	Paris, 26 July	The French Government supports the request for mediation made by Serbia to the British Government on the advice of Russia.	56
54.	M. Paléologue ... ..	St. Petersburg, 26 July.	M. Sazonof, still animated by the same conciliatory feelings, proposes direct conversations between Vienna and St. Petersburg regarding changes in the ultimatum so as to render it acceptable.	56
55.	M. Dumaine ... ..	Vienna, 26 July	The Russian Ambassador on returning to Vienna proposes to make a new suggestion there with a view to settlement.	57
56.	M. Bienvenu-Martin	Paris, 26 July	Baron von Schoen's representations at the Quai d'Orsay to the effect that France should intervene with Germany at St. Petersburg for the sole purpose of offering pacific advice. His refusal to reply, for want of instructions, to the demand for mediation by four Powers in St. Petersburg and in Vienna.	58

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57.	Note for the Ministers	Paris, 26 July	Further visit of the German Ambassador to affirm and emphasize the pacific intentions of his preceding representations. His refusal to express an opinion on the advisability of Germany giving Vienna counsels of moderation; he persists in the effort to get the French Government to join in a common démarche for "pacific solidarity" at St. Petersburg only, upon whom, according to him, peace depends.	59
58.	M. Chevalley ...	Christiania, 26 July	Orders to the German Fleet off Norway to return to Germany.	60
59.	M. d'Annville ...	Luxemburg, 26 July	First preparations for mobilisation at Thionville.	61
60.	M. Farges ...	Bâle, 27 July	First preparations for mobilisation in the Grand Duchy of Baden.	61
61.	M. Bienvenu-Martin	Paris, 27 July	Summary of the three successive démarches of Baron von Schoen. The situation becomes graver. Austria refusing both to content herself with the concessions offered by Serbia and to enter into conversations on the subject with the Powers. Fresh British proposal to seek, in Paris, Berlin, Rome and London, means of avoiding a crisis, Russia and Austria, the Powers directly interested, keeping aloof.	61
62.	M. Bienvenu-Martin	Paris, 27 July	Fresh démarche by Baron von Schoen at the Quai d'Orsay with the evident object of compromising France with regard to Russia while gaining time to facilitate Austrian military action in Serbia which Germany does nothing to delay.	63
63.	M. de Fleurian ...	London, 27 July	The Austrian and German Ambassadors give it to be understood that they are sure of British neutrality in spite of Sir A. Nicolson's words to Prince Lichnowsky.	64
64.	M. Paléologue ...	St. Petersburg, 27 July	Conciliatory attitude of M. Sazonof.	64
65.	M. Bompart ...	Constantinople, 27 July	It is believed at Constantinople that the Austrian-Servian conflict will remain localised and that Russia will not intervene on Serbia's behalf.	64

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66.	M. de Fleuriau ...	London, 27 July	Great Britain stops the demobilisation of her Fleet and warns Germany that invasion of Serbia by Austria may lead to a European war.	65
67.	M. Jules Cambon ...	Berlin, 27 July	Herr von Jagow gives vague pacific assurances, and declares, in answer to a question, that Germany would not mobilise if Russia mobilised on the Austrian frontier only. He displayed the greatest anxiety.	65
68.	M. de Fleuriau ...	London, 27 July	Sir E. Grey proposes that the French, German, and Italian Ambassadors in London should join him in discussing a means of solving the difficulties of the situation.	66
69.	M. de Fleuriau ...	London, 27 July	Servia has not asked for British mediation; it is therefore necessary to adhere to the project of four-Power mediation recommended by Britain.	66
70.	M. Bienvenu-Martin	Paris, 27 July	The French Government accepts the British proposal which genuinely moderating advice by Germany to Vienna can, however, alone bring to a successful end.	66
71.	M. de Fleuriau ...	London, 27 July	The Italian Government also accepts mediation by four Powers.	67
72.	M. Barrère ...	Rome, 27 July	The Marquis di San Giuliano declares that he had no foreknowledge of the Austrian Note and unhesitatingly supports Sir E. Grey's proposal.	67
73.	M. Jules Cambon ...	Berlin, 27 July	Herr von Jagow rejects the idea of a conference of the Powers whilst protesting that he is desirous of a peaceful solution.	68
74.	M. Jules Cambon ...	Berlin, 27 July	Herr von Jagow avoids further representations on this subject made by M. Jules Cambon. Advisability of putting forward the British proposals in a different form so as to nonplus Germany.	68
75.	M. Bienvenu-Martin	Paris, 27 July	Count Szécsen comes to the Quai d'Orsay to present a memorandum from his Government justifying the measures of coercion which he announces as imminent against Servia—text of this memorandum.	70



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75	M. Press Bureau <i>Communiqué.</i>	Vienna, 28 July	Semi-official communiqué from the Vienna Press Bureau on the Servian reply, which is represented as inadequate.	81
76.	M. René Viviani ...	On board "La France," 28 July	Acknowledges receipt of M. Bienvenu-Martin's despatch, and approves the latter's reply to Baron von Schoen and also to Sir E. Grey's proposal.	81
77.	M. Bienvenu-Martin	Paris, 28 July	Summary of the situation: Germany's refusal to intervene at Vienna. Her objection to the British proposal; presentation of the Austrian memorandum. Dangers of the situation.	82
78.	M. Bienvenu-Martin	Paris, 28 July	Baron von Schoen's visit to the Quai d'Orsay. He renews his declaration of pacific intentions, but still evades consideration of practical methods of preventing a conflict.	82
79.	M. Bienvenu-Martin	Paris, 28 July	Instructions to M. Dumaine to keep in touch with his British colleague to present at Vienna the British demand for mediation.	83
80.	M. Paul Cambon ...	London, 28 July	The German Ambassador in London, like Baron von Schoen in Paris, insists on the utility of England exercising a moderating action at St. Petersburg only. On the other hand M. Sazonof has accepted the British proposal for mediation, but he would like to preface it with a direct conversation with Vienna from which he expects satisfactory results.	83
81.	M. Jules Cambon ...	Berlin, 28 July	Herr von Jagow still shows hostility to the conference proposed by Sir E. Grey, and bases his dilatory attitude on the news of Russian efforts for a direct <i>entente</i> between Vienna and St. Petersburg.	84
82.	M. Paléologue ...	St. Petersburg, 28 July	M. Sazonof finds himself obliged to note that Austria avoids his proposal for a direct <i>entente</i> .	85
83.	M. Dueraine ...	Vienna, 28 July	According to Count Berchtold, Austria's declaration of war against Servia renders futile all efforts at conciliation. He thus breaks off <i>pourparlers</i> with St. Petersburg.	86

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## CHAPTER V.

*From the Austrian Declaration of war upon Serbia (28 July, 1914) to the Ultimatum of Germany to Russia (31 July, 1914).*

1914.

84. M. Barrère ...	...	Rome, 29 July	The Consulta considers that the Austrian declaration of war should not prevent the continuation of diplomatic efforts to bring about a conference in London.	87
85. M. Bienvenu-Martin		Paris, 29 July	Germany appears to give up the hope of Anglo-French pressure being exerted on Russia alone, but still refuses to act in Vienna. In these circumstances it appears indispensable that Russia should definitely and at once support the British proposal for mediation by four Powers so as to get it accepted by Berlin before military action by Austria finally compromises peace.	87
86. M. Paléologue ...	...	St. Petersburg, 29 July	The Russian Government adheres to this proposal in its entirety.	88
87. M. Klobukowski ...	...	Brussels, 29 July	Renewed anxiety at Brussels caused by the puzzling and threatening attitude of Germany.	88
88. M. Ronssin ...	...	Frankfort, 29 July	Important movements of troops about Frankfort.	89
89. M. Allizé ...	...	Munich, 29 July	Military preparations in S. Germany.	89
90. M. Dumaine ...	...	Vienna, 29 July	Military preparations in Bohemia.	89
91. M. Paléologue ...	...	St. Petersburg, 29 July	Austria avoids the direct conversation to which she had been invited, and hurries on war preparations.	90
92. M. Jules Cambon ...	...	Berlin, 29 July	Herr von Jagow maintains his dilatory attitude, which is vaguely pacific, throwing the eventual responsibility of a conflict upon Russia, whilst at the same time declaring that he pins his hope to a direct <i>entente</i> between Vienna and St. Petersburg for the success of which he affects to be working.	90
93. M. Dumaine ...	...	Vienna, 29 July	Austria appears determined to fight. She is urged to war by Herr von Tschirschky, German Ambassador. The situation becomes graver.	91

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94.	M. Bienvenu-Martin	Paris, 29 July	Baron von Schoen has come to say that Germany would consult Vienna regarding her intentions, that this would afford a basis for discussion, and that military operations would not be actively pushed forward.	92
95.	M. Bienvenu-Martin	Paris, 29 July	In view of the disquieting attitude of Germany, of the refusal of Count Berchtold to continue <i>pourparlers</i> and of the military preparations of Austria, Russia is obliged to begin a partial mobilisation.	92
96.	M. Barrère ...	Rome, 29 July	Marquis di San Giuliano explains the attitude of Germany and Austria as being due to their erroneous conviction that Russia would abandon Serbia.	93
97.	M. René Viviani ...	Paris, 29 July	Direct Austro-Russian conversations having been interrupted by Austria's declaration of war on Serbia, the French and Russian Governments request Sir E. Grey to revive in Berlin his proposal for the intervention of four Powers, and to influence Italy with a view to obtaining her full support.	94
98.	M. Paul Cambon ...	London, 29 July	Germany only being willing to accept the principle of four-Power mediation, Sir Edward Grey, in order to avoid any further delay in reply, will leave it to the German Government to declare in what form this intervention appears to it to be practicable. He regards the situation as being very grave.	94
99.	M. Boppe ...	Belgrade, 29 July	The Servian Government has obtained from Russia the assurance that the latter Power will not cease to interest herself in Serbia's fate.	95
100.	M. Paléologue ...	St. Petersburg, 29 July	The German Ambassador at Berlin has come to declare that his country would mobilise if Russia did not stop her military preparations.	95



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102.	M. Paléologue ...	St. Petersburg, 30 July	The Russian Government declares its readiness to negotiate to the very last, while at the same time remaining convinced that Germany will not work at Vienna in favour of peace.	97
103.	M. Paléologue ...	St. Petersburg, 30 July	Owing to a new and less threatening démarche by the German Ambassador, M. Sazonof hastened to put forward a new proposal indicating that Russia would suspend her military preparations if Austria would declare her readiness to eliminate from her ultimatum the clauses which impair the sovereignty of Serbia.	97
104.	M. Dumaine ...	Vienna, 30 July	As the result of a very cordial interview between the Russian Ambassador and Count Berchtold a new attempt at direct Austro-Russian conversation will be made at St. Petersburg with a view to friendly settlement of the Servian question.	98
105.	M. Jules Cambon ...	Berlin, 30 July	The German Government deny the news of mobilisation, but take all necessary measures to prepare it.	99
106.	M. René Viviani ...	Paris, 30 July	M. Paul Cambon is asked to acquaint the British Government with all the corroborating evidence which proves the active military measures and threats made by Germany since July 25, and to point out that France maintains her troops at a distance of about 10 kilometres from the frontier.	99
107.	M. Jules Cambon ...	Berlin, 30 July	Herr von Jagow declares that M. Sazonof's proposal is unacceptable to Austria.	100

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108.	M. Paul Cambon ...	London, 30 July	The German Ambassador brought no reply to Sir E. Grey's request that the German Government should itself formulate a proposal for mediation by four Powers. Prince Lichnowsky questioned the British Government regarding its military preparations. The information given to Sir E. Grey as to German military preparations has led him to think that the time has come to consider in common every hypothesis.	101
109.	M. Jules Cambon ...	Berlin, 30 July	Herr von Jagow declares that in order to gain time he will get in touch with Vienna direct and inquire their conditions, thus again eluding the demand of Sir E. Grey. He complains of Russia.	101
110.	M. Paul Cambon ...	London, 31 July	Sir E. Grey warns the German Ambassador in London that England could not remain neutral in a general conflict in which France was involved. On the other hand he has told M. Paul Cambon that the British Government would not guarantee us its intervention. The autograph letter from the President of the Republic to the King of England has been handed to His Majesty.	102
111.	M. Mollard ...	Luxemburg, 31 July	The Luxemburg Minister of State gives information regarding preparations made on the German frontier and asks France for an undertaking to respect the neutrality of the Grand Duchy, an undertaking which has not been obtained from Germany.	103
112.	M. René Viviani ...	Paris, 31 July	The French Government, in order to respond to England's desire, requests St. Petersburg to modify the proposal made by M. Sazonof to Austria in order to make it acceptable to that Power, and to permit of a pacific solution of the dispute.	103
113.	M. Paléologue ...	St. Petersburg, 31 July	The Russian Government has agreed to modify its formula in spite of the feeling provoked by the bombardment of Belgrade and the constantly provocative actions of Austria-Hungary.	105

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116.	M. Jules Cambon ...	Berlin, 31 July	Germany on her side decrees a "state of danger of war" and asks Russia to demobilise.	106
117.	M. René Viviani ...	Paris, 31 July	In announcing at Paris the ultimatum addressed to Russia, Baron von Schoen asks the French Government to inform him, before 1 p.m. next day, what would be the attitude of France in the event of a Russo-German conflict.	107
118.	M. Paléologue ...	St. Petersburg, 31 July	General mobilisation of the Austro-Hungarian Army leads to general Russian mobilisation.	107
119.	M. Klobukowski ...	Brussels, 31 July	The Belgian Government receives an official assurance that France will respect Belgian neutrality.	108

## CHAPTER VI.

*Declaration of War by Germany on Russia (Saturday, August 1, 7.10 p.m.) and on France (Monday, August 3, at 6.45 p.m.)*

120.	M. René Viviani ...	Paris, 1 August	The Austrian Ambassadors at Paris and St. Petersburg make two démarches of a conciliatory nature. Unfortunately the attitude of Germany scarcely justifies the hope of a pacific solution.	109
121.	M. Jules Cambon ...	Berlin, 1 August	Austria-Hungary announces at St. Petersburg that she agrees to discuss the basis of her disagreement with Servia; but Germany's summons to Russia to demobilise within twelve hours appears to have swept away the last hopes of peace.	110



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123.	M. Jules Cambon ...	Berlin, 1 August	The German Government refuses to give a similar undertaking.	111
124.	M. Barrère ...	Rome, 1 August	Marquis di San Giuliano informs the German Ambassador that Italy will remain neutral.	111
125.	M. René Viviani ...	Paris, 1 August	Being informed of the conciliatory dispositions of Austria, and of Russia's acceptance of the British formula, Baron von Schoen no longer speaks of his departure and protests that he is peacefully disposed whilst at the same time declaring that he has received no fresh information from his Government.	112
126.	M. Paul Cambon ...	London, 1 August	Sir E. Grey states that England has refused to give the promise to observe neutrality asked for by Germany. Respect of Belgian neutrality means much to England, and Germany has not replied to the question asked on this point.	113
127.	M. René Viviani ...	Paris, 1 August	French mobilisation has been ordered during the day in reply to German preparations.	113
128.	M. Mollard ...	Luxemburg, 1 August	The Luxemburg Minister of State requests the French Government for an assurance regarding Luxemburg neutrality similar to that which has been received by Belgium.	115
129.	M. René Viviani ...	Paris, 1 August	This assurance is given by the French Government.	115
130.	M. Jules Cambon ...	Berlin, 1 August	General mobilisation is ordered at Berlin.	115
131.	M. Eyschen ...	Luxemburg, 2 August	Violation of Luxemburg neutrality by German troops. Protest by the Minister of State.	116
132.	M. Mollard ...	Luxemburg, 2 August	Explanations furnished by the German Government, who declare that the measures taken in Luxemburg are only precautionary, and are in no way hostile to the Grand Duchy.	116
133.	Note from Baron von Schoen.	Paris, 2 August	The same explanation as to the entry of German troops into the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg.	116
134.	M. Paléologue ...	St. Petersburg, 2 August	Germany has declared war on Russia.	117
135.	M. René Viviani ...	Paris, 2 August	Transmission of this news to French diplomatic agents abroad.	117

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136.	M. René Viviani	Paris, 2 August	French Diplomatic agents abroad are requested to make this known to the Governments to which they are accredited.	117
137.	M. Paul Cambon	London, 2 August	Sir E. Grey has given the assurance that the British Fleet will defend the French coasts against any German attack by sea. The violation of Belgian neutrality would be considered as a <i>casus belli</i> .	117
138.	M. René Viviani	Paris, 2 August	The Prime Minister will communicate to the French Chamber Sir E. Grey's declarations with regard to the assistance of the British Fleet.	118
139.	M. René Viviani	Paris, 2 August	Protest addressed to Berlin against the violations of the French Frontier.	118
140.	M. Pellet	The Hague, 3 August	The German Minister at The Hague informs the Netherlands Government of the entry of Imperial troops into Luxemburg and Belgium, owing to military exigencies.	119
141.	M. Klobukowski	Brussels, 3 August	The Belgian Government refuses to comply with the summons made to it that it shall allow German troops free passage through its territory.	119
142.	M. Klobukowski	Brussels, 3 August	It does not think the moment has yet arrived to make an appeal to the guaranteeing Powers for the defence of her independence.	120
143.	M. Paul Cambon	London, 3 August	The declaration as to the intervention of the British Fleet binds the British Government.	120
144.	M. Paul Cambon	London, 3 August	Ineffective démarche by the German Ambassador in London in order to obtain from Sir E. Grey an assurance that the neutrality of Britain would not depend on respect for Belgian neutrality.	121
145.	M. Paul Cambon	London, 3 August	Sir E. Grey announces to the House of Commons the declaration regarding the intervention of the British Fleet, and reads a letter from King Albert appealing for Great Britain's support.	121
146.	M. René Viviani	Paris, 3 August	The French Government denies in London the report that the German frontier has been violated by French officers.	121

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# FRANCE AND THE EUROPEAN WAR.

## FULL TEXT OF DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS.

### CHAPTER I.

#### WARNINGS.

1913.

No. 1.

*M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador in Berlin, to M. Jonnart,  
Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Berlin, March 17, 1913.*

Our naval and military attachés send to their respective Ministers reports upon the new German military law. I direct the attention of your Excellency to these important documents.

Only the study of the financial means with which to provide for the military measures which Germany has in view, delays the publication of the final proposals of the Government. In spite of the affected patriotism with which the wealthy classes accept the sacrifice which will be demanded of them, they are, nevertheless, particularly in the business world, dissatisfied by the financial measures announced, and they feel that a forced contribution imposed in time of full peace creates a redoubtable precedent for the future. On the other hand, the Federal Governments have offered the most lively resistance to the innovation, which will attribute to the Empire resources drawn from direct taxation. Up to the present, taxation of this nature has been reserved to the Federal States, who see in the abandonment of this rule a further affirmation of the personality of the Empire, which constitutes, to a certain degree, a belittling of their own sovereignty.

However this may be, by increasing the strength of the German Army, the Empire intends to leave nothing to chance should a crisis arise.

Germany's new departure has produced a situation she did not expect; the proposal of the Government of the Republic re-establishing Three Years' Service, and the virile resolution with which this proposal has been greeted in France. The impression of astonishment made by these proposals has been turned to account by the Imperial Government to urge the



absolute necessity for an increase in the military forces of Germany. The plans for this increase are represented as being a reply. This is contrary to truth, since the immense military effort accepted by France is but the consequence of German initiative.

The Imperial authorities lose no opportunity of exalting patriotic feeling. Every day the Emperor takes pleasure in recalling memories of 1813. Yesterday evening there was a military tattoo in the streets of Berlin, and speeches were delivered in which the present situation was compared with that of a century ago. The enthusiasm of public opinion will have its echo in the discussion which will begin next month in the Reichstag, and I have reason to fear that the Chancellor himself may be moved to make some allusion to relations between France and Germany in his statements to the House. This exaltation of the nation's patriotism at a time when fresh sacrifices are demanded of it was to be expected; but it is an abuse of historical parallel to compare the present with 1813. If the movement which a century ago aroused the German people against the man of genius who aspired to universal domination could find any equivalent to-day, it ought to be sought for in France, since the French people has no other thought but to defend itself against domination by force.

It is none the less true that this state of opinion in the two countries makes the situation grave.

JULES CAMBON.

#### ANNEXE 1.

*Report of Lieutenant-Colonel Serret, Military Attaché at the French Embassy in Berlin, to M. Etienne, Minister of War.*

*Berlin, March 15, 1913.*

The patriotic movement displayed in France has aroused positive anger in certain quarters. I do not, of course, maintain that the virulent article of the *Cologne Gazette* expresses any general feeling. It is the angry explosion of an impulsive journalist immediately disowned by the Government.

But in spite of its unseemliness, the manifestation of the *Cologne Gazette* is not negligible. It has been approved in its spirit, if not in its letter, by several fairly important newspapers, and appears to me to correspond to a real feeling, to a latent anger.

It is interesting to take note of it, because it throws a more vivid light upon the meaning of present armaments.

For some time past people have been heard to declare that the military proposals of France were extraordinary and unjustified. In a drawing-room a member of the Reichstag, and not an agitator, speaking of the Three Years' Service in France, went so far as to say, "It is a provocation, and we shall not permit it." More moderate people, both soldiers and civilians, currently support the thesis that France with her forty million souls has not the right to rival Germany in this way.

In short, they are furious, and their anger is not the result of the outcry of certain French papers, which serious people scarcely heed: it is vexation. People are enraged to see that in spite of the enormous effort undertaken last year, which has been maintained, and again increased this year, they will probably still be unable to out-distance France. Since we neither wish to be nor can be with Germany, it is her real object to put us completely out of the race. This cannot be too often repeated, and the forthcoming law, which French opinion regards rather too much as being a spontaneous outburst, is but the inevitable and expected consequence of the law of June, 1912.

This latter measure indeed, while creating two new army corps, purposely, and in accordance with German methods, left incomplete important units and regiments. It was evident that no great time would be lost in filling up these gaps.\* The Balkan crisis provided a wonderful opportunity; it broke out just at the right time to enable the centenary of the Wars of Liberation to be exploited, with a view to obtaining more easily further sacrifices in memory of those already agreed to against us.

May I recall, in order the better to show the genesis of this military programme, what was written by my predecessor, Colonel Pellé, a year ago when the law of 1912 made its appearance:

"We discover every day how deep and how lasting are the sentiments of wounded pride and of rancour against us, provoked by the events of last year. The treaty of November 4, 1911, is a profound disappointment.

"The resentment felt in every part of the country is the same. All Germans, even the Socialists, resent our having taken their share in Morocco.

"It appeared, one or two years ago, as if the Germans were set out to conquer the world. They deemed themselves so strong that they thought no one would dare to enter the lists against them. Boundless possibilities were opened up for German industry, German trade, and German expansion.

"Naturally those ideas and those ambitions have not disappeared to-day. Germans still require outlets for their commerce, and they still desire economic and colonial expansion. This they consider as their right, as they are growing every day, and the future belongs to them. They look upon us, with our 40,000,000 inhabitants, as a secondary nation.

"In the crisis of 1911 this secondary nation held its own against them. The Emperor and the Government yielded; public opinion has neither forgiven them nor us. *Public opinion does not intend that such a thing shall occur again.*"

At a time when the second and formidable portion of their programme is on the eve of realisation, when German military power is on the point of acquiring that definite superiority, which, should occasion arise, would force us to face humiliation or destruction, France suddenly refuses to abdicate, and shows, as Renan said, "Her eternal power of renaissance and resurrection."

\* The problem which confronts us to-day would, therefore, have been raised, and in a more acute form, a few years later, since the shrinkage of our contingents continues to reduce our peace effectives.

German vexation is very comprehensible.

The Government, of course, invokes the general European situation and talks of the Slav peril. To me, public opinion seems in reality indifferent to the Slav danger, but it has nevertheless accepted, with very good grace, to say no more of it, the huge burdens of these two consecutive laws.

On the 10th of March last, the centenary of the organisation of the general German rising against us, an enormous crowd, in spite of the rain, witnessed the military parade in front of the castle in the middle of the Tiergarten, at the foot of the statues of Queen Louisa and Frederick William III., which were surrounded by mounds of flowers.

These anniversaries recording the struggle against France are to be continued throughout the year. In 1914 the centenary of the first campaign in France, of the first Prussian entry into Paris, will be celebrated.

To sum up, if German public opinion does not point its finger at France as does the *Cologne Gazette*, it is nevertheless against us that it will long continue to be aimed. German public opinion considers that in proportion to our forty million inhabitants we occupy a "place in the sun" which is really too large. It is constantly proclaimed that the Germans desire peace, and the Emperor more than any other, but they do not mean peace based on mutual concessions and balance of armaments. They want to be feared, and they are now making the necessary sacrifices. If at any moment their national pride should be hurt, the confidence the country will be able to have in the enormous superiority of its army will favour an explosion of national anger before which the moderation of the Imperial Government may perhaps be powerless.

It must, moreover, be noticed that the Government is doing its utmost to inflame national feeling by pompous celebration of all the anniversaries of 1813. The trend of opinion can only result in giving to a war a more or less national character. By whatever pretext Germany may justify a European conflagration, nobody can prevent the first decisive blows from being struck at France.

## ANNEXE 2.

*M. de Faramond, Naval Attaché at French Embassy in Berlin, to M. Baudin, Minister of Marine.*

*Berlin, March 15, 1913.*

In reporting to you the debate on the naval estimates by the Reichstag Committee, I said that no naval law increasing the fleet would be presented this year, and that the whole military effort would be directed against us.

The new bill to increase German effectives has not yet been laid before the Reichstag, but we nevertheless know that it deals with "a military reinforcement on a grand scale," to use the expression of the *North German Gazette*.



The semi-official newspapers have, moreover, commented upon the Army Bill in terms which would justify one in regarding as exact the communiqué of the *Lokal Anzeiger*.

The German effectives at present amount to 720,000 men. We have reason to conclude that on October 1, 1914, the strength of the Imperial Army will be brought to a figure close upon 860,000. The importance of this figure would be less did not the new bill (according to the hints of official newspapers) tend, as did the law of 1912, to place the army corps near our frontier as closely as possible on a war footing, with a view to a sudden attack upon us, with greatly superior forces, on the very opening day of hostilities. It is an imperative necessity for the Imperial Government to achieve success at the very outset of operations.

The conditions under which the German Emperor would to-day embark upon a struggle against France are no longer those of forty years ago. On the outbreak of the war of 1870, the Prussian General Staff had taken into consideration the possibility of a victorious French offensive, and Moltke, foreseeing that we might possibly succeed in getting as far as Mainz, said to his sovereign, "There they (the French) will come to grief (*Là ils se heurteront*)."

The German soldier is no longer what he was 40 years ago—a simple, religious man, ready to die at the order from his King—and William II. cannot afford to allow a retreat to enter into his calculations. Taking into account the four million Socialist votes polled at the last election, and remembering that the franchise is only given at the age of twenty-five, one may be justified in thinking that the active army, composed of young people between the ages of twenty and twenty-five, must have in its ranks a considerable number of Socialists.

It would, of course, be folly to believe that the German Socialists will throw down their arms the day that France and Germany come to grips. But it will be extremely important for the Imperial Government to persuade them, on the one hand, that we are the aggressors, and on the other that they may have complete confidence in the command and in the result.

I was much struck, during the last ceremony of swearing-in the recruits of the guard at Potsdam, to hear the Emperor take as the text of his discourse to the young soldiers, "The duty of being more courageous and disciplined in bad, than in good fortune." It is just because an initial German defeat would have incalculable results for the Empire that the aim of all the military plans elaborated by the headquarters staff is a smashing offensive against France.

In reality the Imperial Government wishes to be able to meet every possible eventuality. The greatest danger appears to be from France. The *Cologne Gazette* has said so in an article full of hate and of violence, of which the manner rather than the matter has been disavowed by the Wilhelmstrasse [The German Foreign Office].

But we must persuade ourselves that the view expressed by the *Cologne Gazette* is, at the present moment, that of the immense majority of the German people. I believe it interesting in this connection to quote



a conversation which one of the members of our Embassy had the other evening with the old Prince Henckel von Donnersmark, because it may well reflect the ideas which reign in court circles here.

Alluding to the new German Army Bill, the Prince von Donnersmark said: "The French are quite wrong in thinking that we cherish dark designs, and that we desire war. We cannot, however, forget that in 1870 popular feeling forced the French Government to attack us insanely, without being ready. Who can assure us that public opinion, so prompt to catch fire in France, will not some day force the Government of the Republic to make war upon us? It is against this danger that we wish to guard ourselves." The Prince added: "I have frequently been regarded in France as one of the artisans of the war of 1870. That is altogether wrong. Although I worked on the consequences of the war, I did my best to prevent its outbreak. Some time before the war, at a dinner where the most eminent personages of the Imperial régime were gathered, I raised my voice to deplore those sentiments of enmity which were already showing themselves between France and Prussia. I was told that if I spoke thus it was because I feared a struggle, the issue of which would certainly be unfavourable to Prussia. I replied, 'No; it is not because I am afraid that I reject the idea of a war between France and Prussia, but really because I believe its avoidance to be in the interests of the two countries. And since you have alluded to the chances of such a struggle, I am going to give you my opinion. I am convinced that you would be beaten, for the following reasons. In spite of the brilliant qualities which I admit belong to the French and which I admire, you are not precise. By precision I do not mean the fact of arriving punctually at an appointment; I mean punctuality in every sense of the word. The Frenchman, who has great facility for work, is not as punctual as the German in the accomplishment of his duties. In the coming war the victorious nation will be that nation whose servants, from the top to the bottom of the ladder, are exact in the accomplishment of their duty, however important or however trivial it may be.'" Prince von Donnersmark added: "The punctuality which played so great a part, when it was a question forty years ago of moving an army of 500,000 men, will have still greater importance in the course of the next war, in which masses of a far greater number will have to be put into action."

In this way the old Prince expressed the confidence all Germans have in the superiority of their military organisation.

In speaking above of the new German Bill I only alluded to an increase in effectives. The Bill, however, also provides for an increase in material, for defensive works, the details of which are not known, but of which an idea can be formed by the amount of the contemplated expenditure: 1,250,000,000 francs. The carrying out of the Quinquennate Law of 1911 did not call for any special financial measures. The Army and Navy law of 1912 was provisionally covered by budgetary surpluses of 1910 and 1911, by a reform of the Alcohol law, and by postponing the reduction of the tax on sugar (these last two measures only yielded together a sum of some sixty million francs).

It must, moreover, be remembered that large loans have recently been made by the Empire and by Prussia: 500 million marks on

January 29, 1912, and 350 million marks on March 7, 1913. A considerable portion of these loans must have been devoted to military expenditure.

The Army law of 1913 will call for quite exceptional financial measures. According to the indications furnished by the semi-official Press, the non-recurring expenditure will amount to a milliard of marks, and the permanent annual expenditure, due to the increase in effectives, will exceed 200 million marks.

It appears almost certain that non-recurring expenditure will be covered by a war tax upon capital. Small fortunes will be exempt, and a progressive tax will be placed upon fortunes above 20,000 marks. Presented in this form the war tax cannot displease the Socialists, who will be enabled, following their usual tactics, to reject the principle of the Army law while voting the credits which ensure its execution.

The Government fears that this extraordinary tax of a milliard, exclusively hitting acquired wealth, may create lasting discontent among the rich and the middle classes, and it is doing all in its power to persuade those whom it is going to mulct so heavily that the security of the Empire is threatened, and to establish a parallel between the warlike times of 1813 and the present. By noisily celebrating the centenary of the War of Independence they wish to convince the people of the necessity of the sacrifice, and to remind it that France is to-day, as she was a hundred years ago, the hereditary enemy.

If we take note of the fact that the German Government is endeavouring to prevent this enormous tax from being paid in several instalments, and if, as is stated by some newspapers, the entire payment must be made before July 1, 1914, we get a formidable hint, for nothing can explain such haste on the part of the military authorities to have a liquid war treasure of one milliard in their chest.

Nothing has yet been said with regard to meeting the permanent expenditure arising from the application of the laws of 1912 and 1913. Fresh legislation will evidently be necessary to provide the annual resources. In conclusion, in Germany the execution of military reform follows very closely upon the decision taken to accomplish it. All the fresh measures provided for by the Quinquennate Law of 1911 and by the law of 1912 are already in force. It is very possible that a portion of the material, the purchase of which is to be authorised by the new law, is already being manufactured. Military secrets are so well guarded here that it is extremely difficult to follow what is going on with regard to personnel and material.

With 700,000 men under arms (without counting the very numerous reservists who are at present under training), a perfect military organisation, and a public opinion which allows itself to be ruled by the bellicose appeals of the Army and Navy Leagues, the German people is at the present moment a very dangerous neighbour.

If Three Years' Service be adopted and immediately applied in France, conditions will be less unequal next year. German effectives will still be considerably greater than our own, but the calling up of the whole of the available contingent will no longer allow of selection, and will bring

elements of secondary order and even undesirable units into the ranks of the German army, and the moral value of the active army will thereby suffer.

The Germans wished, by a great and supreme effort, to upset the balance of the two camps which divide Europe. Beyond this they cannot do much.

They have not thought France capable of a great sacrifice. The adoption of Three Years' Service in France will upset their calculations.

FARAMOND.

## No. 2.

*M. Etienne, Minister of War to M. Jonnart, Minister of Foreign Affairs.*

*Paris, April 2, 1913.*

I have just received from a trustworthy source an official and secret report dealing with the strengthening of the German army. It falls under two heads. The first section consists of general considerations, and the second relates in the greatest detail, arm by arm, the steps to be taken. The portions relating to the use of motor-cars and of the air services are particularly striking. I have the honour to enclose herewith a copy of this document, which appears to me to demand your attention.

ETIENNE.

## ANNEXE.

*Note regarding the strengthening of the German Army.*

*Berlin, March 19, 1913.*

### I.

General considerations regarding the new Army laws.

The increase has taken place in three stages:—

I. The Algeciras Conference removed the last doubts as to the existence of an *Entente* between France, England and Russia. We have seen on the other hand that Austria-Hungary was obliged to detach forces for use against Serbia and Italy. Finally, our (*i.e.*, the German) Fleet at that moment was not sufficiently strong. At the end of the dispute the first things to be done, therefore, were to strengthen our coastal defence and to increase our naval force. To the English intention of sending an expeditionary force of 100,000 men to the Continent, we had to reply by better formation of reserves, who would have to be employed according to circumstances on the coast, in our fortresses and in siege operations. It was already clear at that time that a great effort was indispensable.

II. The French having violated the Moroccan Conventions, brought about the Agadir incident. At that moment the progress of the French Army, the moral recovery of the nation, the technical advantage gained



in the field of aviation and in that of *mitrailleuses*, made an attack against the French less easy than in the previous period. Moreover, an attack by the British Fleet had to be expected. This difficult situation showed the necessity of an increase in the army. This increase was from this moment on regarded as a minimum.

III. The Balkan War might have dragged us into war in support of our Ally. The new situation to the south of Austria-Hungary diminished the value of the help which this Ally might be able to give us. On the other hand, France had strengthened herself by a new *loi des cadres* (a law strengthening the officering of the French Army). It was therefore necessary to advance the date upon which the new military law should come into force. Opinion is being prepared for a further strengthening of the active Army, which will ensure an honourable peace to Germany, and the possibility of suitably guaranteeing her influence in the affairs of the world. The new Army law and the complementary measures which must follow, will nearly allow the complete attainment of this aim. Neither the ridiculous clamours for revenge of the French jingoes, nor the English gnashing of teeth, nor the wild gestures of the Slavs, will turn us from our end, which is to strengthen and to extend *Deutschtum* (Germanism) throughout the entire world. The French may arm as much as they like. They cannot from one day to another increase their population. The use of a black army on the European theatre of operations will for long remain a dream—a dream, moreover, lacking in beauty.

## II.

### Aim and Duties of our National Policy, of our Army, and of its Special Branches.

Our new Army law is but an extension of the military education of the German people. Our ancestors of 1813 made greater sacrifices. It is our sacred duty to sharpen the sword which has been placed in our hand, and to hold it ready for our defence as well as to strike our enemy. *The idea that our armaments are a reply to the armaments and policy of the French must be instilled into the people.* The people must be accustomed to think that an offensive war on our part is a necessity if we are to combat the adversary's provocations. We must act with prudence in order to arouse no suspicion, and so as to avoid the crises which might damage our economic life. Things must be so managed that under the weighty impression of powerful armaments, of considerable sacrifices, and of political tension, an outbreak (*Losschlagen*) shall be considered as a deliverance, because after it would come decades of peace and of prosperity, such as those which followed 1870. The war must be prepared for from a financial point of view. There is much to be done in this direction. The distrust of our financiers must not be aroused, but nevertheless there are many things which it will be impossible to hide.

There need be no worry about the fate of our colonies. The final result in Europe will settle that for them. On the other hand, disturbances must be stirred up in Northern Africa and in Russia. This is a means of



absorbing forces of the adversary. It is, therefore, vitally necessary that through well-chosen agents we should get into contact with influential people in Egypt, Tunis, Algiers, and Morocco, in order to prepare the necessary measures in case of European war. These secret allies would, of course, be recognised openly in time of war, and on the conclusion of peace they would be guaranteed the preservation of the advantages they had won. These desiderata can be realised. A first attempt made a few years ago gave us the necessary contact. Unfortunately, the relations established then have not been sufficiently consolidated. Whether we like it or not, we shall have to resort to preparations of this sort in order rapidly to bring the campaign to an end. Risings in time of war created by political agents require careful preparation by material means. They must break out simultaneously with the destruction of the means of communication. They should have a guiding head who might be found among influential religious or political chiefs. The Egyptian school is specially suited for this. More and more it gathers together the intellectuals of the Mussulman world. By whatever means we must be strong, so that by a powerful effort we may destroy our enemies in the east and in the west. But in the next European war the small states must be forced to follow us or must be cowed. In certain conditions their armies and their fortresses could rapidly be conquered or neutralised (this might probably be the case with Belgium and Holland), so as to prevent our western enemy from obtaining a base of operations against our flank. To the north we have nothing to fear from Denmark or from the Scandinavian states. We have the less to fear, as in any case we should arrange for the concentration of a strong army in the north, capable of replying to any evil intentions on this side.

At the worst Denmark might be forced by England to abandon her neutrality, but by then the decision would already have been reached by land and sea. Our northern army, the strength of which might be greatly increased by Dutch troops, would oppose an extremely active defence to any attack from this direction. In the south Switzerland forms an extremely solid bulwark, and we can count upon her defending her neutrality against France with energy, and thus protecting this flank. As has been said above, the situation with regard to the small states on our north-western frontier cannot be viewed in the same light. There the matter is vital for us, and the end towards which we should strive should be to take the offensive in great superiority from the outset. For this it will be necessary to concentrate a great army followed by strong forces of the Landwehr, which will lead the small States to follow us, or, at least, to remain inactive in the theatre of war, and which will crush them in case of armed resistance. If these States could be persuaded to organise their fortification system in such a manner that they could make an effective protection for our flank, the invasion plan might be given up. But for this it would also be necessary, particularly in Belgium, that the army should be reformed so that it might offer serious guarantees of effective resistance. If, on the other hand, that country's defensive organisation were turned against us, which would give obvious advantages to our western

adversary, we could not in any way offer Belgium any guarantee of the security of her neutrality. A vast field is therefore open for our diplomacy to work in our interests in that country. The plans made in this direction allow of the hope that the offensive might be taken immediately the concentration of the army of the lower Rhine is completed. An ultimatum with brief delay, followed immediately by invasion, would enable us to justify our action sufficiently from the point of view of International Law.

Such are the duties of our Army, They demand large effectives. If the enemy attack us, or if we wish to tame him, we shall do as did our brothers a hundred years ago. The aroused eagle will take its flight and, seizing the enemy in its sharpened claws, render him harmless. We shall then remember that the provinces of the old German empire, the county of Burgundy and a large portion of Lorraine, are still in the hands of the Franks, that thousands of our German brothers of the Baltic Provinces groan under the yoke of the Slav. It is a national matter to give back to Germany what she formerly possessed.

### No. 3.

*M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador in Berlin, to M. Stephen Pichon,  
Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Berlin, May 6, 1913.*

I spoke this evening to the Secretary of State of the Ambassadors' Conference, and of the results obtained at yesterday's sitting in London. The crisis which threatened Europe has, in his opinion, been averted, but only for a little time. "It seems," said Herr von Jagow to me, "that we are walking in a country of mountains. We have just crossed a difficult pass and we now see other heights rising up before us."

"The pass we have just climbed," I replied, "was perhaps the most difficult to cross."

The crisis we have just been through was very serious. Here the danger of war was considered imminent. I have in a certain number of facts, which your Excellency should know, a proof of the pre-occupations of Germany.

Yesterday I received a call from one of my colleagues, with whom I maintain intimate and cordial relations. During a visit he paid to Herr von Jagow, the latter asked him confidentially what exactly was the situation of Russia in the Far East, and if she had at that time anything to fear in that direction which might retain her forces there. The Ambassador replied that he saw nothing, absolutely nothing, which might be the cause of concern to the Russian Government and that the latter had its hands free in Europe. I said above that the danger of war had been regarded as very imminent; people have not been satisfied by feeling the ground in the Far East—even here preparations have been made.

The mobilisation of the German Army is not confined to the summoning of the reservists to the barracks. There is in Germany a preliminary step which we have not in France, and which consists in warning officers and men of the reserve to hold themselves ready for the call, so that they may make the necessary arrangements. It is a general "garde-à-vous," and only the incredible spirit of submission, of discipline, and of secrecy, which prevails in this country renders the existence of such a disposition possible. If a similar warning were given in France, the whole country would quiver and the Press would speak of it the next morning.

This warning was issued in 1911, during the negotiations which I was conducting with regard to Morocco.

Well, it has again been issued. It was done ten days ago, that is to say at the time of the Austro-Albanian tension. I know it, and I have it from several different sources, notably from reservist officers who told their friends of it in the strictest secrecy. These gentlemen have taken the necessary steps to provide in their safes means of subsistence for their families for a year. It is even said that it was for this reason that the Crown Prince, who was to have made the trial trip in the Emperor, did not embark.

The decision which brought about this preparatory step to mobilisation is in accordance with the ideas of the Grand General Staff. On this point I have been informed of the remark made in German circles by General von Moltke, who is considered here to be the most distinguished officer in the German Army. The idea of the General Staff is to act by surprise. "The commonplaces as to the responsibility of the aggressor," said General von Moltke, "must be disregarded. When war has become necessary it must be waged by ranging all the chances on one's own side. Success alone justifies it. Germany cannot and must not give Russia time to mobilise, or she will be obliged to maintain on the eastern frontier a force which would leave her in a position of equality, if not of inferiority, in front of France. Therefore, we must forestall our principal adversary immediately there are nine chances in ten that we are going to have war, and we must begin war without waiting, in order brutally to crush all resistance." This is exactly the state of mind in military circles. It corresponds to the state of mind in political circles, where Russia is not, as is France, necessarily regarded as an enemy. This is what was being thought and said privately a fortnight ago. Of this adventure it is necessary to retain the lesson contained in the facts I have detailed above. These people do not fear war; they fully accept its possibility, and they have taken their steps in consequence. *They wish always to be ready.* As I have said, this requires conditions of secrecy and of discipline and a persevering will; enthusiasm cannot do all. It may be useful to meditate upon this lesson at the time when the Government of the Republic is asking Parliament for means to strengthen the country.

JULES CAMBON.



## No. 4.

*M. Allizé, French Minister in Bavaria, to M. Stephen Pichon,  
Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Munich, July 10, 1913.*

From a political point of view, one asks to what use the new armaments will be put. Recognising that nobody at present threatens Germany, it is considered that German diplomacy already possesses sufficiently important forces and sufficiently powerful alliances for the successful defence of German interests. As I pointed out after the Moroccan agreement of 1911, it is thought that the Imperial Chancellery will be as incapable in the future as it has been in the past of adopting an active foreign policy, and of securing, at least on this field, successes which will justify the sacrifices that the nation is making.

This state of mind is all the more disquieting as the Imperial Government would as a matter of fact be supported by public opinion in any undertaking on which it entered vigorously, even at the risk of a conflict. The state of war to which all the events in the East have accustomed the mind in the last few years no longer appears as a distant catastrophe, but as the solution of political and economic difficulties which will only become worse.

May the example of Bulgaria exert a salutary influence in Germany. As the Prince Regent once said to me: "The fate of arms is always uncertain. All war is an adventure, and verily foolish is he who engages in it believing himself sure of victory."

ALLIZÉ

## No. 5.

*Note to M. Stephen Pichon, Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Report on German public opinion according to Diplomatic and Consular Agents.*

*Paris, July 30, 1913.*

The information gathered by our agents in Germany from persons in a position to mix in the most varied circles, justifies the conclusion that two feelings dominate and irritate the German mind. 1. The treaty of November 4, 1911, is considered to be a defeat for Germany. 2. France—a new France—the existence of which was unsuspected until the summer of 1911, is considered to be *bellicose*, and is represented as desiring war. Deputies of all parties in the Reichstag, from Conservatives to Socialists, representing the most different districts of Germany, University men of Berlin, Halle, Jena, and Marburg, students, teachers, employes, bank clerks, bankers, artisans, traders, manufacturers, doctors, lawyers, the editors of democratic and socialist newspapers, Jewish publicists, members of the trade unions, pastors and shopkeepers of Brandenburg, Junkers from Pomerania and shoemakers of Stettin celebrating the 505th anniversary of their association, the owners of castles, Government officials, curés and the large farmers of Westphalia.



are unanimous on these two points, with but little shade of opinion in the different classes and parties. All these opinions may be summed up as follows:—The treaty of November 4 was a diplomatic defeat, a proof of the incapacity of German diplomacy, and of the carelessness of the Government, which had been so frequently denounced. It was proof that the future of the Empire was not assured in the absence of a new Bismarck. It was a national humiliation, a European slight, a blow at German prestige, made all the more grave because until 1911 German military supremacy was unquestioned, and because French anarchy and the impotence of the Republic had become a sort of German dogma.

In July, 1911, "*the coup d'Agadir*" raised really for the first time the Moroccan question as a national matter, of importance to the life and to the expansion of the Empire. The revelations and Press law suits which followed it have sufficiently shown how the campaign had been organised, what pan-German cupidities it had inflamed and what ill-feeling it has left behind. If the Emperor was discussed and the Chancellor unpopular, Herr von Kiderlen was the most hated man in Germany last winter. Nevertheless, he is beginning to be less badly thought of, for he has let it be understood that he would take his revenge.

Thus, during the summer of 1911, German public opinion was reared against French public opinion over Morocco. The attitude of France, her tranquil calm, her regained moral unity, her resolution to press her rights to the end, the fact that she has the insolence not to be afraid of war, form the most constant and most serious subject of anxiety and bad temper to German public opinion. Why, then, did not Germany go to war in the summer of 1911, since public opinion, although less unanimous and resolute than French public opinion, nevertheless favoured war? In addition to the pacific desires of the Emperor and the Chancellor, military and financial reasons are advanced in competent quarters.

The events of 1911 caused a great disillusionment in Germany. A new France, united, resolute, and determined no longer to be intimidated, has emerged from the shroud in which Germany saw her becoming enveloped during the last ten years. From December to May German public opinion discovered, with mingled surprise and irritation in the Press of all parties, which reproached the Imperial Government with its incapacity and its cowardice, that the vanquished of 1870 had never ceased since then to wage war, to display its flag and the prestige of its arms in Asia and Africa, and to conquer vast territories. It also discovered that Germany had lived on honorary heroism, that Turkey was the only country in which, under the reign of William II., she had made moral conquests, and that those moral conquests were now greatly compromised by the shame of the Moroccan solution. Each time that France made a "colonial" conquest, the same section of opinion was told, as consolation, "Yes, but that does not prevent the decadence, anarchy and decomposition of France at home." They were mistaken, and public opinion was being deceived.

In view of this condition of German public opinion, which considers that France is bellicose, what can one say of the future from the point of

view of a possible and imminent war? German public opinion on this point is divided into two currents. Forces of peace exist in the country, but they are inorganic and lack popular leading. They consider that war will be a social disaster for Germany, that pride of caste, the Prussian domination, and the manufacturers of guns and armour plate would get most advantage from it, and that war would especially benefit England. They are composed as follows: The large mass of workmen, artisans and peasants, who are peaceful by instinct; the portion of the nobility which is not bound up with the interests of a military career, but pursues industrial occupations—such as the great lords of Silesia and some very influential personages at court—who are sufficiently enlightened to realise the disastrous political and social consequences of even a victorious war; a great number of manufacturers, merchants and financiers of minor importance, to whom even a victorious war would bring bankruptcy, because all their undertakings thrive on credit, and because they are in a special degree financed by foreign capital; the Poles, the inhabitants of Alsace-Lorraine, the inhabitants of Schleswig Holstein, who are conquered but not assimilated, and are in suppressed revolt against "Prussian policy," approximately seven million annexed Germans, let us say. Finally, the Governments and ruling classes of the great southern states, Saxony, Bavaria, Wurtemberg, and the Grand Duchy of Baden are divided between this double feeling: an unfortunate war would compromise the Confederation from which they have derived great economic advantages; a victorious war can only benefit Prussia and "Prussianisation," against which they defend with difficulty their political independence and administrative autonomy. These elements prefer peace to war by reason or by instinct, but they are only counterbalancing political forces whose influence upon public opinion is limited, or silent passive social forces which are defenceless against the contagion of a warlike wave. An example will explain the idea. The 110 Socialist deputies are partisans of peace. They could not prevent war, for it would not depend upon any vote of the Reichstag; and in the presence of war the body of their troop would join in the chorus of rage or of enthusiasm with the rest of the country. It must finally be noticed that these partisans of peace on the whole believe in war, because they can see no solution of the present situation. In certain contracts, especially in publishers' contracts, a clause enabling the contract to be cancelled in case of war has been introduced. Nevertheless they hope that the wishes of the Emperor on the one hand, and the difficulties of France in Morocco on the other, will for some time be guarantees of peace. However that may be, their pessimism gives a free field to the partisans of war.

One sometimes speaks of the German military party. The expression is inexact even to say that Germany is the country of the supremacy of military power, as France is said to be the country of the supremacy of civil power. There is a state of mind more worthy of attention than this historic fact because it forms a danger more evident and more near. There is a war party with its chiefs, its troops, a Press either convinced or paid to form opinion and various and redoubtable means



of intimidating the Government. It works upon the country with clear ideas, ardent feeling and with tense and active will. The partisans of war are split up in several categories. Each draws from its caste, its class, its interests and moral and intellectual formation, its feelings of revenge, special reasons which unite to make a general state of mind and increase the strength and rapidity of the warlike current.

Some desire war, because it is "inevitable" in consequence of present circumstances, and for Germany, in their opinion, it will come better sooner than later. Others consider it as necessary for economic reasons found in over-population and over-production, the need of markets and of outlets, or for social reasons such as that diversion abroad alone can prevent or delay the rising to power of the democratic and socialist masses. Others again, insufficiently reassured as to the future of the Empire, and believing that time works for France, think that the event should be precipitated. It is not unusual to come across the vague but deeply-rooted feeling in the course of conversations, or in patriotic pamphlets, that a free Germany and a resuscitated France are two incompatible historical facts. Others are bellicose by "Bismarckism," if one may use the term. They feel themselves humiliated at having to discuss matters with the French, to speak of right and reason in negotiations or conferences where they have not always easily prevailed, when they have the more decisive force on their side. From their recent past, they derive a pride which is constantly fed by living memories, by oral tradition and by books, and which is hurt by the events of the last few years. Irritated vexation characterises the spirit of the "Wehrvereine" and other groups of Young Germany. The desire of others for war is found in mystic hatred of revolutionary France. Others, finally, want war from spite. It is these last who collect the pretexts for it. These feelings find their concrete expression, in reality, as follows: The Junkers, represented in the Reichstag by the Conservative party, wish at any price to avoid the succession duties which are inevitable if peace be prolonged. At the last sitting of the session which has just come to an end, the principle of these duties was voted. This is a serious blow to the interests and privileges of the landed nobility. On the other hand this nobility is the military aristocracy, and it is instructive to compare the Army list with the Nobility list. War alone can make its prestige last and serve its family interests. One speaker of the party, in the course of the debate on the Army law, brought forward as an argument in favour of the passing of the law the necessity of promotion for officers. Finally, this social class which forms a hierarchy of which the King of Prussia is the supreme head, sees with terror the democratisation of Germany and the growing force of the Socialist party, and considers that its days are numbered. Not only are its material interests threatened by a formidable movement against agrarian protection, but also its political representation diminishes in every legislature. In the Reichstag of 1878 there were 162 members drawn from the ranks of the nobility among the 397 members of the House; in that of 1898 eighty-three; in the Reichstag of 1912 fifty-seven, of whom only twenty-seven sat on the Right, while there were only fourteen on the Centre, seven on the Left and one on the Socialist benches.

The great *bourgeoisie* represented by the National Liberal party, the party of the "contented," has not the same reasons for desiring war. With exceptions, it is, however, bellicose. It has its reasons of a social nature. The upper middle-class is no less affected than the nobility by the democratisation of Germany. In 1871 it had 125 representatives in the Reichstag, 155 in 1874, 99 in 1887, and in 1912, 45. It does not forget that it played a great parliamentary rôle after the war, in helping the designs of Bismarck against the Junkers, but to-day, badly balanced between conservative instincts and liberal ideas, it is asking from war the solutions which its incapable and pitiable representatives cannot find. Moreover, doctrinaire manufacturers declare that the difficulties they have with their workers originated in France, the revolutionary home of ideas of emancipation—without France "industry would be quiet."

Finally, the gun and armour-plate manufacturers, the great merchants who clamour for greater markets, and the bankers who speculate on the golden age and the indemnity of war, think that war would be good business.

Among the "Bismarckians" must be included the Government officials of all services, who are represented closely enough in the Reichstag by the independent conservatives or Empire party—the party of the retired—whose impetuous ideas overflow in the *Post*.

They find their school and breeding ground among the groups of young men whose mind has been prepared and developed at school or university. The universities cultivate a warlike ideology with the exception only of one or two distinguished minds. The economists by force of statistics prove the necessity for Germany to have a colonial and commercial empire, corresponding with the industrial output of the Empire. There are fnatical sociologists who go further. Armed peace, according to them, is a crushing burden to the nations. It prevents the improvement of the lot of the masses, and favours socialist development. France, in obstinately desiring her revenge, is opposed to disarmament. Once and for all France must be reduced to impotence for a century. That is the best and most rapid way of solving the social question. Historians, philosophers, political publicists and other apologists of *Deutsche Kultur*, wish to force upon the world its specifically German way of feeling and of thinking. They want to conquer the intellectual supremacy which, in the opinion of lucid minds, still belongs to France. It is from this source that is fed the phraseology of pan-Germans, as are also the feelings and contingents of the Kriegervereine and Wehrvereine and other associations of this nature, which are too well known for it to be necessary for us to discuss them further. We need only note that the discontent caused by the treaty of November 4 has considerably increased the membership of the colonial societies.

There are, finally, the partisans of war from spite and resentment. They are the most dangerous. They are recruited specially among diplomats. German diplomats have a very bad Press in public opinion. The most bitter are those who, since 1905, have been concerned in the negotiations between France and Germany. They accumulate and add



up their complaints against us, and some day they will present their account in the warlike Press. One has the impression that it will be in Morocco that they will find this account, although an incident is always possible at every point on the globe where France and Germany are in contact. They want a "revenge," for they complain of having been duped. During the discussion of the Army law, one of these bellicose diplomatists declared, "Germany will only be able to talk seriously with France when she has all her able-bodied men under arms."

How will this "conversation" be begun? It is fairly widely held, even in pan-German circles, that Germany will not declare war in view of the system of defensive alliances and the feeling of the Emperor, but that when the moment comes she ought by every means to force France to attack her. France must be offended if necessary, that is the Prussian tradition.

Must war be regarded as inevitable?

It is not very probable that Germany will risk the adventure, if France can give decisive proof to public opinion that the *Entente Cordiale* and the Russian Alliance are not merely diplomatic fictions, but realities which exist and which will come into play. The British fleet inspires a salutary terror. People, however, are quite well aware that victory on water will leave everything in suspense and that the decisive account will be settled on land.

Russia has much more weight on public opinion than she had three or four years ago, but in political and military circles it is not believed that her assistance will be sufficiently rapid and energetic to be effective.

Minds are thus becoming accustomed to regard the next war as a duel between France and Germany.

#### No. 6.

*M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, to M. Stephen Pichon,  
Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Berlin, November 22, 1913.*

I have received from an absolutely sure source a record of a conversation which is reported between the Emperor and the King of the Belgians, in the presence of the chief of the General Staff, General von Moltke, a fortnight ago—a conversation which would appear greatly to have struck King Albert. I am in no way surprised by the impression created, which corresponds with that made on me some time ago. Hostility against us is becoming more marked, and the Emperor has ceased to be a partisan of peace. The German Emperor's interlocutor thought up to the present, as did everybody, that William the Second, whose personal influence has been exerted in many critical circumstances in favour of the maintenance of peace, was still in the same state of mind. This time, it appears, he found him completely changed. The German Emperor is no longer in his eyes the champion of peace, against the bellicose tendencies of certain German parties. William II. has been brought to think that war with France is inevitable, and that it will

have to come to it one day or the other. The Emperor, it need hardly be said, believes in the crushing superiority of the German army and in its assured success.

General von Moltke spoke in exactly the same sense as his sovereign. He also declared that war was necessary and inevitable, but he showed himself still more certain of success. "For," said he to the King, "this time we must put an end to it" (*cette fois il faut en finir*), "and your Majesty can hardly doubt the irresistible enthusiasm which on that day will carry away the whole German people."

The King of the Belgians protested that to interpret the intentions of the French Government in this manner was to travesty them, and to allow oneself to be misled as to the feelings of the French nation by the manifestations of a few hotheads, or of conscienceless intriguers.

The Emperor and his Chief of General Staff none the less persisted in their point of view.

During this conversation the Emperor, moreover, appeared overwrought, and irritable. As the years begin to weigh upon William II. the family traditions, the retrograde feelings of the court, and, above all, the impatience of soldiers, are gaining more ascendancy over his mind. Perhaps he may feel I know not what kind of jealousy of the popularity acquired by his son, who flatters the passions of the Pan-Germans, and perhaps he may find that the position of the Empire in the world is not commensurate with its power. Perhaps, also, the reply of France to the last increase in the German army, the object of which was to place Germanic superiority beyond question, may count for something in these bitternesses, for whatever one may say it is felt here that the Germans cannot do much more. One may ask what lay behind the conversation. The Emperor and his Chief of General Staff may have intended to impress the King of the Belgians, and to lead him not to resist in case a conflict with us should arise. Perhaps, also, there may be a desire to have Belgium less hostile towards certain ambitions displayed here with regard to the Belgian Congo. But this latter hypothesis does not seem to me to be compatible with the intervention of General von Moltke.

Further, the Emperor William is less master of his impatience than is generally believed. More than once I have seen him allow his innermost thoughts to escape. Whatever may have been the object of his conversation, which has been reported to me, the confidence has none the less the gravest character. It corresponds with the precariousness of the general situation, and with the state of a certain portion of opinion in France and in Germany. If I were allowed to draw conclusions I would say that it would be wise to take into account the new fact that the Emperor is growing familiar with an order of ideas which formerly was repugnant to him, and that, to borrow from him a phrase he likes to use, "we should keep our powder dry."

JULES CAMBON.

## CHAPTER II.

## PRELIMINARIES.

From the death of the Hereditary Archduke, June 28, 1914, to the presentation of the Austrian Note to Serbia, July 23, 1914.

## No. 7.

*M. Dumaine, French Ambassador in Vienna, to M. Viviani, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs,*

*Vienna, June 28, 1914.*

News has just reached Vienna that the Hereditary Archduke of Austria and his wife were assassinated to-day at Serajevo by a student from Grahovo.

A few moments before the attack to which they have succumbed, they had escaped death by the explosion of a bomb which wounded several officers of their suite.

The Emperor, who is at present at Ischl, was immediately telegraphically informed.

DUMAINE.

## No. 8.

*M. Dumaine, French Ambassador in Vienna, to M. Viviani, Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs.*

*Vienna, July 2, 1914.*

The crime of Serajevo is inflaming the liveliest resentment in Austrian military circles and among all those who are not resigned to allowing Serbia to keep the place she has won in the Balkans.

The inquiry into the origin of the outrage, which is to be demanded on conditions intolerable to the dignity of the Belgrade Government, would, in case of a refusal, provide the excuse for proceeding to military execution.

DUMAINE.

## No. 9.

*M. de Manneville, Chargé d'Affaires in Berlin, to M. Viviani, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Berlin, July 4, 1914.*

The Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs told me yesterday, and repeated to the Russian Ambassador to-day, that he hoped that Serbia

would give satisfaction to the demands which Austria might address to her, with a view to the search for and prosecution of those concerned in the Serajevo crime. He added that he was confident that this would be the case, because, if Serbia acted otherwise, she would have the opinion of the whole civilised world against her. And the German Government does not, therefore, appear to share the apprehensions displayed in a portion of the German Press as to possible tension, or at least does not wish to appear to do so.

## No. 10.

*M. Paléologue, French Ambassador in St. Petersburg, to M. Viviani,  
Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*St. Petersburg, July 6, 1914.*

M. Sazonof, in the course of a conversation he thought fit to have with the Austro-Hungarian Chargé d'Affaires, has pointed out to him, in a friendly manner, the disturbing irritation which Austrian Press attacks on Serbia threaten to produce in his country.

Count Czernin, having let it be understood that the Austro-Hungarian Government might perhaps be forced to search, on Servian territory, for the instigators of the Serajevo outrage, M. Sazonof interrupted him to say, "No country has suffered more than Russia from outrages planned upon foreign territory. Have we ever claimed to adopt against any country whatever the measures with which your newspapers threaten Serbia? Do not enter upon that path."

May this warning not be lost.

PALÉOLOGUE.

## No. 11.

*M. d'Apchier le Maugin, French Consul-General at Budapest, to M. Viviani,  
Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Budapest, July 11, 1914.*

Questioned in the Chamber as to the state of the Austro-Servian question, Count Tisza declared that first of all the result of the judicial inquiry, of which he refused to reveal the slightest detail, must be awaited. The Chamber highly approved this attitude. He was just as discreet as to the decisions taken in the meeting of Ministers at Vienna, and allowed no guess as to whether the plan of the representations at Belgrade, which has filled the newspapers of the two worlds, would be proceeded with. The Chamber again acquiesced.

With regard to these representations it would seem that an order has been given to belittle their importance. Hungarian anger, has, as it were, evaporated in the virulent articles of the Press, which is now unanimous in discountenancing the démarche as possibly dangerous. The official newspapers in particular desire that the expression "pourparlers," which appears to them more friendly and polite, should be substituted for the



word "démarche," with its threatening air. Thus, officially, for a quarter of an hour, everything is for peace.

Everything is for peace in the newspapers, but the mass of the public believes in war and fears it. Moreover, persons in whom I have every reason to have confidence have told me that they know that every day guns and ammunition have been sent in large quantities to the frontier. True or not true, this rumour has been reported to me from various quarters with corroborative details. It shows, at any rate, the nature of the general preoccupations. The Government, whether it be seriously desirous of peace, or whether it be *preparing a coup*, is now doing everything it can to allay this anxiety. That is why the tone of the Government newspapers has been lowered first, by one note and then by two, until now it has become almost optimistic. But the Government newspapers themselves have carefully spread the alarm. Their optimism to order is really without an echo. The nervousness of the Bourse, a barometer one cannot neglect, is a sure proof of that. Stocks, without exception, have fallen to improbably low prices. The Hungarian four per cent. was yesterday quoted at 79.95, a price which has never been quoted since the first issue.

D'APCHIER LE MAUGIN.

#### No. 12.

M. Dumaine, French Ambassador, Vienna, to M. Viviani, French Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Vienna, July 15, 1914.

Certain organs of the Vienna Press, discussing the military organisation of France and of Russia, represent these two countries as being unable to have their say in European affairs, which would insure considerable facilities to the Dual Monarchy, supported by Germany, in the task of placing Serbia under the *régime* it would please it to dictate. The *Militärische Rundschau* makes no bones about it: "The moment is still favourable for us. If we do not decide upon war, the war we shall have to make in two or three years at the latest will be begun in circumstances much less propitious; now the initiative belongs to us. Russia is not ready, the moral factors are for us, might as well as right. Since some day we shall have to accept the struggle, let us provoke it at once. Our prestige, our position as a great power, our honour, are in question. There is more still, for, in all probability, it is our existence which is at stake. 'To be, or not to be'—that is really the big business of to-day." The *Neue Freie Presse* of to-day, improving upon its own record, taxes Count Tisza with the moderation of his second speech, in which he said, "Our relations with Serbia in any case must be cleared up." These words provoke the journal's indignation. For this newspaper appeasement and security can only be achieved by a *war to the knife* against pan-Servianism, and it is in the name of humanity that it demands the extermination of the accursed Servian race.

DUMAINE.

## No. 13.

*M. Dumaine, French Ambassador in Vienna, to M. René Viviani, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Vienna, July 19, 1914.*

The Chancellor of the Consulate, who has handed me his half-yearly report, summarising various facts of an economic nature which have been studied since the beginning of the year, has added some political information drawn from a source which commands consideration.

I have asked him to draft in brief form the information he has gathered as to the approaching presentation of the Austrian note to Serbia, which the newspapers have announced persistently for some days past. You will find the text of this information enclosed. It is interesting by reason of its precision.

DUMAINE.

## No. 14.

*Extract from a consular report on the economic and political situation in Austria.*

*Vienna, July 20, 1914.*

I hear from a personage who is specially well-informed with regard to official news that the French Government would be wrong in heeding the optimism mongers. Much will be demanded of Serbia. The dissolution of several societies engaged in national propaganda, will be forced upon her. She will be called upon to repress nationalism, to guard the frontier in collaboration with Austrian commissaries, to police her schools with reference to anti-Austrian feeling, and it is really difficult for a Government to agree to act as policeman for a foreign Government. The shifts by which Serbia will no doubt wish to delay a direct and clear reply have been taken into account, and that is why a brief delay will be fixed for her to notify her acceptance or refusal. The tenor of the note and its imperative air make it almost certain that Belgrade will refuse. Then military operations will follow.

There is here, as in Berlin, a clan which accepts the idea of a conflict on a general scale—in other words, a conflagration. The governing idea probably is that it is necessary to start before Russia can have finished the great improvement of her army and of her railways, and before France has overhauled her military organisation.

But here there is not agreement in high circles. Count Berchtold and the diplomats want at most a localised operation against Serbia, but everything has to be considered possible—everything. I have been struck by a curious fact. Generally, the official telegraph agency, in its summaries of the views of the foreign Press, disregards all but the official newspapers and the more important organs; it omits all quotations and all mention of the others. This is a rule and a tradition. For the last ten days the official agency has daily supplied to the Press of Austria-Hungary a complete review of the whole Servian Press, giving a prominent place to the least known, the smallest and most insignificant newspapers,

who, owing to their very insignificance, use language which is freer, more daring, more aggressive, and frequently insulting. The object of this work of the official agency is evidently to arouse opinion, to create an opinion favourable to war. The fact is significant.

No. 15.

*M. Jules Cambon, Ambassador of France in Berlin, to M. Bienvenu Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Berlin, July 21, 1914.*

I am told that the representative of Servia in Berlin is said to have declared yesterday to the Wilhelmstrasse, that his Government was ready to listen to the request of Austria arising out of the Serajevo outrage, provided that she did not demand judiciary co-operation with a view to repression and prevention of political crime, but that he had been charged to warn the German Government that it would be dangerous to endeavour by this inquiry to damage the prestige of Servia.

Confidentially I may also tell your Excellency that the Russian Chargé d'Affaires spoke of this question to Herr von Jagow at to-day's diplomatic reception. He told him that he supposed that the German Government really was well acquainted with the note prepared by Austria, and was in consequence in a position to give an assurance that the Austro-Servian difficulties would be localised. The Secretary of State protested that he was entirely ignorant of the contents of this note, and he expressed himself in the same sense to me. I could not help but be astonished at a declaration which is so little in conformity with what circumstances would lead one to imagine.

I have, moreover, been assured that already the preliminary warning of mobilisation, which places Germany in a sort of *garde-à-vous* during periods of tension, has been sent to the men destined to receive it in such circumstances. This is a measure to which, owing to German habits, they may have recourse without exposing themselves to indiscretion and without alarming the population. It is not sensational in character, and, as we have already seen, it is not necessarily followed by effective mobilisation, but it is nevertheless significant.

JULES CAMBON.

No. 16.

*From M. Bienvenu Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to London, St. Petersburg, Vienna and Rome.*

*Paris, July 21, 1914.*

I particularly draw your attention to the information I have received from Berlin. The French Ambassador reports extreme weakness on the Berlin bourse yesterday, and attributes it to the anxieties which the Servian question is beginning to arouse. M. Jules Cambon has very grave reason for believing that when Austria makes the *démarche* at Belgrade which she believes necessary in consequence of the Serajevo crime, Germany will support her with her authority, without seeking to play a mediatory part.

BIENVENU MARTIN.



## No. 17.

*M. Bienvenu Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the French Ambassadors in London, St. Petersburg, Vienna and Rome.*

*Paris, July 22, 1914.*

M. Jules Cambon having questioned Herr von Jagow as to the tenor of the Austrian note to Belgrade, the latter replied that he was in no way acquainted with its contents. Our Ambassador showed the surprise this answer caused him. He notes that the slump on the Berlin bourse continues, and that pessimistic news is in circulation.

M. Barrère has also spoken of the same matter with the Marquis di San Giuliano, who displayed anxiety, and assured M. Barrère that he was working in Vienna so that only possible things should be asked of Servia; for example, the dissolution of the Bosnian Club, and not a judicial inquiry into the cause of the Serajevo attempt.

In the present circumstances, the most favourable supposition one can make is that the Vienna Cabinet, feeling itself swamped by its Press and by the military party is endeavouring to obtain the maximum from Servia by direct and indirect preliminary intimidation, and is leaning upon Germany to this end.

I have asked the French Ambassador in Vienna to use all his influence with Count Berchtold, in order to represent to him in friendly conversation how greatly moderation shown by the Austrian Government would be appreciated in Europe, and what reverberation might be caused by brutal pressure on Servia.

BIENVENU MARTIN.

## No. 18.

*M. Dumaine, French Ambassador in Vienna, to M. Bienvenu Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Vienna, July 22, 1914.*

Nothing is known yet as to the decisions which Count Berchtold, who has prolonged his stay at Ischl, is endeavouring to obtain from the Emperor. The Government is credited with the intention of acting with the greatest rigour towards Servia, of having done with her, "of treating her like another Poland." Eight army corps are reported to be ready to take the field, but M. Tisza, very disturbed by the agitation in Croatia, is said to have intervened actively in the direction of moderation.

In any case it is believed that the démarche in Belgrade will take place this week. The demands of the Austro-Hungarian Government, relating to the repression of crime, and to certain surveillance and police guarantees, appear to be acceptable to the dignity of Servians. M. Jovanovitch believes that they will be agreed to. M. Pashitch wants



a peaceful arrangement, but declares himself ready for every resistance. He is confident in the strength of the Servian army, and he counts, moreover, on the union of all the Slavs of the Monarchy to paralyse the effort directed against his country.

Unless there is complete blindness, it should be seen here that a *coup de force* has the greatest chance of being disastrous, both to the Austro-Hungarian troops as well as to the already-compromised cohesion of the nationalities ruled by the Emperor. The German Ambassador, Herr von Tschirschky, shows himself to be a partisan of violent resolutions, while willingly allowing it to be understood that the Imperial Chancellery might not be in complete agreement with him on this point. The Russian Ambassador, who left for the country yesterday in view of the reassuring declarations made to him at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, has confided to me that his Government will have no objection to steps being taken for the punishment of the guilty, and for the dissolution of the notoriously revolutionary associations, but could not admit exactions which would have been humiliating for Servian national feeling.

DUMAINE.

#### No. 19.

*M. Paul Cambon, French Ambassador in London, to M. Bienvenu Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*London, July 22, 1914.*

Your Excellency has been good enough to communicate to me impressions gathered by our Ambassador in Berlin with regard to the consequences of the *démarche* which the Austrian Government is proposing to make at Belgrade. Those impressions have been confirmed by a conversation which I had yesterday with the principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. Sir Edward Grey told me that he had received a visit from the German Ambassador, who confided to him that in Berlin they expected the Austro-Hungarian Government to take steps with the Servian Government, that the German Government busied itself in holding back and in moderating the Vienna Cabinet, but that up to the present it had not succeeded, and that it was not without anxiety as to what would be the consequences of such a *démarche*. Sir Edward Grey replied to Prince Lichnowsky that he liked to think that, before intervening in Belgrade, the Austro-Hungarian Government had informed itself thoroughly of the circumstances of the plot to which the hereditary Archduke and the Duchess of Hohenberg had fallen victims, and that it had assured itself that the Servian Government had cognisance of that plot, and had not done all that it ought to have done to prevent its effects. For if it could not be proved that the responsibility of the Servian Government was implicated in some degree the intervention of the Austro-Hungarian Government could not justify itself and would rouse against it the opinion of Europe. Prince Lichnowsky's communication left Sir Edward Grey under an impression of anxiety which he did

not hide. The same impression was given me by the Italian Ambassador, who also dreads the possibility of further tension in Austro-Servian relations.

This morning I received the visit of the Servian Minister, who also shares Sir Edward Grey's apprehension. He fears that Austria will place the Servian Government in the presence of a demand which the dignity of the Government, and especially the susceptibility of public opinion, will render unacceptable without protest. When I referred to the calm which appears to prevail in Vienna, which is testified to by all the Ambassadors accredited in this capital, he replied that this official calm was only apparent and concealed most deeply-rooted hostile feelings towards Servia, and he added that if these feelings were displayed in a *démarche* lacking in the desirable moderation, it would be necessary to take into account the public opinion of Servia, which had been inflamed by the bad actions showered by Austria upon the country, and which had been rendered less patient by the still fresh memory of two victorious wars. In spite of the sacrifices with which Servia had bought her recent victories she can still place 400,000 men in the field, and public opinion, which was aware of this, was not inclined to tolerate any humiliation.

Sir Edward Grey to-day saw the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador. He begged Count Mensdorff to urge his Government not to depart from the prudence and moderation which are necessary if fresh complications are to be avoided: only to ask of Servia measures to which she could reasonably agree, and not to allow itself to be dragged beyond that.

PAUL CAMBON.

## No. 20.

*M. Bienvenu Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to London, Berlin, St. Petersburg, and Rome.*

*Paris, July 23, 1914.*

The first intentions of the Austro-Hungarian Government were, according to the information gathered by the French Ambassador in Vienna, to act with the greatest rigour against Servia and to hold eight army corps ready to take the field. Its present attitude would appear to be more conciliatory. In reply to a question put to him by M. Dumaine, whom I instructed to call the attention of the Austrian Government to the anxiety aroused in Europe, Baron Macchio stated to our Ambassador that the tone of the Austrian note, and the demands formulated by it permitted one to count upon a pacific *dénouement*. I do not know what trust is to be placed in these assurances in view of the habits of the Imperial Chancellery. In any case the Austrian note will be presented within a very brief space of time. The Servian Minister considers that in his desire for an arrangement M. Pashitch will accept the demands relating to the repression of crime, and the surveillance and police guarantees, but will resist anything which might impair the sovereignty or dignity of his country. In

the Vienna diplomatic corps the German Ambassador recommends violent resolutions, whilst declaring ostensibly that the Imperial Chancellery is not wholly in agreement with him on this point. The Russian Ambassador, relying on the assurances given him, confided to M. Dumaine before leaving Vienna that his Government would raise no objection to the punishment of the guilty and dissolution of the revolutionary associations, but could not have tolerated exactions which would have been humiliating to the national feeling of Servia.

BIENVENU MARTIN.

No. 21.

*M. Allizé, French Minister at Munich, to M. Bienvenu Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, Paris.*

*Munich, July 23, 1914.*

The Bavarian Press appears to believe that a peaceful solution of the Austro-Servian incident is not only possible but even probable. Official circles, on the contrary, for some time past, have displayed with more or less sincerity positive pessimism.

The Prime Minister, notably, said to me to-day that the *Austrian note of which he had cognisance* was, in his opinion, drawn up in terms acceptable to Servia, but that the present situation appeared to him none the less to be very grave.

ALLIZÉ.

## CHAPTER III.

The Austrian note and the Servian reply (July 24 and 25).

No. 22.

*M. René Viviani, Prime Minister, to M. Bienvenu Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

I shall be obliged if you will immediately transmit the following information and instructions to M. Dumaine:—

*Reval, July 24, 1914, 1.0 a.m.*

In the course of my interviews with the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, we have been led to consider the dangers which might result from any Austro-Hungarian *démarche* with regard to Servia in connection with the crime to which the Hereditary Archduke fell a victim. We are agreed in thinking that it would be well to neglect nothing which might prevent a demand for explanations or some *mise en demeure* which would be equivalent to intervention in the internal affairs of Servia, and which the latter might justly consider as an infringement of her sovereignty and independence.

In consequence we have thought it well to give to Count Berchtold, in friendly conversation, counsels of moderation such as shall make him understand how badly inspired would be any *démarche* at Belgrade in which one might discern a threat on the part of the Vienna Cabinet.

The British Ambassador, informed of this by M. Sazonof, expressed the view that his Government would doubtless associate itself in proceedings tending to avert a danger which may threaten the general peace, and he has telegraphed to this effect to his Government.

M. Sazonof has sent instructions to this effect to M. Schébéko. Although there is no question here of a collective or concerted *démarche* by the representatives of the Triple Entente at Vienna, I beg you to discuss the matter with the Russian and British Ambassadors, and to come to an understanding with them as to the best means by which each of you can without delay make Count Berchtold hear the counsels of moderation which appear to us to be demanded by the present situation.

I add that it would be well to ask M. Paul Cambon to urge upon Sir Edward Grey the usefulness of this step, and to support the suggestion which the British Ambassador in Russia must have made to the Foreign Office to this effect. Count Benckendorff is charged to make a similar recommendation.

RENÉ VIVIANI.  
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## No. 23.

*M. Bienvenu Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to M. René Viviani, Prime Minister, on board the "France."*

*Paris, July 24, 1914.*

I immediately transmitted your instructions to Vienna, but information in the Press of this morning shows that the Austrian note was presented in Belgrade at six o'clock yesterday evening.

This note, of which we have not yet received the official text from the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador, appears to be very pronounced. It is said to aim not only at obtaining the prosecution of the Servians directly involved in the attempt of Serajevo, but is also reported to demand the immediate repression of all anti-Austrian propaganda in the Servian Press and Army. Servia, it appears, is given until six o'clock on Saturday evening to yield.

In transmitting your instructions to M. Dumaine I begged him to come to an agreement with his British and Russian colleagues.

BIENVENU MARTIN.

## No. 24.

## TEXT OF THE AUSTRIAN NOTE.

*(Note communicated by Count Szécsen, Austro-Hungarian Ambassador, to M. Bienvenu Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, Friday, July 24, 1914, at 10.30 a.m.)*

The Austro-Hungarian Government felt compelled to address the following note to the Servian Government on the 23rd July, through the medium of the Austro-Hungarian Minister at Belgrade:—

"On March 31, 1909, the Servian Minister at Vienna, on the instructions of the Servian Government, made the following declaration to the Imperial and Royal Government:—

"Servia recognises that the *fait accompli* regarding Bosnia has not affected her rights, and consequently she will conform to the decisions that the Powers may take in conformity with Article 25 of the Treaty of Berlin. In deference to the advice of the Great Powers Servia undertakes to renounce from now onwards the attitude of protest and opposition which she has adopted with regard to the annexation since last autumn. She undertakes, moreover, to modify the direction of her policy with regard to Austria-Hungary and to live in future on good neighbourly terms with the latter."

The history of recent years, and in particular the painful events of the 28th June last, have shown the existence of a subversive movement with the object of detaching a part of the territories of Austria-Hungary from the Monarchy. The movement which had its birth under the eye of the Servian Government, has gone so far as to make itself manifest on both sides of the Servian frontier in the shape of acts of terrorism and a series of outrages and murders.

Far from carrying out the formal undertakings contained in the declaration of the 31st March, 1909, the Royal Servian Government has done nothing to repress these movements. It has permitted the criminal machinations of various societies and associations directed against the Monarchy, and has tolerated unrestrained language on the part of the Press, the glorification of the perpetrators of outrages, and the participation of officers and functionaries in subversive agitation. It has permitted an unwholesome propaganda in public instruction. In short, it has permitted all manifestations of a nature to incite the Servian population to hatred of the Monarchy and contempt of its institutions.

This culpable tolerance of the Royal Servian Government had not ceased at the moment when the events of the 28th June last proved its fatal consequences to the whole world.

It results from the depositions and confessions of the criminal perpetrators of the outrage of the 28th June that the Serajevo assassinations were planned in Belgrade, that the arms and explosives with which the murderers were provided had been given to them by Servian officers and functionaries belonging to the Narodna Odbrana; and finally, that the passage into Bosnia of the criminals and their arms was organised and effected by the chiefs of the Servian frontier service.

The above-mentioned results of the magisterial investigation do not permit the Austro-Hungarian Government to pursue any longer the attitude of expectant forbearance which it has maintained for years in face of the machinations hatched in Belgrade, and thence propagated in the territories of the Monarchy. The results, on the contrary, impose on it the duty of putting an end to the intrigues which form a perpetual menace to the tranquility of the Monarchy.

To achieve this end the Imperial and Royal Government sees itself compelled to demand from the Royal Servian Government a formal assurance that it condemns this dangerous propaganda against the Monarchy; in other words, the whole series of tendencies, the ultimate aim of which is to detach from the Monarchy territories belonging to it, and that it undertakes to suppress by every means this criminal and terrorist propaganda.

In order to give a formal character to this undertaking the Royal Servian Government shall publish on the front page of its "Official Journal" of June 26 (July 13) the following declaration:—

"The Royal Government of Servia condemns the propaganda directed against Austria-Hungary, *i.e.*, the general tendency of which the final aim is to detach from the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy territories belonging to it, and it sincerely deplores the fatal consequences of these criminal proceedings.

"The Royal Government regrets that Servian officers and functionaries participated in the above-mentioned propaganda and thus compromised the good neighbourly relations to which the Royal Government was solemnly pledged by its declaration of March 31, 1909.

"The Royal Government, which disapproves and repudiates all idea of interfering or attempting to interfere with the destinies of the inhabitants of any part whatsoever of Austro-Hungary, considers it its duty formally to warn officers and functionaries, and the whole population of

the Kingdom, that henceforward it will proceed with the utmost rigour against persons who may be guilty of such machinations, which it will use all its efforts to anticipate and suppress."

This declaration shall simultaneously be communicated to the Royal Army as an Order of the day by His Majesty the King and shall be published in the "Official Bulletin" of the Army.

The Royal Servian Government further undertakes:

1. To suppress any publication which incites to hatred and contempt of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and the general tendency of which is directed against its territorial integrity;

2. To dissolve immediately the society styled Narodna Odbrana, to confiscate all its means of propaganda, and to proceed in the same manner against other societies and their branches in Servia which engage in propaganda against the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. The Royal Government shall take the necessary measures to prevent the societies dissolved from continuing their activity under another name and form;

3. To eliminate without delay from public instruction in Servia, both as regards the teaching body and also as regards the methods of instruction, everything that serves, or might serve, to foment the propaganda against Austria-Hungary.

4. To remove from the military service, and from the administration in general, all officers and functionaries guilty of propaganda against the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy whose names and deeds the Austro-Hungarian Government reserves to itself the right of communicating to the Royal Government;

5. To accept the collaboration in Servia of representatives of the Austro-Hungarian Government in the suppression of the subversive movement directed against the territorial integrity of the Monarchy;

6. To take judicial proceedings against accessories to the plot of June 28 who are on Servian territory. Delegates of the Austro-Hungarian Government will take part in the investigation relating thereto;

7. To proceed without delay to the arrest of Major Voijsa Tankosic and of the individual named Milan Ciganovic, a Servian State employe, who have been compromised by the results of the magisterial inquiry at Sarajevo;

8. To prevent by effective measures the co-operation of the Servian authorities in the illicit traffic in arms and explosives across the frontier, to dismiss and punish severely the officials of the frontier service at Schabatz and Loznica guilty of having assisted the perpetrators of the Sarajevo crime by facilitating their passage across the frontier.

9. To furnish the Imperial and Royal Government with explanations regarding the unjustifiable utterances of high Servian officials both in Servia and abroad, who, notwithstanding their official position, did not hesitate after the crime of the 28th June to express themselves in interviews in terms of hostility to the Austro-Hungarian Government; and, finally,

10. To notify the Imperial and Royal Government without delay of the execution of the measures comprised under the preceding heads.



The Austro-Hungarian Government expects the reply of the Royal Government at the latest by 5\* o'clock on Saturday evening, July 25.

A memorandum dealing with the results of the magisterial inquiry at Serajevo with regard to the officials mentioned under heads (7) and (5) is attached to this note.

I have the honour to request your Excellency to bring the contents of this note to the knowledge of the Government to which you are accredited, accompanying your communication with the following observations:—

On March 31, 1909, the Royal Servian Government addressed to Austria-Hungary the declaration of which the text is reproduced above.

On the very day after this declaration Servia embarked on a policy of installing revolutionary ideas into the Serb subjects of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and so preparing the separation of the Austro-Hungarian territory on the Servian frontier..

Servia became the centre of a criminal agitation.

No time was lost in the formation of societies and groups whose object, either avowed or secret, was the creation of disorders on Austro-Hungarian territory. These societies and groups count among their members generals and diplomatists, Government officials and judges—in short, men at the top of official and unofficial society in the Kingdom.

Servian journalism is almost entirely at the service of this propaganda, which is directed against Austria-Hungary, and not a day passes without the organs of the Servian Press stirring up their readers to hatred or contempt for the neighbouring Monarchy, or to the outrages directed more or less openly against its security and integrity.

A large number of agents are employed in carrying on by every means the agitation against Austria-Hungary, and corrupting the youth in the frontier provinces.

Since the recent Balkan crisis there has been a recrudescence of the spirit of conspiracy inherent in Servian politicians, which has left such sanguinary imprints on the history of the Kingdom. Individuals belonging formerly to bands employed in Macedonia have come to place themselves at the disposal of the terrorist propaganda against Austria-Hungary.

In the presence of these doings, to which Austria-Hungary has been exposed for years, the Servian Government has not thought it incumbent on it to take the slightest step. The Servian Government has thus failed in the duty imposed on it by the solemn declaration of March 31, 1909,

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\*The Austro-Hungarian Ambassador, in a private note to the Minister for Foreign Affairs in the course of July 24, made the following correction:—"In the copy of the Despatch which I had the honour to hand Your Excellency this morning, it was stated that my Government awaited a reply from the Belgrade Cabinet not later than 5 p.m. on Saturday, July 25. Our Minister in Belgrade only having presented his note at 6 p.m. yesterday, the delay of the reply is therefore prolonged up to Saturday at 6 p.m. I thought it my duty to inform Your Excellency of this slight modification in the delay fixed for the Servian Government's reply."



and acted in opposition to the will of Europe and the undertaking given to Austria-Hungary.

The patience of the Imperial and Royal Government in the face of the provocative attitude of Serbia was inspired by the territorial disinterestedness of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and the hope that the Servian Government would end in spite of everything by appreciating Austria-Hungary's friendship at its true value. By observing a benevolent attitude towards the political interests of Serbia, the Imperial and Royal Government hoped that the Kingdom would finally decide to follow the analogous line of conduct on its own side. In particular, Austria-Hungary expected a development of this kind in the political ideas of Serbia, when, after the events of 1912, the Imperial and Royal Government, by its disinterested and ungrudging attitude, made such a considerable aggrandisement of Serbia possible.

The benevolence which Austria-Hungary showed towards the neighbouring State had no restraining effect on the proceedings of the Kingdom, which continued to tolerate on its territory a propaganda of which the fatal consequences were demonstrated to the whole world on June 28 last, when the Heir Presumptive to the Monarchy and his illustrious consort fell victims to a plot hatched at Belgrade.

In the presence of this state of things the Imperial and Royal Government has felt compelled to take new and urgent steps at Belgrade with a view to inducing the Servian Government to stop the incendiary movement that is threatening the security and integrity of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy.

The Imperial and Royal Government is convinced that in taking this step it will find itself in full agreement with the sentiments of all civilised nations, who cannot permit regicide to become a weapon that can be employed with impunity in political strife, and the peace of Europe to be continually disturbed by movements emanating from Belgrade.

In support of the above the Imperial and Royal Government holds at the disposal of the French Government a dossier elucidating the Servian intrigues and the connection between those intrigues and the murder of June 28.

An identical communication has been addressed to the Imperial and Royal representatives accredited to the other signatory Powers.

You are authorised to leave a copy of this despatch in the hands of the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

*Vienna, July 24, 1914.*

#### ANNEXE.

The criminal inquiry opened by the Court of Serajevo against Gavrilo Princip and his accessories in and before the act of assassination committed by them on June 28 last, has up to the present led to the following conclusions:—

1. The plot, having as its objects the assassination of the Archduke Francis Ferdinand at the time of his visit to Serajevo, was formed at Belgrade by Gavrilo Princip, Nedeljko Cabrinovic, one Milan Ciganovic, and Trifko Grabez, with the assistance of Commander Voijta Tankosic.

2. The six bombs and the four Browning pistols and ammunition with which the guilty parties committed the act were delivered to Princip, Cabrinovic, and Grabez by the man Milan Ciganovic and Commander Voija Tankosic at Belgrade.

3. The bombs are hand-grenades coming from the arms depot of the Servian army at Krajujevac.

4. In order to ensure the success of the act, Ciganovic taught Princip, Cabrinovic, and Grabez how to use the bombs, and gave lessons in firing Browning pistols to Princip and Grabez in a forest near the shooting ground at Topschider.

5. To enable Princip, Cabrinovic, and Grabez to cross the frontier of Bosnia-Herzegovina and smuggle in their contraband of arms secretly, a secret system of transport was organised by Ciganovic.

By this arrangement the introduction into Bosnia-Herzegovina of criminals and their arms was effected by the officials controlling the frontiers at Chabac (Rade Popovic) and Loznica, as well as by the customs officer Rudivoj Grbic, of Loznica, with the assistance of various individuals.

#### No. 25.

*M. Bienvenu Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to M. René Viviani, Prime Minister on board the "France," and to London, Berlin, Vienna, St. Petersburg, Rome and Belgrade.*

*Paris, July 24, 1914.*

I have the honour to inform you that a copy of the Austrian note which was presented in Belgrade on Thursday evening was left with me this morning by the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador. Count Szécsen informed me that the Austro-Hungarian Government expected a reply from the Servian Government by 5\* o'clock (see note on page 33) in the evening of Saturday, the 25th.

The note is based upon Serbia's undertaking to recognise the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina and reproaches the Servian Government with having tolerated an anti-Austrian propaganda in which had participated Government officials, the Army, and the Press—a propaganda which threatened the security and integrity of Austria, the dangers of which had been shown by the crime of June 28. This crime, according to the results of the inquiry made, had been plotted at Belgrade.

The Austrian Government declares itself obliged to put an end to a propaganda constituting a permanent danger for its tranquillity, and to exact from the Servian Government an official enunciation of its desire to condemn it and repress it by the publication in the "Official Gazette" of the 26th of a declaration, the terms of which are indicated, reproving and regretting this propaganda and threatening to take action. By an Order of the Day, signed by the King, this declaration has to be brought to the knowledge of the army. Moreover, the Servian Government is to pledge itself to suppress the publications, dissolve the societies, and

dismiss the officers and officials whose names shall be furnished by the Austrian Government, to accept the collaboration of Austrian officials in the suppression of this subversive action, as well as in the inquiry to be made into the Serajevo attempt, and, finally, to proceed to the immediate arrest of a Servian officer and a Servian employé implicated in the attempt.

A note is annexed to the Austrian memorandum, summarising the results of the inquiry into the Serajevo crime, and declaring that it was plotted at Belgrade, that the bombs came from a dépôt of the Servian army, and were supplied to the assassins, and finally that the assassins were trained and assisted by Servian officers and employés.

When calling, immediately after communication of this note, upon the Acting Political Director, Count Szécsen informed him, without comment of any sort, of the presentation of this note. M. Berthelot, acting on my suggestion, could only point out to the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador the anxious impression aroused by the news published that morning as to the contents of the Austrian note, and the painful feeling which would of necessity be caused in French opinion by the moment chosen for so imperative a step with such a short time limit; that is to say, the time when the President of the Republic, the Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs had left St. Petersburg and were on the high seas, and were therefore unable to exert in agreement with the Powers not directly interested, the appeasing action between Austria and Servia which was so desirable in the interests of general peace.

The Servian Minister is still without any indication as to the intentions of his Government.

The German Ambassador has asked me to receive him this afternoon at five o'clock.

BIENVENU MARTIN

#### No. 26.

*M. Bienvenu Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs to M. Thiébaud,  
French Minister at Stockholm (for the Prime Minister), and to  
Belgrade, Vienna, London, Berlin, Rome and  
St. Petersburg.*

Paris, July 24, 1914.

This morning M. Vesnitch had still received no telegram from his Government informing him of its intentions, and he did not know the contents of the Austrian note.

In response to his request for advice he was told by the Political Direction as a purely personal matter that Servia should seek to gain time, the delay of 48 hours constituting perhaps a "*mise en demeure*" rather than an ultimatum proper: that there might perhaps be an opportunity, for instance, of immediately offering satisfaction on all points which were not irreconcilable with the dignity and sovereignty of Servia; to point out that the results of the Austrian inquiry with regard to Serajevo were unilateral, and that Servia, while ready to take action against



those guilty of a crime which she highly reproved, asked to be acquainted with the proofs so as to be able to verify them rapidly; to seek especially to escape from the direct clutch of Austria by declaring herself ready to submit to the arbitration of Europe.

I have asked in London and St. Petersburg for the views and intentions of the British and Russian Governments. It is shown on the other hand by our information, that Italy only received communication of the Austrian note to-day, and that she had neither been sounded nor warned on the subject.

BIENVENU MARTIN.

No. 27.

*M. Bienvenu Martin, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Stockholm, Belgrade, London, St. Petersburg, Berlin and Rome.*

Paris, July 24, 1914.

The French Ambassador in Vienna informs me that opinion has been surprised by the suddenness and the exaggeration of the Austrian demands, but that the military party appears above all to fear that Servia will yield.

The Servian Minister in Austria thinks that his Government will show itself conciliatory as regards the punishment of those guilty of the crime, and with regard to the guarantees to be given with a view to the suppression of the anti-Austrian propaganda, but that it cannot accept the dictation to the King of an Army Order nor the dismissal of officers suspect to Austria, nor the intervention of foreign officials in Servia. M. Jovanovitch thinks that if it were possible to begin a discussion the dispute might still be settled with the help of the Powers.

Our Ambassador in Berlin gives an account of the feeling aroused by the Austrian note and of the state of mind of the Russian Chargé d'Affaires who thinks that a great portion of German opinion wants war. The tone of the Press is threatening and seems to have as its object the intimidation of Russia. Our Ambassador is to see Herr von Jagow this evening.

M. Barrère reports that Italy is acting in a moderating sense in Vienna and is trying to avoid complications.

BIENVENU MARTIN.

No. 28.

*M. Bienvenu Martin, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Stockholm (for the Prime Minister), and to Belgrade, London, St. Petersburg, Berlin, Vienna and Rome.*

Paris, July 24, 1914.

Baron von Schoen came to me to-day and read me a note from his Government, of which he did not wish to leave me a copy, but which at my request he read twice.



This note is couched almost textually as follows:—

"The statements by Austro-Hungarian newspapers with regard to the circumstances in which occurred the crime against the person of the Hereditary Archduke and his wife clearly reveal what the pan-Servian agitation had in view and the means which it employed to attain it. According to the known facts, there can neither be any doubt that it is at Belgrade that must be sought the active centre of the agitation tending to detach the Southern Slav provinces from Austria, with a view to joining them to the Kingdom of Servia, nor that at any rate its activity has been developed with the connivance of members of the Government and of the Army.

The Servian agitation dates back a number of years. Pan-Servian Chauvinism manifested itself especially during the Bosnian crisis. If at that time the provocations to which Austria-Hungary was subjected on the part of Servia did not arouse a conflict, it is due to the great self-control and moderation of the Austro-Hungarian Government and to the energetic intervention of the Powers. The promise then made by the Servian Government to adopt an irreproachable attitude has not been kept. The pan-Servian propaganda has under the eyes, or at least with the tacit tolerance of official Servia, continued to grow in extent and in intensity.

It is to this that must be attributed the last crime and its thread must be sought for in Belgrade. Unquestionably it would not be reconcilable either with dignity or with the conservative spirit of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, to remain much longer inactive in the presence of the agitation which is proceeding on that side of the frontier, and which constitutes a perpetual menace to the security and integrity of its territories. In view of this state of affairs, the conduct as well as the claims of the Austro-Hungarian Government must be considered as justified. Nevertheless, the attitude recently adopted by public opinion and by the Servian Government, does not preclude the fear that the Servian Government will refuse to accede to these claims and even that it will allow itself to be dragged into adopting a provocative attitude towards Austria-Hungary. If the latter does not wish definitely to renounce its rank as a great power, there is nothing left for the Austro-Hungarian Government to do but to prosecute its claims on the Servian Government by exercising strong pressure, and, if necessary, by taking military measures the nature of which must be left to its discretion."

The German Ambassador especially directed my attention to the last two paragraphs of his note before he read it. He indicated that in them lay the chief point. I took note of the actual text, which is as follows: "The German Government considers that the present question is a matter to be settled exclusively between Austria-Hungary and Servia, and that the Powers have the greatest interest in restricting it to the two interested parties.

"The German Government ardently desires the localisation of the conflict, since by the natural play of alliances any intervention by another Power would have incalculable consequences."

I remarked to the German Ambassador that just as it appeared to be legitimate to call for the punishment of all those concerned in the

Serajevo attempt, so on the other hand it appeared difficult to exact measures which would be unacceptable to the dignity and sovereignty of Serbia, since the Servian Government, even should it wish to submit, would run the risk of being swept away by revolution.

I also pointed out to Baron von Schoen that his note only took into account two hypotheses; that of refusal pure and simple, or that of a provocative attitude on the part of Serbia. There was a third hypothesis (which would leave the door open to an arrangement) which ought in any case to be considered, that of acceptance by Serbia, who would agree to give immediately full satisfaction as to the punishment of the guilty and all guarantees compatible with its sovereignty and dignity for the repression of the anti-Austrian propaganda.

I added, that if the end pursued by Austria were legitimate, there might be room for discussion of the means. If Serbia gave evident proof of goodwill, it would be impossible to understand an Austrian refusal to enter into conversation. Perhaps one ought not to make it too difficult for third party Powers, who neither morally nor sentimentally could disinterest themselves in the fate of Serbia, to adopt an attitude in conformity with the wish expressed by Germany for the localisation of the conflict.

Baron von Schoen recognised the value of these considerations and vaguely declared that hope was still possible. In reply to the question put to him as to whether the Austrian note bore the character of a mere *mise en demeure* for allowing of discussion or of an ultimatum, he replied that he had no personal view on this point.

BIENVENU MARTIN.

#### No. 29.

*M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador in Berlin, to M. Bienvenu Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Berlin, July 24, 1914.*

The presentation of the Austrian Note to Serbia has caused profound emotion. The Austrian Ambassador declares that his Government can abate none of its claims; the same thing is said at the Wilhelmstrasse, and in the Press. The majority of the *Chargés d'affaires* now in Berlin came to see me this morning. They displayed little hope in a pacific issue. The Russian *Chargé d'affaires* remarked with bitterness that Austria had handed in her note at the very moment when the President of the Republic and the Prime Minister had left St. Petersburg. He is inclined to think that a large body of opinion in Germany wants war, and would like to seize this opportunity when Austria will doubtless show herself to be more united than in the past, and when the German Emperor, through a feeling of monarchical solidarity and of horror for the crime, is less likely to show himself conciliatory.

Herr von Jagow is going to receive me at the close of the afternoon.

JULES CAMBON.

## No. 80.

M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador in Berlin, to M. Bienvenu Martin,  
Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Berlin, July 24, 1914.

I to-day asked the Secretary of State in an interview I had with him if it was true, as was stated in the newspapers, that Austria had sent a note to the Powers dealing with her differences with Servia; if he had received it, and what he thought of it.

Herr von Jagow replied affirmatively, adding that the note was energetic, and that he approved it, the Servian Government having long since exhausted Austrian patience. He considers, moreover, that for Austria the question is one of a domestic nature, and he hopes that it will be localised. I then said to him that not having received any instructions, I only wished to have with him an entirely personal exchange of views. I then asked him if the Berlin cabinet had really been in complete ignorance of the Austrian claims before they were communicated to Belgrade, and as he replied that this was so, I expressed my surprise that he should thus undertake to support pretensions, the limit and nature of which he ignored.

"It is only," said Herr von Jagow, interrupting me, "because we are talking personally between ourselves that I allow you to say that to me."

"Certainly," I replied, "but if Peter I. humiliates himself Servia will probably be given over to internal troubles. That will open the door to fresh possibilities, and do you know where Vienna will lead you?" I added that the language of the German Press was not that of a people who were indifferent and foreign to the affair, but told of active support. Finally, I remarked that the shortness of the time given to Servia in which to yield would make a bad impression upon Europe.

Herr von Jagow replied that he expected "*un peu d'émotion*" on the part of Servia's friends, but that he counted upon their giving Servia good advice.

"I do not doubt," I then said, "that Russia will make an effort in Belgrade to bring the cabinet to make what concessions are acceptable, but if you ask something of one, why not ask it of the other? And if it be expected that advice will be given in Belgrade, is it not legitimate to expect that on the other hand advice will also be tendered to Vienna?"

The Secretary of State allowed himself to say that that would depend on circumstances, but, recovering himself immediately, declared that the matter must be localised. He asked me if really I considered the situation serious. "Assuredly," I replied, "for, if what is going on has been pondered over, I do not understand why people have cut their bridges behind them."

Everything shows that Germany is prepared to support in a thoroughly energetic manner the attitude of Austria. The weakness displayed for some years past by the Austro-Hungarian ally has undermined the confidence placed in her here. She was found heavy to move. The foolish trials, such as the Agram and Friedjung affairs, made her police



odious by covering it with ridicule. All that one asked of her was that she should be strong, but it is now thought sufficient that she should be brutal.

An article which appeared in the *Lokal Anzeiger* reveals a state of mind in the German Chancellery, to which we in Paris are naturally not inclined to pay enough attention. I refer to the feeling of monarchical solidarity. I am convinced that this point of view must be largely taken into account, in appreciating the attitude of the Emperor William, whose impressionable nature must have felt the murder of a Prince who had received him a few days earlier.

It is none the less striking to note the care with which Herr von Jagow and all the officials under him are at pains to say to everybody that they know nothing of the nature of the note handed by Austria to Servia.

JULES CAMBON.

No. 31.

*M. Paléologue, French Ambassador in St. Petersburg, to M. Bienvenu Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*St. Petersburg, July 24, 1914.*

The Austro-Hungarian Ambassador has communicated to M. Sazonof a threatening note to Servia. As the President of the Republic and the Prime Minister have been able to ascertain directly, the sentiments of the Emperor of Russia and his Ministers are most pacific, but the ultimatum, which the Austro-Hungarian Government has just handed to the Belgrade Cabinet, brings a new and disturbing element into the situation.

Russian public opinion would not tolerate an Austrian attack upon Servia. The shortness of the time limit in the ultimatum makes the moderating action, which the Powers of the Triple Entente might exert at Vienna, still more difficult.

Further, M. Sazonof presumes that Germany will want to support her ally, and I am afraid that this impression is accurate. Only an affirmation of the solidarity of the Triple Entente can prevent the Germanic Powers from accentuating their provocative attitude.

PALÉOLOGUE.

No. 32.

*M. Paul Cambon, French Ambassador in London, to M. Bienvenu Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*London, July 24, 1914.*

Sir Edward Grey having discussed with me his desire to neglect nothing which may put an end to the crisis, we agreed in thinking that the British Cabinet might ask the German Government to take the initiative in a démarche in Vienna, with a view to offering the mediation between Austria and Servia of the four Powers not directly interested. If Germany is agreeable time will be gained, and that is the essential.



Sir Edward Grey told me that he would discuss the plan I have just explained with Prince Lichnowsky. I have mentioned it to my Russian colleague, who suspects a surprise on the part of Germany and imagines that Austria would not have sent her ultimatum without a previous understanding with Berlin. Count Benckendorff said that Prince Lichnowsky, on his return from leave about a month ago, displayed pessimistic views as to relations between St. Petersburg and Berlin. He had noted the anxiety aroused in the latter capital by news of a naval understanding between Russia and England, by the visit of the Emperor Nicholas to Bukarest, by the strengthening of the Russian Army. Count Beckendorff has concluded from this that war against Russia would be accepted willingly in Germany.

The Under-Secretary of State has been struck, as we have all, by the anxious appearance of Prince Lichnowsky, since his return from Berlin, and he thinks that if Germany had wished she could have prevented the presentation of the ultimatum.

The situation is therefore most grave, and we see no means of staying the progress of events.

Nevertheless Count Beckendorff thinks it well to try the *démarche* upon which I have agreed with Sir Edward Grey.

PAUL CAMBON.

#### No. 33.

*M. Paul Cambon, French Ambassador in London, to M. Bienvenu Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*London, July 24, 1914.*

The Servian Minister received a telegram to-night from M. Pashitch, stating that the Austro-Hungarian Government had sent its ultimatum, which expires to-morrow, Saturday, at six o'clock. M. Pashitch does not give the terms of the Austro-Hungarian communication, but if it is such as *The Times* of to-day reports it would seem impossible for the Servian Government to accept it. I and my Russian colleague, who considers that it will be extremely difficult for his Government not to support Servia, have asked ourselves what intervention can stop the conflict.

Sir Edward Grey having summoned me for this afternoon, I propose to suggest to him that the semi-official intervention of the German Government in Vienna should be asked for so as to prevent a sudden attack.

PAUL CAMBON.

#### No. 34.

*M. Bienvenu Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Stockholm (for the Prime Minister), Belgrade, St. Petersburg, Berlin, Vienna and Rome.*

*Paris, July 24, 1914.*

The Austrian Ambassador having communicated to Sir Edward Grey his Government's Note, the latter pointed out that never had a declara-

tion of so formidable character been addressed by one Government to another. He drew the attention of Count Mensdorff to the responsibility that Austria had assumed.

Sir Edward Grey, in view of the possibility of a conflict between Austria-Hungary and Russia, proposes to ask for the assistance of the German Government with a view to mediation by the four Powers not directly interested in the Servian affair, England, France, Italy, and Germany. This mediation would be made both in Vienna and in St. Petersburg.

I have given counsels of prudence to the Servian Minister, and I am willing to associate myself with any conciliatory action in Vienna, in the hope that Austria will not maintain in their entirety her claims upon a small state, if that state shows itself disposed to give all satisfaction compatible with her independence and sovereignty.

BIENVENU MARTIN.

#### No. 35.

*M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador in Berlin, to M. Bienvenu Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Berlin, July 25, 1914.*

The Belgian Minister is very much concerned. He considers that Austria and Germany have wished to profit from the circumstances by which Russia and Great Britain are threatened with domestic troubles, and by the fact that in France our military system appears to be shaken. Also he does not believe in the ignorance which the Berlin Government affects as to the Austrian démarche.

He thinks that if the form of it was not submitted to the Cabinet in Berlin, its time was perfectly chosen with the Berlin Cabinet with a view to surprising the Triple Entente in a moment of disorganisation.

He has seen the Italian Ambassador, who had interrupted his leave to return. It would appear that Italy is much surprised, to say nothing stronger, at having been kept out of the whole affair by her two allies.

JULES CAMBON.

#### No. 36.

*M. Bienvenu Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Stockholm (Prime Minister), and to London, St. Petersburg, Berlin, Rome and Vienna.*

*Paris, July 25, 1914.*

The German Ambassador came at noon to protest against an article which appeared in the *Echo de Paris*, under the heading "Menace Allemande," and which had reference to the démarche of Baron von Schoen. Baron von Schoen has informed a number of journalists, and called at the Political Direction to say, that there was no "agreement" between Austria and Germany over the Austrian note, of which the German Government was ignorant, although the German Government had subsequently approved it, on receiving communication of it at the

same time as the other Powers. Baron von Schoen added, that there was, moreover, no "menace." The German Government had confined itself to indicating that it considered the localisation of the conflict desirable, and that the intervention of other Powers threatened to aggravate the dispute.

The acting Political Director, in taking note of this step of Baron von Schoen, begged him to repeat the actual terms of the last two paragraphs of his note, and pointed out to him that those terms revealed the wish of Germany to thrust herself between the Powers and Austria. M. Berthelot added that as no confidence had been made to any journalist, the news in the *Echo de Paris* only engaged that newspaper, and only showed that the German démarche appeared to have been known outside the Quai d'Orsay, and that, not by its action—an allusion which the German Ambassador did not take up.

The Austrian Ambassador in London has called upon Sir Edward Grey, and has informed him that the Austrian note does not constitute "an ultimatum," but a "demand for a reply with a time limit," which meant that if the Austrian demands were not accepted by six o'clock this evening, the Austrian Minister would leave Belgrade and the Austro-Hungarian Government would begin acts of military "preparation," but not military "operations." The London Cabinet, like those of Paris and St. Petersburg, has advised Belgrade to express its regret for any guilt which might be proved in the Serajevo attempt, and to promise the utmost satisfaction in this respect. As to the rest, it was added, it is Serbia's concern to reply as may seem best in Servian interests. The British Minister in Belgrade is to consult his French and Russian colleagues, and, if they have been also instructed in this sense, to advise the Servian Government to give satisfaction on every possible point. Sir Edward Grey told Prince Lichnowsky, who up to the present has made no communication similar to that made by Baron von Schoen in Paris, that if the Austrian note did not lead to trouble between Austria and Russia, the British Government would not have to concern itself with it, but it was to be feared that the strict character of the Austrian note and the shortness of the time allowed would result in tension. In these circumstances the only chance of avoiding a struggle would be in the mediation of France, Germany, Italy, and England, Germany alone being able to act in this sense upon the Vienna Government. The German Ambassador replied that he would transmit this suggestion to Berlin, but he led the Russian Ambassador, who is a relative of his, to understand that Germany would join in no proceedings in Vienna.

BIENVENU MARTIN.

No. 37.

*M. de Fleuriau, French Chargé d'Affaires in London, to M. Bienvenu Martin  
Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

London, July 25, 1914.

The German Ambassador called at the Foreign Office to state that his Government would refuse to intervene between Austria and Serbia.



Sir Edward Grey replied that without the help of Germany in Vienna they could not act in St. Petersburg. If, however, Austria and Russia both mobilised it would give an opportunity for intervention by the four other Powers. Would the German Government then maintain its passive attitude and refuse to associate itself with Great Britain, France and Italy? Prince Lichnowsky did not think so, because it would then no longer be a question between Vienna and Belgrade, but of a conflict between Vienna and St. Petersburg. Sir Edward Grey added this remark, that if war did break out no Power in Europe would be able to remain aloof from it.

DE FLEURBAU.

No. 38.

*M. Paléologue, French Ambassador in St. Petersburg, to M. Bienvenu Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*St. Petersburg, July 25, 1914.*

The Russian Government is going to endeavour to obtain from the Austro-Hungarian Government an extension of the time limit of the ultimatum, so as to enable the Powers to form an opinion on the judiciary documents, communication of which is offered to them.

M. Sazonof has begged the German Ambassador to point out the danger of the situation to his Government. He refrained, however, from alluding to the step which Russia will no doubt be led to take if Serbia is threatened in her national independence or territorial integrity. The evasive replies and recriminations of Count de Pourtalés made an unfavourable impression upon M. Sazonof.

A council of Ministers will be held to-morrow under the Presidency of the Emperor. M. Sazonof retains all his moderation. "We must avoid," he said to me, "everything which may precipitate the crisis. I think that even if the Austro-Hungarian Government proceeds to action against Serbia, we ought not to break off negotiations."

PALÉOLOGUE.

No. 39.

*M. Bienvenue Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to M. Dumaine, French Ambassador in Vienna.*

*Paris, July 25, 1914.*

The Russian Government has instructed its representatives in Vienna to ask the Austrian Government for an extension of the time given to Serbia. This would enable the Powers to form an opinion on the record of the case which Austria has offered to communicate to them and to avoid consequences which would be undesirable for all.

An Austrian refusal of this demand would rob of all significance her step in communicating her note to the Powers, and would place her in



contradiction with international morality. The Russian Government has asked that you shall without delay make a similar request to Count Berchtold. I beg you to support the demand of your colleague. The Russian Government has sent the same request to London, Rome, Berlin and Bukharest.

BIENVENU MARTIN.

No. 40.

*M. de Fleuriau, French Chargé d'Affaires in London, to M. Bienvenu Martin,  
Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*London, July 25, 1914.*

Sir Edward Grey this morning received communication of the instructions given to the Russian Ambassador in Vienna, with a view to obtaining an extension of the time limit given to Servia by the Austrian note of the day before yesterday. M. Sazonof asked that the Russian step should be supported by the British Embassy.

Sir Edward Grey has telegraphed to Sir M. de Bunsen, instructing him to express himself in the same sense as his Russian colleague, and to recall the Austrian communication made to him late yesterday evening by Count Mensdorff, according to which Servian failure to adhere to the conditions of the ultimatum would to-day only result in diplomatic rupture and not in immediate military operations.

Sir Edward Grey concluded from this that the Powers would be given time to intervene and seek for means of solving the crisis.

DE FLEURIAU.

No. 41.

*M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador in Berlin, to M. Bienvenu Martin,  
Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Berlin, July 25, 1914.*

This morning the British Chargé d'Affaires, in accordance with the orders of his Government, asked Herr von Jagow if Germany would join Great Britain, France and Italy, in order to intervene in Austria and Russia with a view to preventing a conflict, and first of all in asking Vienna for an extension of the time limit granted to Servia by the ultimatum. The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs replied that on receipt of the telegram from Prince Lichnowsky informing him of Sir Edward Grey's intention, he had telegraphed that very morning to his Ambassador in Vienna instructing him to ask for this extension of the time limit from Count Berchtold. Unfortunately, Count Berchtold is at Ischl. Moreover, Herr von Jagow does not believe that this demand will be accepted.

The British Chargé d'Affaires also inquired of Herr von Jagow, as I did yesterday, whether Germany had not had some knowledge of the Austrian note before it was sent, and received a reply so definitely negative that he could not press the matter; but he could not but express his surprise at the blank cheque given by Germany to Austria.

Herr von Jagow having replied that the matter was a domestic question to Austria, he pointed out that it had become, in the highest degree, international.

JULES CAMBON.

No. 42.

*M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador in Berlin, to M. Bienvenu Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Berlin, July 25, 1914.*

The Russian Chargé d'Affaires has been told to ask the German Government to press the Vienna Cabinet for an extension of the time limit of the ultimatum. Herr von Jagow only having given him an appointment at the end of the afternoon, that is to say, at the moment when the ultimatum will expire, M. Broniewski sent, with all speed, a written note to the Secretary of State, in which he pointed out that the delay of the communication made by Austria to the Powers rendered the effect of the communication illusory, since it did not give the Powers time to become acquainted with the facts alleged before the expiry of the ultimatum. He insisted very urgently on the necessity of extending it, if one had not in view the creation of a great crisis.

JULES CAMBON.

No. 43.

*M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador in Berlin, to M. Bienvenu Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Berlin, July 25, 1914.*

The Russian Chargé d'Affaires has called upon the Secretary of State, and has made the démarche he was instructed to make with a view to an extension of the time limit of the ultimatum. Herr von Jagow replied to him that he had already sent an indication of this sort to Vienna, but that he thought that all these steps were too late.

M. Broniewski insisted, saying that if the time limit could not be prolonged the work of execution could at least be retarded so as to allow the Powers to use their good offices for the avoidance of a conflict. He added that the Austrian note was couched in terms calculated to hurt Serbia and to force her to war.

Herr von Jagow replied that there was no question of war, but of "execution" in a local matter.

The Chargé d'Affaires persisted and expressed regret that the German Government did not measure its responsibilities in the event of hostilities occurring, which might spread to the rest of Europe. To this Herr von Jagow replied that he refused to believe in such consequences.

The Russian Chargé d'Affaires has heard, as I have, a rumour that Austria, while declaring that she desires no territorial annexation will occupy portions of Serbia until she has received full satisfaction. "We know," he said to me, "what the word 'satisfaction' means." M. Broniewski's impressions as to the *arrière pensées* of Germany are very pessimistic.

JULES CAMBON.

## No. 44.

*M. Barrère, French Ambassador in Rome, to M. Bienvenu Martin,  
Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Rome, July 25, 1914.*

The Russian Ambassador has made the *démarche* at the Consulta in accordance with the instructions issued by M. Sazonof to the Russian representatives in Paris, Rome, Berlin and Bukarest, which were to induce these different cabinets to associate their action with that of Russia in Vienna with a view to obtaining an extension of the time limit given to Servia.

In the absence of the Marquis di San Giuliano, M. Salandra and M. de Martino replied that they would get into communication with the Minister for Foreign Affairs, but that his reply could only reach them towards six o'clock, that is to say, too late to take any step in Vienna.

BARRÈRE.

## No. 45.

*M. Dumaine, French Ambassador in Vienna, to M. Bienvenu Martin, Acting  
Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Vienna, July 25, 1914.*

The Russian Chargé d'Affaires received instructions from his Government to ask for a postponement of the ultimatum to Servia just at the time that Count Berchtold was leaving for Ischl with the intention of remaining near the Emperor until the end of the crisis.

Prince Koudacheff has, nevertheless, informed him of the step he had to take by means of two telegrams in plain language, one addressed to Count Berchtold, *en route*, and the other to his destination. He does not expect any effect from them.

Baron Macchio, General Secretary at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, to whom the Prince communicated his telegraphic instructions and the sense of his telegraphic *démarche*, displayed an icy coldness when his interlocutor represented to him that to submit a plaint with justificative documents without giving time for the study of the *dossier* was contrary to international courtesy. Baron Macchio replied that sometimes interest exempted one from being courteous.

The Austrian Government is resolved to inflict humiliation upon Servia: it will not accept intervention of any Power until the blow has been struck and been received full in the face by Servia.

DUMAINE

## No. 46.

*M. Boppe, French Minister in Belgrade, to M. Bienvenu Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Belgrade, July 25, 1914.*

M. Pashitch has just acquainted me with the reply which will be handed to the Austrian Minister this evening.

The Servian Government agrees to publish in the Official Journal to-morrow the declaration required of it. It will also communicate that declaration to the army in an Order of the Day. It will dissolve the societies of national defence and all other associations likely to carry on agitation against Austria-Hungary. It undertakes to make modifications in the Press law, to dismiss from the service of the army, of public instruction, and of other departments, all officials whose participation in the propaganda is proved. It only asks that the names of these officials shall be communicated to it.

As to the participation of Austrian officials in the inquiry, it asks for explanations as to the manner in which that participation shall take place. It could only accept co-operation so far as is compatible with international law and good neighbourly relations.

It agrees to all the other demands of the ultimatum and declares that if the Austro-Hungarian Government is not satisfied it is prepared to accept the decision of the Hague tribunal or that of the Great Powers who took part in drawing up the Declaration of March 13, 1909.

## No. 47.

*M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador in Berlin, to M. Bienvenu Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*July 25, 1914.*

Throughout the whole afternoon it has been rumoured that Servia would bow to the Austrian demands. This evening newspapers publish special editions announcing the rupture at Belgrade and the departure of the Austrian Minister. This rumour has just been confirmed to the correspondent of the *Agence Havas* by the Wilhelmstrasse. Large groups of several hundred persons are stationed in front of the newspaper offices, and a large crowd of young people has just crossed the Pariser Platz shouting "hurrah" for Germany, and singing patriotic songs. They are on their way to the Column of Victory, to the Austrian Embassy, and then on to the Italian Embassy. It is a significant explosion of jingoism. A German personage whom I saw this evening admitted to me that it had been feared here that Servia might accept the Austrian note wholesale, while postponing the discussion of its application, so as to gain time and so as to allow of the Powers' action becoming effective before the rupture.



In financial quarters measures are being taken already for every eventuality; in these quarters no means of stopping the crisis are seen, in view of the firm support which Germany is giving to Austria.

In my opinion, England alone appears likely to be heeded to in Berlin.

Whatever may happen, Paris, St. Petersburg, and London will only succeed in maintaining peace worthily by showing themselves resolutely and completely united.

JULES CAMBON.

No. 48.

*M. Dumaine, French Ambassador in Vienna, to M. Bienvenu Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Vienna, July 25, 1914.*

Your telegram was handed to me precisely at the hour of the expiry of the time allowed Serbia. I have already informed you of the conditions in which the Russian Chargé d'Affaires had to execute his démarche. It seems useless to support it, as there is no longer time.

In the afternoon a rumour was circulated that Serbia had yielded to the ultimatum, while adding that she referred the matter to the Powers. But it is stated, at the last moment, that the Austrian Minister has just hastily left Belgrade. He is said to have deemed insufficient the adhesion of the Servian Government to the conditions laid down by his own Government.

DUMAINE.

No. 49.

*Reply of Servian Government to Austro-Hungarian Note.*

*(Communicated by M. Vesnitch, Servian Minister, July 27.)*

*Belgrade, July 25, 1914.*

The Royal Servian Government have received the communication of the Imperial and Royal Government of the 10th instant,\* and are convinced that their reply will remove any misunderstanding which may threaten to impair the good neighbourly relations between the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and the Kingdom of Servia.

Conscious of the fact that the protests which were made both from the tribune of the national Skuptchina† and in the declarations and actions of the responsible representatives of the State—protests which were cut short by the declarations made by the Servian Government on the 18th\* March, 1909—have not been renewed on any occasion as regards the great neighbouring Monarchy, and that no attempt has been made since that time, either by the successive Royal Governments or by their organs, to change the political and legal state of affairs created in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Royal Government draw attention to the fact that in this connection the Imperial

\* Old Style.

† The Servian Parliament.

and Royal Government have made no representation except one concerning a school book, and that on that occasion the Imperial and Royal Government received an entirely satisfactory explanation. Serbia has several times given proofs of her pacific and moderate policy during the Balkan crisis, and it is thanks to Serbia and to the sacrifice that she has made in the exclusive interest of European peace that that peace has been preserved. The Royal Government cannot be held responsible for manifestations of a private character, such as articles in the press and the peaceable work of societies—manifestations which take place in nearly all countries in the ordinary course of events, and which, as a general rule, escape official control. The Royal Government are all the less responsible, in view of the fact that at the time of the solution of a series of questions which arose between Serbia and Austria-Hungary they gave proof of a great readiness to oblige, and thus succeeded in settling the majority of these questions to the advantage of the two neighbouring countries.

For these reasons the Royal Government have been pained and surprised at the statements, according to which members of the Kingdom of Serbia are supposed to have participated in the preparations for the crime committed at Serajevo; the Royal Government expected to be invited to collaborate in an investigation of all that concerns this crime, and they were ready, in order to prove the entire correctness of their attitude, to take measures against any persons concerning whom representations were made to them. Falling in, therefore, with the desire of the Imperial and Royal Government, they are prepared to hand over for trial any Servian subject, without regard to his situation or rank, of whose complicity in the crime of Serajevo proofs are forthcoming, and more especially they undertake to cause to be published on the first page of the "Journal Officiel," on the date of the 13th (26th) July, the following declaration:—

"The Royal Government of Serbia condemn all propaganda which may be directed against Austria-Hungary, that is to say, all such tendencies as aim at ultimately detaching from the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy territories which form part thereof, and they sincerely deplore the baneful consequences of these criminal movements. The Royal Government regret that, according to the communication from the Imperial and Royal Government, certain Servian officers and officials should have taken part in the above-mentioned propaganda, and thus compromised the good neighbourly relations to which the Royal Servian Government was solemnly engaged by the declaration of the 31st March, 1909 (*new style*), which declaration disapproves and repudiates all idea or attempt at interference with the destiny of the inhabitants of any part whatsoever of Austria-Hungary, and they consider it their duty formally to warn the officers, officials, and entire population of the kingdom that henceforth they will take the most rigorous steps against all such persons as are guilty of such acts, to prevent and to repress which they will use their utmost endeavour."

This declaration will be brought to the knowledge of the Royal Army in an order of the day, in the name of His Majesty the King, by his Royal Highness the Crown Prince Alexander, and will be published in the next official army bulletin.

The Royal Government further undertake:—

1. To introduce at the first regular convocation of the Skuptchina, a provision into the press law providing for the most severe punishment of incitement to hatred or contempt of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and for taking action against any publication the general tendency of which is directed against the territorial integrity of Austria-Hungary. The Government engage at the approaching revision of the Constitution to cause an amendment to be introduced into article 22 of the Constitution of such a nature that such publication may be confiscated, a proceeding at present impossible under the categorical terms of article 22 of the Constitution.

2. The Government possess no proof, nor does the note of the Imperial and Royal Government furnish them with any, that the "Narodna Odbrana," and other similar societies, have committed, up to the present, any criminal act of this nature through the proceedings of any of their members. Nevertheless, the Royal Government will accept the demand of the Imperial and Royal Government, and will dissolve the "Narodna Odbrana" Society and every other society which may be directing its efforts against Austria-Hungary.

3. The Royal Servian Government undertake to remove without delay from their public educational establishments in Servia all that serves or could serve to foment propaganda against Austria-Hungary, whenever the Imperial and Royal Government furnish them with facts and proofs of this propaganda.

4. The Royal Government also agree to remove from military service, all such persons as the judicial inquiry may have proved to be guilty of acts directed against the integrity of the territory of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and they expect the Imperial and Royal Government to communicate to them, at a later date, the names and the acts of these officers and officials, for the purposes of the proceedings which are to be taken against them.

5. The Royal Government must confess that they do not clearly grasp the meaning or the scope of the demand made by the Imperial and Royal Government, that Servia shall undertake to accept the collaboration of the organs of the Imperial and Royal Government upon their territory, but they declare that they will admit such collaboration as agrees with the principle of international law, with criminal procedure, and with good neighbourly relations.

6. It goes without saying that the Royal Government consider it their duty to open an inquiry against all such persons as are, or eventually may be, implicated in the plot of June 15 (*old style*), and who happen to be within the territory of the kingdom. As regards the participation in this inquiry of Austro-Hungarian agents or authorities appointed for this purpose by the Imperial and Royal Government, the Royal Government cannot accept such an arrangement, as it would be a violation of the Constitution and of the law of criminal procedure; nevertheless, in concrete cases, communications as to the results of the investigation in question might be given to the Austro-Hungarian agents.



7. The Royal Government proceeded, on the very evening of the delivery of the note, to arrest Commander Voislav Tankossitch. As regards Milan Ziganovitch, who is a subject of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and who, up to June 15 (*old style*), was employed (on probation) by the directorate of railways, it has not yet been possible to arrest him.

The Austro-Hungarian Government are requested to be so good as to supply as soon as possible, in the customary form, the presumptive evidence of guilt, as well as the eventual proofs of guilt which have been collected up to the present, at the inquiry at Serajevo, for the purposes of the later inquiry.

8. The Servian Government will reinforce and extend the measures which have been taken for preventing the illicit traffic of arms and explosives across the frontier. It goes without saying that they will immediately order an inquiry and will severely punish the frontier officials on the Schabatz-Loznitza line, who have failed in their duty and allowed the authors of the crime of Serajevo to pass.

9. The Royal Government will gladly give explanations of the remarks made by their officials, whether in Servia or abroad, in interviews after the crime which, according to the statement of the Imperial and Royal Government, were hostile towards the monarchy, as soon as the Imperial and Royal Government have communicated to them the passages in question in these remarks, and as soon as they have shown that the remarks were actually made by the said officials, although the Royal Government will itself take steps to collect evidence and proofs.

10. The Royal Government will inform the Imperial and Royal Government of the execution of the measures comprised under the above heads, in so far as this has not already been done by the present note, as soon as each measure has been ordered and carried out.

If the Imperial and Royal Government are not satisfied with this reply, the Servian Government, considering that it is not to the common interest to precipitate the solution of this question, are ready, as always, to accept a pacific understanding, either by referring this question to the decision of the International Tribunal of The Hague, or to the Great Powers which took part in the drawing up of the declaration made by the Servian Government on March 18 (31), 1909.



## CHAPTER IV.

## The Rupture of the Diplomatic Relations (July 25, 1914) and the Declaration of War by Austria to Servia (July 28, 1914).

No. 50.

*M. Bienvenu Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Copenhagen (for the Prime Minister), and to London, Berlin, St. Petersburg, Rome and Vienna.*

*Paris, July 26, 1914.*

The events of Saturday may be summarised as follows:—Refusal of Austria to agree to the extension of the time limit demanded by Russia; departure of the Austrian Minister from Belgrade, after the handing-in of the Servian reply, which was considered insufficient, although it went to the limit of the concessions deemed possible; mobilisation order given in Servia, the Government of which has withdrawn to Kragujevatz, whither it has been followed by the French and Russian Ministers.

Italy, to whom the Austrian note was communicated on Friday without any request for support, or even opinion, has not been able in the absence of the Marquis di San Giuliano, who will not return until Tuesday, to reply to the Russian demand that she should insist in Vienna upon an extension of the time limit. A confidence made by the Italian Ambassador to M. Paléologue shows that at Vienna they still comfort themselves with the illusion that Russia "Will not stand firm." It must not be forgotten that Italy is only bound by the engagements of the Triple Alliance in matters in which she has been previously consulted.

We learn from St. Petersburg that M. Sazonof has advised Servia to ask for British mediation. At the Council of Ministers held on the 25th in the presence of the Emperor, the mobilisation of thirteen army corps was considered, destined if needs be to operate against Austria. This mobilisation would, however, only become effective if Austria constrains Servia by force of arms, and only after notification by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, to whom is left the duty of determining its date. Freedom is also given him to continue the negotiations even in the event of an occupation of Belgrade. Russian opinion shows that it would be impossible, politically and morally, for Russia to allow Servia to be crushed.

In London a German démarche was made on the 25th in the same terms as those used by Baron von Schoen in Paris. Sir Edward Grey replied to Prince Lichnowsky that if war broke out no Power in Europe could remain unconcerned. He did not go into further detail, and his

language to the Servian Minister was very reserved. The communication made on the evening of the 25th by the Austrian Ambassador has made Sir Edward Grey more optimistic. Since the diplomatic rupture is not to bring about immediate military operations the Secretary of State still likes to hope that the Powers will have time to intervene.

In Berlin the tone of the Secretary of State to the Russian Chargé d'Affaires is very unsatisfactory and dilatory. To a request that he should join in asking Vienna for an extension of the time limit, he replied that he had already acted in this sense, but that it was too late. To the request that he should obtain a delay in order to prolong the measures of execution, he replied that it was a domestic matter—not a war, but a local execution. Herr von Jagow pretends not to believe that Austrian action may lead to general consequences.

There is a positive explosion of jingoism in Berlin. The German Emperor is returning directly to Kiel. M. Jules Cambon considers that Germany will reply immediately to the first military steps of Russia, and will probably not await a pretext to attack us. In Vienna the French Ambassador did not have time to associate himself in the step of his Russian colleague with a view to obtaining an extension of the delay given to Servia. He does not regret this, the demand having been categorically refused, and England also not having had time to give instructions to her agent on the matter.

A note has been handed me by the British Embassy. It gives an account of the conference of the British Ambassador in St. Petersburg with M. Sazonof and M. Paléologue. Sir Edward Grey thinks that the four Powers who are not interested in the question should urge upon Russia and Austria that their armies should not cross the frontier, and that time should be given to Great Britain, France, Germany, and Italy to mediate. If Germany agree, the British Government has reason to believe that Italy also would be happy to associate herself in the joint action of Great Britain and France. The adhesion of Germany is essential, for neither Austria, no more than Russia, would tolerate any intervention but that of impartial friends or of allies.

BIENVENU MARTIN.

No. 51.

*M. Barrère, French Ambassador in Rome, to M. Bienvenu Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Rome, July 26, 1914.*

A Vienna telegram just received at the Consulta reports the diplomatic rupture between Austria and Servia, and states that Austria is taking military action. The Marquis di San Giuliano, who is at Fiuggi, will only reach Rome the day after to-morrow.

I had an interesting conversation to-day with the Prime Minister on the situation, the full gravity of which he realises.

From the sum of his remarks I gather the impression that the Italian Government desires, in case of conflict, to hold itself aloof and to remain in an observant attitude.

In this connection, M. Salandra said to me, "We shall make the greatest effort to prevent a breach of peace. Our position is somewhat similar to that of England, perhaps we might do something in a pacific direction with the English."

M. Salandra confirmed to me that the Austrian note had been communicated to Rome at the last moment.

BARRÈRE.

No. 52.

*M. Barrère, French Ambassador in Rome, to M. Bienvenu Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

Rome, July 26, 1914.

M. Sazonof told the Italian Ambassador in St. Petersburg yesterday that Russia would employ all diplomatic means to avoid a struggle, and that she had not given up hope that mediation might bring Austria to adopt a less obstinate attitude; nevertheless he could not be asked to allow Serbia to be crushed.

I note that the bulk of Italian public opinion is hostile to Austria in this grave matter.

BARRÈRE.

No. 53.

*M. Bienvenu Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to M. de Fleuriau, Chargé d'Affaires in London.*

Paris, July 26, 1914.

M. Paléologue sends me the following telegram: "M. Sazonof is advising the Servian Government to solicit the mediation of the British Government," In agreement with M. Paul Cambon, I think that the French Government can only express the hope that the British Government would accept if an offer of this nature is made to it.

Please express yourself in this sense at the Foreign Office.

BIENVENU MARTIN.

No. 54.

*M. Paléologue, French Ambassador in St. Petersburg, to M. Bienvenu Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

St. Petersburg, July 26, 1914.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs continues with praiseworthy perseverance to seek means to bring about a peaceful solution. "I shall show myself ready to negotiate up to the last instant," he said to me.

It is in this spirit that he has asked Count Szápáry to come and see him for a "frank and loyal explanation." In his presence M. Sazonof

discussed the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum, article by article, showing clearly the insulting character of the different clauses. "The intention which inspired this document," he said, "is legitimate if you pursue no other aim but the protection of your territory against the agitation of Servian Anarchists, but the step to which you have had recourse is not defensible." He concluded, "Take back your ultimatum, modify its form, and I will guarantee the result."

The Austrian Ambassador appeared to be touched by his language, but pending instructions he reserved the opinion of his Government. M. Sazonof, without being discouraged, has decided to suggest this evening to Count Berchtold the opening of direct conversation between Vienna and St. Petersburg with regard to the changes to be made in the ultimatum. This friendly and semi-official interposition of Russia between Austria and Servia has the advantage of being expeditious. I therefore think it preferable to any other procedure, and I think it is likely to succeed.

PALÉOLOGUE.

No. 55.

*M. Dumaine, French Ambassador in Vienna, to M. Bienvenu Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Vienna, July 26, 1914.*

Count Schébéko has returned in all haste from a visit to Russia. He only undertook this journey after an assurance had been given by Count Berchtold that the claims against Servia would be thoroughly acceptable.

The Austrian Ambassador in St. Petersburg had spoken to M. Sazonof in the same sense on the eve of the presentation of the note. This very usual proceeding in the diplomacy of the Monarchy which was also employed by Baron Macchio with me appears greatly to have added to the irritation of the Russian Government.

Count Schébéko is, nevertheless, about to profit by the inevitable delay of mobilisation in order to make a proposal for an arrangement which will at least have the advantage of taking the measure of the sincerity of Germany's pacific declarations.

While we were discussing the matter this evening, together with Sir M. de Bunsen, the latter received instructions from his Foreign Office as to the steps to be taken by the representatives of the four less directly interested Powers. I expect, therefore, that to-morrow we shall have to come to an agreement with the Duke of Avarna and Herr von Tschirsky, who almost certainly will entrench himself behind the principle of the localisation of the conflict in order to refuse his co-operation. It is my impression, moreover, that the Austrian Government, although surprised by, and perhaps regretting the energy with which it has been inspired, will be unable to refrain from the beginnings of military action.

DUMAINE.



## No. 56.

*M. Bienvenu Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Copenhagen (for the Prime Minister), and to London, Berlin, St. Petersburg, Vienna, and Rome.*

*Paris, July 26, 1914.*

The summary of the Servian reply to the Austrian note only reached us with a delay of 20 hours. Although the Servian Government has yielded on all points, with the exception of two small reservations, the Austrian Minister has broken off relations, thus proving that his Government is firmly decided to proceed to the execution of Servia.

According to a telegram from M. Jules Cambon, the British Ambassador has the impression that there is a slight yielding. He pointed out to Herr von Jagow that Sir Edward Grey did not ask him to intervene between Austria and Servia, but that, this question being no longer localised, he asked him to intervene with Great Britain, France, and Italy, in Vienna and St. Petersburg. The Secretary of State thereupon declared that he would do his best to maintain peace. In the course of an interview between M. Barrère and the Secretary-General of the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the latter indicated that the Italian Government would in all probability not have given its approval to the Austrian note; but as that note was not communicated to it beforehand, the Italian Government was therefore relieved of all responsibility for the grave initiative taken by Austria.

The German Ambassador called this afternoon to make a communication with a view to obtaining the intervention of France in Russia in a pacific sense. Austria, he said to me, has informed Russia that she was seeking neither territorial aggrandisement nor to damage the integrity of the Kingdom of Servia. Her only intention was to ensure her own tranquillity and to exercise police functions. It was upon Russia's decision that the avoidance of war depended. Germany was on the side of France in the ardent desire for the maintenance of peace, and she earnestly hoped that France would use her influence in a soothing manner in St. Petersburg.

I replied to this suggestion that Russia was moderate, that she had committed no act throwing doubt upon her moderation, and that we were in agreement with her in seeking for a peaceful solution of the struggle. It therefore appeared to me that in counterpart Germany should act in Vienna, where the efficacy of her action was sure, with a view to avoiding military operations tending to the occupation of Servia.

The Ambassador having pointed out to me that that was irreconcilable with the position adopted by Germany, "that the question only concerned Austria and Servia," I said to him that mediation in Vienna and St. Petersburg might be made by the four Powers who were less directly interested in the matter.

Baron von Schoen then sheltered himself behind his lack of instruction on this point, and I told him that in these circumstances I did not feel able to act in St. Petersburg alone.

Our conversation concluded with the renewed assurance by the Ambassador as to the peaceful intentions of Germany, who, he declared, was with France on this point.

BIEUVENU MARTIN.

*Note for the Minister.**Paris, Sunday Evening, July 26, 1914.*

After the visit Baron von Schoen paid to the Minister at five o'clock this afternoon, he called upon the Political Direction at seven o'clock this evening, in order to ask that a short communiqué might be given to the Press dealing with the interview between the German Ambassador and the Minister of Foreign Affairs, with a view to avoiding tendentious comment in the newspapers such as that published by the *Echo de Paris* on the previous day.

Baron von Schoen, defining his idea, suggested the following terms, which were noted by the Acting Political Director under his dictation:—"The German Ambassador and the Minister of Foreign Affairs had a further interview in the course of the afternoon; during which they examined, in the most friendly spirit and with a feeling of pacific solidarity, the means which might be employed for the maintenance of general peace."

The Acting Political Director at once replied, "Then, in your mind, everything is settled, and you give us the assurance that Austria accepts the Servian note, or will be willing to converse with the Powers with regard to it?"

The Ambassador appeared to be taken aback, and made a vigorous denial. It was therefore pointed out to him that if nothing had changed in the negative attitude of Germany, the terms of the suggested "note to the Press" were excessive, and likely to give French opinion a false feeling of security by creating illusions as to the actual situation, the dangers of which were but too evident.

To the lavish assurances of the German Ambassador as to his optimistic impression, the Acting Political Director asked him whether he would allow him to speak to him in a purely personal and private manner as man to man with complete freedom and without regard to their respective positions. Baron von Schoen begged him to do so.

M. Berthelot then said that to any ordinary mind Germany's attitude could not be explained unless it was leading up to war. A purely objective analysis of the facts and psychology of Austro-German relations logically led one to this conclusion. In view of the repeated statement that Germany was unaware of the contents of the Austrian note it was no longer possible to express doubts on this point. Was it, however, probable that Germany would have taken her place with closed eyes by the side of Austria in such an adventure? Did the psychology of the past relations between Vienna and Berlin allow one to admit that Austria should have taken up a position from which she could not possibly draw back without having first weighed with her Ally all the consequences of her obduracy? He pointed out how surprising was the refusal of Germany to advise mediation in Vienna, now that Germany was acquainted with the extraordinary text of the Austrian note. What would be the responsibility of the German Government? What would be the nature of the suspicions which would weigh upon her, if she persisted in thrusting herself

between Austria and the Powers after the almost complete submission of Serbia, and when the slightest word of advice given by her to Vienna would dispel the nightmare which weighed upon Europe?

The rupture of diplomatic relations by Austria, her threats of war, and the mobilisation she was carrying out, made specially urgent the pacifying action of Germany, for on the day when Austrian troops had crossed the Servian frontier a state of affairs would be created which would, without doubt, force the St. Petersburg Cabinet to intervene, which would threaten to let loose the war which Germany declared she was anxious to avoid.

Baron von Schoen, who listened smilingly, again replied that Germany had been unaware of the text of the Austrian note,\* and had only given it its approval after it had been presented. She still considered that Serbia required a lesson severe enough to ensure that she should not forget it, and that Austria owed it to herself to put an end to a situation which was dangerous and intolerable for a Great Power. He declared, moreover, that he did not know the text of the Servian reply, and showed himself personally surprised that it should not have satisfied Austria, if it was such as the newspapers, who were frequently badly informed, represented it to be.

He again insisted on the pacific intentions of Germany, and gave his view as to the effect which good advice, tendered in a friendly tone, for instance, by England in Vienna, would produce. According to him Austria was not obstinate; what she rejected was the idea of formal mediation—the “spectre” of a conference. A peaceful word from St. Petersburg, good words uttered in a conciliatory tone by the Powers of the Triple Entente, would be likely to be well received. He finally added that he did not say that Germany on her side would not give some advice to Vienna.

The Political Director declared that in these circumstances he would consult the Minister as to the advisability of communicating a short note to the Press, couched in a moderate tone.

#### No. 58.

*M. Chevalley, French Minister in Christiania, to M. Bienvenu Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Christiania, July 26, 1914*

The whole German Fleet in Norway has been ordered to put to sea. German authorities at Bergen declare that it is to return directly to Germany.

\* See Document No. 21, letter from the French Minister at Munich, stating that the Bavarian Prime Minister said on July 23 that he was aware of the contents of the Austrian note to Serbia.

See also the British Blue Book, Document No. 95, statement by Sir M. de Bunsen, stating that, “Although I am not able to verify it, I have private information that the German Ambassador (in Vienna) knew the text of the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia before it was dispatched, and telegraphed it to the German Emperor. I know from the German Ambassador himself that he endorses every line of it.”



German ships scattered in the fiords to the north of Bergen will, it is said, join those around Stavanger.

CHEVALLEY.

No. 59.

*M. d'Annville, Chargé d'Affaires in Luxemburg, to M. Bienvenu Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Luxemburg, July 26, 1914.*

According to news I have just received from Thionville the four last classes released from the colours have been ordered to hold themselves at the disposal of the Kommandatur at any moment. Without being completely mobilised reservists are forbidden to leave their places of domicile.

D'ANNOVILLE.

No. 60.

*M. Farges, French Consul-General at Bâle, to M. Bienvenu Martin, Acting Minister, Foreign Affairs.*

*Bâle, July 27, 1914.*

The German officers on leave in this region received orders to interrupt their leave four days ago and to return to Germany. Further, I learn from two reliable sources that warning has been given to motor-car owners in the Grand Duchy of Baden to be ready to place their cars at the disposal of the military authorities two days after the receipt of a further order. They have been told to observe secrecy with regard to this order under penalty of a fine. Finally, Austria, a few weeks ago, placed an order for aeroplanes with the Aviatik works. The people of Bâle are very anxious and banking facilities are tightening up.

FARGES.

No. 61.

*M. Bienvenu Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador in Berlin (sent to Copenhagen for the Prime Minister), and to London, St. Petersburg, Vienna, and Rome.*

*Paris, July 27, 1914.*

The three steps taken by the German Ambassador in Paris seem to be characteristic. On Friday he reads a note in which the German Government places itself categorically between Austria and the Powers, approving the Austrian ultimatum to Servia, and adding that "Germany ardently desires that the conflict shall be localised, any intervention by another Power by reason of the play of alliances being certain to



produce incalculable consequences." On the second day, Saturday, the effect having been produced and the Powers having, in view of the surprise, of the briefness of the delay, and of the risk of general war, advised Serbia to yield, Baron von Schoen returns to attenuate the character of his démarche. Pretending to be astonished by the impression made, he protests that Germany is being credited with intentions which are not hers since there had neither been agreement before nor threat afterwards. On the third day, the Sunday, the result having been achieved, since Serbia has in fact yielded, it may be said, to all the claims of Austria, the German Ambassador appears again twice. He insists upon the pacific intentions of Germany and upon her ardent desire to collaborate in the maintenance of peace after having recorded the Austrian success which closes the first phase of the crisis.

The situation at the present moment remains alarming in view of the incomprehensible refusal of Austria to accept Serbia's submission, of her mobilisation operations, and of her threat to invade Serbia. The attitude adopted at the outset by the Austrian Government with German support to accept no conversation among the Powers, does not in practice enable the latter to intervene usefully with the Austrian Government without the intermediary of Germany. In the meanwhile, time presses, for if the Austrian Army crosses the frontier it will be difficult to stop the crisis, Russia apparently not being able to tolerate any occupation of Serbia in view of the fact that the latter has in reality bowed to the Austrian note in giving all satisfaction and every guarantee. Germany, by reason of the position adopted by her, is qualified to intervene effectively and to be heeded in Vienna. If she does not do so she will justify all suspicions and will assume responsibility for the war. The Powers, and in particular, Russia, France and England, have by their urgent advice determined Belgrade to yield; they have therefore done their part. It is now the turn of Germany, who is alone able to make herself quickly heard in Vienna, to give advice to Austria, who has obtained satisfaction and cannot for a detail which it will be easy to settle let loose a general war.

The proposal made by London presents itself in these conditions: M. Sazonof having told the British Ambassador that, in consequence of Serbia's appeal to the Powers, Russia would agree to hold aloof, Sir Edward Grey has made the following suggestion to the Cabinets of Paris, Berlin and Rome. The French, German and Italian Ambassadors in London would be ordered to seek with Sir Edward Grey a means of settling the present trouble, it being understood that so long as these conversations lasted, Russia, Austria and Serbia should refrain from any active military operations. Sir A. Nicolson has mentioned this suggestion to the German Ambassador, who viewed it with favour; it will also be well received in Paris and in all probability in Rome as well. Here, again, it is for Germany to speak. She has an opportunity of showing her goodwill otherwise than in words.

I beg you to support the step of your British colleague with the German Government, after having consulted with him as to the extent and the manner which it may seem fit to you to do.

BIENVENU MARTIN.

## No. 62.

*M. Bienvenu Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Copenhagen (for the Prime Minister), Berlin, St. Petersburg, London and Vienna.*

*Paris, July 27, 1914.*

The German Ambassador after his *démarche* yesterday with a view to the soothing intervention of France in St. Petersburg returned, as I have informed you, to the Political Direction, on the pretext that it might be well to communicate a short note to the Press showing the pacific and friendly nature of the conversation. He even suggested the following terms: "The Ambassador and the Minister have had a further interview, in the course of which the means which might be employed for the maintenance of general peace were examined in a very friendly spirit and with a feeling of pacific solidarity." It was at once replied to him that the terms appeared to be excessive and calculated to create illusions in public opinion as to the actual situation, but that, nevertheless, a brief note of the nature indicated, that is to say, a note reporting a conversation in which were discussed the means adopted for the safeguard of peace, might be issued if the Minister approved of it. The following is the communication made: "The German Ambassador and the Minister of Foreign Affairs have had a further interview, in the course of which they sought for a means of action of the Powers for the maintenance of peace." This purposely colourless phrasing avoided a solidarity with Germany which might be wrongly interpreted.

This morning Baron von Schoen wrote a private letter to the Political Director on the pretext of summarising his conversation with the Minister, and he added: "Make good note of the phrase as to the solidarity of pacific sentiments. It is not a banal phrase but the sincere expression of the truth." The summary attached to the letter was as follows: "The Cabinet of Vienna has formally and officially informed the St. Petersburg Cabinet that it does not seek to acquire territory in Servia, and that it in no way wishes to touch the integrity of the Kingdom. Her only intention is to insure her tranquillity. In this moment, the decision as to whether a European war is to break out, depends entirely upon Russia. The German Government is firmly confident that the French Government, with which it knows itself to be united in the urgent desire that European peace may be maintained, will exert all its influence in a soothing manner on the St. Petersburg Cabinet." I have informed you of the reply which was returned. The French step in St. Petersburg would have been difficult to explain and ought to have as corollary a German *démarche* in Vienna, or, failing that, a mediation in the two capitals by the four Powers who are not so much concerned.

Baron von Schoen's letter may be interpreted in various ways. The most probable is that, like his action itself, it aims at compromising France with regard to Russia, leaving Germany free in case of a check to throw upon Russia and upon France the responsibility for any war, and finally it aims at masking behind unheeded pacific assurances the

military action of Austria in Serbia, taken with a view to assuring a complete Austrian success.

I communicate this to you for your information and so that you may make what use you like of it.

BIENVENU MARTIN

No. 63.

*M. de Fleuriau, French Chargé d'Affaires in London, to M. Bienvenu Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*London, July 27, 1914.*

The German and Austro-Hungarian Ambassadors give it to be understood that they are certain that England will observe neutrality if a conflict break out. Sir Arthur Nicolson told me that Prince Lichnowsky, however, after the conversation he had with him to-day, could not preserve any doubt as to the liberty of intervention which the British Government intends to keep, should it deem intervention necessary.

The German Ambassador cannot have failed to be struck by this declaration, but, so as to bring pressure upon Germany, and so as to avoid a conflict, it appears indispensable that Germany should be led to hold it for certain that she would find England and Russia by the side of France.

FLEURIAU.

No. 64.

*M. Paléologue, French Ambassador in St. Petersburg, to M. Bienvenu Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*St. Petersburg, July 27, 1914.*

M. Sazonof has used conciliatory language to all my colleagues. In spite of public feeling the Russian Government is endeavouring with success to restrain the Press. Great moderation in particular has been recommended towards Germany. Since yesterday M. Sazonof has received no news from Vienna or Berlin.

PALÉOLOGUE.

No. 65.

*M. Bompard, French Ambassador in Constantinople, to M. Bienvenu Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Therapia, July 27, 1914.*

The Austro-Servian conflict is engaging the attention of the Ottoman Government, and the Turks are delighted with the trials of Serbia; but there is a general feeling that the struggle will remain localised. It is generally thought that again Russia will not intervene on behalf of Serbia in conditions which would spread the armed struggle.



The unanimous feeling in Ottoman political quarters is that Austria, with the support of Germany, will attain her end, and will force Serbia, after Bulgaria, to come within the orbit of the Triple Alliance.

BOMPAED.

No. 66.

*M. de Fleuriau, French Chargé d'Affaires in London, to M. Bienvenu Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

London, July 27, 1914.

Sir Edward Grey this morning told the German Ambassador that if Austria invaded Serbia after the Servian reply, she would prove that she was not merely seeking a settlement of the questions mentioned in her note of July 23, but that she wished to crush a small state. "Then," he added, "a European question would be raised, and a war would ensue, in which all the Powers would take part." The attitude of Great Britain is defined by the stoppage of the demobilisation of her fleet. The First Lord of the Admiralty, on Friday, already discreetly took this step on his own initiative. To-night Sir Edward Grey and his colleagues decided to publish this news. This result is due to the conciliatory attitude of Serbia and Russia.

DE FLEURIAU.

No. 67.

*M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador in Berlin, to M. Bienvenu Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

Berlin, July 27, 1914.

To-day I asked the Secretary of State how he regarded the British step taken with a view to Germany joining the Cabinets of London, Paris and Rome in the prevention of hostilities between St. Petersburg and Vienna.

I pointed out that we had Sir Edward Grey's proposal, which opened the way to a peaceful issue. Herr von Jagow repeated again that he was willing to adhere to it, but he pointed out that if Russia mobilised Germany would be obliged to mobilise as well, that we also would be forced to do so, and that the struggle would be almost inevitable. I asked him if Germany would believe herself bound to mobilise in the event of Russia mobilising only on her Austrian frontier. He replied no, and formally authorised me to acquaint you with this restriction. He would also attach the greatest importance to intervention in Russia by the Powers allied or friendly with that State.

Finally, he remarked that if Russia attacked Austria, Germany would have to attack at once on her side. The proposed British intervention in St. Petersburg and Vienna could, therefore, in his view only become effective if events were not precipitated. He is not without hope



that in this case it might be successful. I expressed regret that Austria by her obstinacy had led Europe to the difficult straits through which we are now passing, but I voiced the hope that intervention would attain its end.

JULES CAMBON.

No. 68.

*M. de Fleuriau, French Chargé d'Affaires in London, to M. Bienvenu Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

London, July 27, 1914

Yesterday, in the course of a conversation between M. Sazonof, M. Paléologue and Sir George Buchanan, the Russian Minister said that Serbia was ready to appeal to the Powers, and that in this event his Government would agree to remain aloof. Sir Edward Grey, on the basis of these words, has formulated a proposal to the Cabinets of Paris, Berlin and Rome, which Sir Francis Bertie will lay before your Excellency. The four Powers would intervene in the conflict, and the Ambassadors of France, Germany and Italy in London would be instructed to seek, with Sir Edward Grey, a means of settling the present difficulties. It would be understood, that during the proceedings of this small conference, Russia, Austria and Serbia would abstain from all active military operations. Sir A. Nicolson has spoken of this suggestion to the German Ambassador, who viewed it with favour.

DE FLEURIAU.

No. 69.

*M. de Fleuriau, French Chargé d'Affaires in London, to M. Bienvenu Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

London, July 27, 1914.

The Servian Minister has not received instructions from his Government to ask for the mediation of England, but it is possible that the telegrams of his Government are being stopped on the way. The British proposal for four-Power intervention indicated in my preceding telegram has now been launched, and it appears to me that it, first of all, must be supported.

DE FLEURIAU.

No. 70.

*M. Bienvenu Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to M. de Fleuriau, French Chargé d'Affaires in London.*

Paris, July 27, 1914.

The British Ambassador has communicated to me Sir Edward Grey's proposal for common action by England, Germany, France and Italy in Vienna, Belgrade and St. Petersburg with a view to stopping active military operations while the German, Italian and French Ambassadors

discuss with Sir Edward Grey the means of finding a solution of the existing complications.

This morning I instructed M. Jules Cambon to consult with the British Ambassador in Berlin and to support his step as he may think fit. I authorise you to take part in the meeting suggested by Sir Edward Grey. I am also ready to give our agents in Vienna, St. Petersburg and Berlin instructions of the nature asked for by the British Government.

Nevertheless, I consider that the chances for the success of Sir Edward Grey's proposal are essentially based upon the action Berlin may be willing to exert in Vienna. Any step on this side to bring about the suspension of military operations appears to me bound to meet with failure if German influence has not previously been exerted.

I have also noted among the remarks of Baron von Schoen that the Austro-Hungarian Government showed itself to be peculiarly susceptible when the words "mediation," "intervention," "conference," were used, and that it was more likely to admit "friendly counsels" and "conversations."

BIENVENU MARTIN.

No. 71.

*M. de Fleuriau, French Chargé d'Affaires in London, to M. Bienvenu Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*London, July 27, 1914.*

I have informed Sir Edward Grey of your adhesion to his proposal for a four-Power mediation and a conference in London. The British Ambassador in Vienna has received the necessary instructions to broach the matter to the Austro-Hungarian Government as soon as his French, German, and Italian colleagues have been authorised to take the same step.

The Italian Government has accepted four-Power intervention with a view to preventing military operations. It is consulting the German Government as to the proposal for a conference and as to procedure to be followed with regard to the Austro-Hungarian Government. The German Government has not yet replied.

DE FLEURIAU.

No. 72.

*M. Barrère, French Ambassador in Rome, to M. Bienvenu Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Rome, July 27, 1914.*

The Marquis di San Giuliano returned to Rome this evening, and I saw him immediately after his arrival. He spoke to me of the contents of the Austrian note, and assured me that he had had no previous knowledge of them whatever.

He was well aware that the note was to be vigorous and energetic in character, but he had no idea that it could take such a form. I asked him if it was true, as is stated in certain newspapers, that in this connexion he had expressed in Vienna approval of Austrian action, and had given the assurance that Italy would fulfil her duties as an Ally towards Austria. He replied, "In no way have we been consulted, we have been told nothing whatever. We have therefore had no reason to make any communication of this nature in Vienna."

The Marquis di San Giuliano is of opinion that Serbia would have acted more wisely in accepting the note in its entirety. He still considers to-day that this is the only thing to be done, and he is convinced that Austria will withdraw none of her pretensions and will uphold them even at the risk of bringing about a general conflagration. He doubts whether Germany is willing to take part in any representations to her Ally. He notes, however, that at this moment Germany takes great account of her relations with London, and he believes that if there is one Power which can persuade Berlin to take pacific action, it is England. As to Italy she will continue to exert all her efforts in favour of peace. It is for this object that she has adhered without hesitation to Sir Edward Grey's proposal to unite in London the Ambassadors of the Powers which are not directly interested in the Austro-Servian conflict.

BARRÈRE.

No. 73.

*M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador in Berlin, to M. Bienvenu Martin,  
Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Berlin, July 27, 1914.*

The British Ambassador, who returned to-day, has seen the Secretary of State and has mentioned to him Sir Edward Grey's suggestion. Herr von Jagow replied by again manifesting his desire for peace, but he added that he could not agree to what would resemble a conference of the Powers. It would establish a sort of court of arbitration, the idea of which could only be acceptable if it were asked for by Vienna and St. Petersburg. Herr von Jagow's words confirm those of Baron von Schoen to your Excellency; in fact, the step of the four Powers in Vienna and St. Petersburg could be taken by diplomatic means without assuming the aspect of a conference, and is capable of being given many forms. What is important is that the common desire of the four Powers, that a conflict should be avoided, should be manifested in Vienna and St. Petersburg. Temporisation alone can find a peaceful issue out of the present difficulties.

JULES CAMBON.

No. 74.

*M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador in Berlin, to M. Bienvenu Martin,  
Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Berlin, July 27, 1914.*

I saw the Secretary of State to-day, and supported the step which had been made by Sir Edward Goschen. Herr von Jagow replied to me,



as he did to the British Ambassador, that he could not accept a proposal to charge the Italian, French and German Ambassadors with the task of seeking, with Sir Edward Grey, a means of solving the present difficulties, for that would be to establish a regular conference to deal with the affairs of Austria and Russia. I replied to Herr von Jagow that I regretted his response, but that the great object which Sir Edward Grey had in view was above a question of form, and what was important was the association of England and France with Germany and Italy in labouring for peace; that this association could show itself in common action in St. Petersburg and Vienna; that he had frequently expressed to me his regret at seeing the two groups of alliances always opposed to each other in Europe, and that here he had an opportunity of proving that there was a European spirit, by showing four Powers belonging to the two groups acting in common agreement to prevent a struggle. Herr von Jagow evaded the matter by saying that Germany had her engagements with Austria. I pointed out that the relations of Germany with Vienna were no more close than those of France with Russia, and that it was he himself who raised the question of the two opposed groups of alliances.

The Secretary of State then said that he did not refuse to act with a view to avoiding an Austro-Russian conflict, but that he could not intervene in the Austro-Servian conflict. "One is the consequence of the other," I said, "and it would be well to prevent the creation of any new state of affairs calculated to bring about the intervention of Russia."

As the Secretary of State persisted in saying that he was obliged to observe his engagements with regard to Austria, I asked him if he had pledged himself to follow Austria everywhere blindfold, and if he had made himself acquainted with the Servian reply to Austria, which had been handed to him that morning by the Servian Chargé d'affaires. "I have not yet had the time," he said. "I regret it," I replied. "You will see that except on points of detail Serbia has yielded completely. It would seem, however, that since Austria has obtained the satisfaction which your support procured her, you might to-day advise her to be content, or to examine with Serbia the terms of the Servian reply."

As Herr von Jagow did not answer me clearly, I asked him if Germany wanted war. He protested energetically, saying that he knew that that was my idea but that it was completely incorrect. "You must then," I replied, "act in consequence. When you read the Servian reply, weigh the terms with your conscience, I beg you in the name of humanity, and do not personally assume a portion of the responsibility for the catastrophe whose preparation you are allowing." Herr von Jagow protested again, adding that he was ready to join England and France in any common effort, but that some form must be found for this intervention which he could accept and that the Cabinets should agree among themselves upon the matter. "Moreover," he added, "direct conversations between Vienna and St. Petersburg are begun and are proceeding. I expect much good of them, and I have hope." When leaving him I told him that this morning I had the impression that the hour of *détente* had struck, but that I saw clearly that that was not the case. He replied that I was mistaken, and that he hoped that things were on the



right road and would be settled, perhaps rapidly. I asked him to take steps in Vienna so that they should move quickly, because it was necessary not to allow the formation in Russia of one of those currents of opinion which carries everything before it.

In my opinion Sir Edward Grey, who must have been advised by Sir Edward Goschen of the refusal opposed to his suggestion in the form given to it, should renew it in another form, so that Germany should not have the pretext of refusing to associate herself with it, and shall take her responsibility in the eyes of England.

JULES CAMBON.

No. 75.

*M. Bienvenu Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Berlin, London, St. Petersburg, Vienna and Rome.*

*Paris, July 27, 1914.*

The Austrian Ambassador has called upon me and has handed me a memorandum which is a positive act of accusation against Serbia. He stated on instructions from his Government, that as Serbia had not replied in a satisfactory manner to the demands of the Imperial Government, the latter found itself forced to employ energetic means to induce Serbia to furnish the satisfaction and guarantees demanded of her. It is to-morrow that the Austrian Government will take steps having this object in view.

I begged the Ambassador to acquaint me with the steps contemplated by Austria, and Count Szécsen replied to me that they might be either an ultimatum, the declaration of war, or the crossing of the frontier, but that he had no precise information on this point.

I then pointed out to the Ambassador that Serbia had accepted nearly every point of Austria's demands, that the differences which existed on some points might be removed with a little reciprocal goodwill and with the help of the Powers friendly to peace. In fixing for to-morrow the carrying out of her resolutions Austria for the second time rendered the assistance of the Powers almost impossible, and assumed a heavy responsibility in running the risk of bringing about a war, the extension of which could not be measured. I send you for your information the memorandum handed to me by Count Szécsen.

#### ANNEXE.

The Servian agitation, which aims at compassing the separation from the Austrian Monarchy of the Slav regions in the south, in order to incorporate them in a great Serb state, extends a long way back. This propaganda on Servian soil, which has always had the same end in view, although it has varied both in regard to means employed and to intensity, had attained its highest pitch during the annexation crisis. Throwing off the protecting cloak of secrecy, it then exhibited itself in all the openness of its tendencies, and, under the patronage of the Servian Government, made manifest its intention to achieve its aims by every means at its disposal.

While the whole of the Servian Press was calling to arms against the Monarchy with venomous outbursts and by distorting facts, associations for the promotion of this conflict were being created quite apart from other means of propaganda.

The society which has become the most important is the "Narodna Odbrana." Sprung from a revolutionary committee which existed at that time, it was founded by Servian military and civil officials as a private society, but in the shape of an organisation depending from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in Belgrade. Among these founders must be cited in particular:—General Buzo Jankovic, the former Ministers, Ljuba Jovanovic, Ljuba Davidovic, and Valislav Valovic, the director of the national printing office, Zivojin Dacic, and the former captains, now majors, Voja Tankovic and Milan Pribicevic. This society had for its aims the creation and organisation of armed bands, with a view to the war against the Monarchy for which they were hoping. A striking description of the activity of the "Narodna Odbrana" at that time will be found in particular in the declarations of the Bosnian-Herzegovinian subject, Trifko Krstanovic, who appeared as a witness before the court-martial at Sarajevo, who was then in Belgrade, and who, together with other subjects of the Monarchy, was accepted as a komitadji by the "Narodna Odbrana." With about 140 others, Krstanovic had been taken to a school which had been founded with a view to the formation of fresh bands at Cuprija, a district in Jagodina, and conducted by the captains Voja Tankosic and Dusan Putnick. The only masters attached to this school were Servian officers; General Buzo Jankovic and Captain Milan Pribicevic had instituted a regular course of lectures in the training of bands, which lasted for three months.

The komitadjis received there complete instructions in shooting and bomb-throwing, in mining, and in the destruction of railways, tunnels, bridges, and telegraphs. According to their chiefs, their duty was to put into practice the knowledge which they had recently acquired in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The result of this activity on the part of the "Narodna Odbrana," which was exercised in the most public manner, and was promoted by the Servian Government, was that guerilla bands against the Monarchy were spread the country. By this agency the subjects of the Monarchy were induced to commit acts of treason against their country, and were systematically taught to practice, as Serb emissaries, secret attacks against the national defences.

This period of aggressive aspirations came to an end with the declaration by the Servian Government on March 31, 1909, in which the Government declared itself ready to acquiesce in the new situation in International Law created by the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and solemnly pledged its willingness to live in future on friendly and good-neighbourly terms with the Monarchy.

After this declaration it seemed that there ought to be an end of the agitation, which constituted a permanent source of disturbance directed against Austria-Hungary, and that means ought to have been found of effecting a friendly *rapprochement* between Servia and the Monarchy. If it had been deprived of the support of the Servian Government and

combated by that Government in accordance with its engagements, the hostile propaganda could only have endured in some secret form, and would have been doomed to early destruction. On the other hand, the point of contact between the Slav portions in the south of the Monarchy and Serbia in the domain of language, race, and civilisation, might have been expected to lead to the initiation of a work of common development inspired by reciprocal friendships and parallel interests.

But these hopes were not fulfilled. The aspirations which were hostile to the Monarchy survived, and under the very eyes of the Servian Government, which took no steps to extinguish this agitation, the propaganda directed against Austria yearly gained in extent and in depth. The hatred against the Monarchy remained in suspense, and became converted into an irreconcilable sentiment. The Servian people, both by the old means, which were better adapted to the situation, and by more complete methods, was called to take part in the "inevitable war to the death" against Austria. Systematically secret relations were established with the Slav dominions in the south of the Monarchy, whose subjects were incited to treason.

Above all, the Servian Press has not ceased to be active in this spirit.

Up to date, no less than 81 journals appearing in Serbia have had to be withdrawn from circulation by post, in view of their contents, which fell within the condemnation of the penal code. There is no single penal law safeguarding the sacred person of the Monarch and of the members of the Imperial Family, or the integrity of the State, which have not been violated by the Servian newspapers.

Without entering into a detailed examination of the views entertained by Servian public opinion, it must be observed that the Press has steadily continued to regard the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, notwithstanding the formal recognition thereof by Serbia, after this recognition as much as before it, as an act of robbery at the expense of Serbia, which demanded reparation. This view is to be found repeated, not only in journals of a more advanced shade of opinion, but also in the "Samoprava," which is in such close relation with the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in Belgrade, and in which this view is expressed in a scarcely-veiled form.

Nor can we leave out of account the manner in which the attempt by Bogdan Zerajic against the Governor of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Marshal von Varesanin, on June 15, 1910, at Sarajevo, was lauded by the Press.

It will be remembered that Zerajic took his life immediately after he had committed his crime, and that he burned before committing it all his papers. For these reasons it was not possible to throw full light upon the motives of his attempt, but, from a document which was found beside him, it was possible to infer that he had been a disciple of Kropotkin. Indications likewise pointed to the conclusion that his attempt bore an anarchist character.

This, however, did not prevent the Servian Press from celebrating the criminal as a national hero and from lauding his act. Even the "Politika" protested against the idea that Zerajic was an anarchist, and



claimed on his behalf that he was "a Servian hero, whose name would be repeated by all Servians with respect and sorrow."

The "Politika" likewise considered August 18 of the same year, "the birthday of his Imperial and Royal Majesty," as a suitable occasion, upon which to revive the memory of this man, Zerajic, "whose name will abide among the people in a sense like that of a saint," and solemnly to laud his attempt in a poem.

This is how this crime, which had nothing in common with aspirations directed against the territory of the Monarchy, was exploited for the advancement of this idea, and in this wise murder was recognised, in the most explicit manner, as a glorious weapon, which was worthy of emulation, in the struggle for the realisation of this idea. This consecration of murder as a perfectly legitimate weapon in the struggle against the Monarchy, is to be found again in the newspapers, which discussed the attempt by Jukic upon the life of the Royal Commissioner de Cuvaj.

These journals, which were circulated not only in Servia, but, as was discovered later, in the Monarchy also, by secret and well-organised channels, and even by resort to fraudulent practices, created and fostered among the masses of the people, this disposition, which furnished a favourable soil for the misdeeds of the society conducting the campaign against the Monarchy.

It was the "Narodna Odbrana," which became the centre of the agitation conducted by the associations. The same persons, who, at the time of the assassination were at its head, are the same who direct its policy to-day. Among them are to be found as active and energetic organisers, the most violent of the opponents of the Monarchy enumerated above. The "Narodna Odbrana," which was organised on a broad and deep foundation, and which boasted a regular hierarchy, soon numbered about 400 adherents, who were extremely active in spreading the agitation.

Moreover, the "Narodna" associated itself very closely with the "Federation of Rifle Clubs" (762 societies), the association of Sokols, "Dusan Silni" (2,500 members), the Olympic Club, the Riding Club, "Knez Mihajlo," the Society of Hunters, and the League of Development, together with a number of other associations, all of which, controlled and protected by the "Narodna," worked in the same spirit. By a process of gradual inter-penetration, these societies ultimately became completely fused in such a way that they nearly formed members of the one body, the "Narodna." Thus this society has spread over the whole of Servia a close network of agitation, and has won over to its ideas all those capable of receiving them.

The official publications of the "Narodna" sufficiently demonstrates the spirit in which this society acts.

In its rules and regulations, which wear the outward appearance of the statutes of a development society, concerned solely with the spiritual and physical amelioration of the Servian people, and with its material advancement, the "Narodna" discloses in its official organ the true and sole motive of its existence in the form of what it describes as its "reorganised programme."

Its object in particular, is to preach to the Servian people "the sacred truth by means of a fanatical and indefatigable campaign," alleging that the Monarchy aspires "to rob Servia of her liberty and of her language, and even to destroy her"; that it is an ineluctable necessity to conduct against Austria-Hungary, Servia's first and greatest foe, a "war to the death with rifles and guns," and to prepare the nation for this struggle "by every means," in order that the conquered territories, in which 7,000,000 of brothers are living under a shameful yoke, may be liberated. All the "efforts for the development" of the "Narodna" are devoted solely to the promotion of this idea, as the simplest means of organising and educating the people with a view to the projected war to the death.

In the same spirit may be found working all the societies affiliated to the "Narodna," and the associations of Sokols at Kragujevac may serve as an example of these.

As in the case of the "Narodna," officers, professors and state officials are at its head.

The speech, in which its president, Major Kovacedic, opened the annual meeting in 1914, makes no pretence of mentioning anything about gymnastics, which are nevertheless the actual sphere of the Sokols, and refers only to the "preparations for war" against "the dangerous enemy, the heartless, hated invader from the north," who robs millions of brother Serbs of their liberties and rights and holds them in bondage and in shame.

In the administrative reports of this association, technical developments are placed entirely in the background, and serve merely as rubrics under which to discuss the veritable "aim of the activity of the administration," notably, "the preparation of national development and the necessity of strengthening the 'crushed nation' to the end that it may thus carry out its programme which still remains unfulfilled and its task not yet performed," and to accomplish this "great action, which is destined to be accomplished in the near future: the liberation of our brothers who live across the Drina and who endure the martyrdom of crucifixion." Even the treasurer makes each financial statement subserve this end by making the appeal that "falcons must be bred" who will be capable of "bringing liberty to brothers who are not yet free."

As is the case with the aspirations for development in the "Narodna" so the gymnastic activity of the Sokols is not the end itself but merely a means in the service of this same propaganda, which is conducted with the same intention, not to say with exactly the same words.

When the "Narodna" issues its summons to take part in a war to the death against the Monarchy, it addresses itself, not only to the people of the Monarchy but to the whole Slav population of the south. In the eyes of the "Narodna" the Slav territories in the south of the Monarchy form part of "our oppressed Servian territories." Similarly, the Slav subjects in the south of the Monarchy are destined to take part in this great national work, and similarly this "healthy and necessary" activity must be reflected on the other side of the Servian frontier and on the very soil of the Monarchy. The "Narodna" seeks its "heroes for

the holy war," among whom, Obelic, the assassin of Murad, is cited as an example of self-sacrifice for his country worthy to be emulated.

In order to induce the brothers "outside Serbia" to take part in "the work of private initiative" the "Narodna" maintains intimate relations with the "brothers on this side of the frontier." It is not stated how this intimacy showed itself in practice, doubtless because this belongs to that part of the "combined operations" which, "for numerous reasons, cannot and must not be explained."

The foreign activities of the "Narodna" and of its affiliated societies are particularly varied.

The form of activities, which is relatively the least dangerous because it is capable of being officially controlled consists in lecturing tours undertaken by influential members of the "Narodna" in the south-western regions of the Monarchy, where they address various societies on questions of national or educational interest. These occasions permit the lecturers to expound to their more educated adherents, in words which are more or less veiled but are comprehensible for those who are already in the secret, the veritable tendencies of the society.

One of the best known among these emissaries is the director of the State Printing Office, Zidojin Dacic, who has already been mentioned; it was he who on August 9, 1909, issued an appeal to the Servian people in which he designated Austria as "the enemy of Serbia," and invited them to prepare themselves for a war against the Monarchy. On several occasions he has undertaken journeys of this kind for purposes of propaganda. At Karlova (in 1912) he threw prudence to the wind and went so far as to speak of the "union of all Serbs against the common enemy."

Still more dangerous are the relations which are maintained by the associations imbued with the spirit of the "Narodna" under the cloak of common interest and of a common civilisation, with societies in the Monarchy; since the respective envoys and corporative visits of these associations, which cannot be made subject to any control, are made use of by the Servians in order to cover all manner of machinations against the Monarchy.

Thus, for instance, an emissary of the "Narodna" who attended the festivities at Sarajevo in September, 1912, did not scruple to enlist in secret Bosniac recruits for his society. The dispatch of a representative of the association of Sokols of Kragujevac to these festivities was designed to signify to the brethren in Bosnia: "We have not forgotten you; the wings of the falcon of Sumadija are still powerful." This idea will in more intimate intercourse doubtless have a quite other expression in conformity with the tendencies of the Narodna as already explained. As for the incidents which take place in the course of similar meetings in Serbia, it is manifest that they escape any control by the Imperial and Royal authorities, who possess with regard to them merely confidential information the accuracy of which it is difficult to test. In connexion with these circumstances there might be reason to raise doubts with regard to the visit of students from Agram to Serbia (April, 1912), who received from their Servian hosts an official, nay, almost



military, welcome, which was accompanied even by a parade and a review of troops in their honour, and this in a manner so suggestive that the association of Sokols of Kragujevac could say: "This event marks the beginning and the spring of a great action which is to unfold itself in developments that are close at hand; it is a germ which will ripen when the soul of the people will melt and when every barrier will have been broken down." It is only recently that there came to the knowledge of the Austro-Hungarian authorities the fact that the Servian Sokol associations had succeeded in persuading certain kindred corporations in the Monarchy to join themselves with them at a place which has up to the present remained secret, and for a purpose which has not yet been completely elucidated as inquiries in this connexion continue to be made. Up to the present, however, the information which has been gained suggests that we have been able to trace one of the means by which the subversive tendencies of the Servian Sokols have corrupted and led into error certain groups of persons in the Monarchy.

This propaganda in widely different circles nevertheless appears to possess a secondary importance when compared with the "work abroad" which is directed by the "Narodna" and its friends to promoting an agitation among individuals. It is in this field that the most deplorable results are to be noted.

By the agency of its confidential representatives and secret emissaries, the society imports the poison of rebellion among adult persons as well as among the young and irresponsible.

It is perfectly appalling thus, under the corrupt influence of Milan Prbicevitch, the former officers of the Honved, V.B.D.K.V.N., and the lieutenant of gendarmerie in Slavonian Croatia, V.K., abandoned the military service of the Monarchy in the most suspicious circumstances and went over to Servia; subsequently they saw the majority of their hopes disappointed, at any rate in part, and they now contemplate returning to the country which they betrayed. The agitation introduced from Servia into the middle schools in Croatia and Bosnia is unhappily so notorious that it scarcely needs to be illustrated by examples. What is less well known is the fact that those who have been removed for some grave breach of discipline from the Croatian and Bosnian schools are received in Servia with open arms and are often protected even by the State and maintained as adversaries of the Monarchy. The Servian schools, with their teachers hostile to Austria, who are many of them adherents of the "Narodna," are manifestly institutions fully admirably fitted for the training of adepts of this kind. A particularly gross case must be quoted here. Last March several pupils in the normal schools for teachers at Pakrac (Croatia) were expelled for having gone on strike. They went over to Servia, where they immediately obtained positions as school teachers or were admitted in normal schools for teachers. One of these exiles, who maintained relations with circles hostile to the Monarchy, publicly declared that he and his fellows would advise, that during the sojourn of the Heir Presumptive in Bosnia, the opinion should openly be expressed that this province was Servian territory. In particular, it is to be observed, that during the stay of the Archduke Francis

Ferdinand in Bosnia, the Prefect of the Servian district of Krajna granted to three of these students who had been so seriously compromised, certain passports, in which he falsely described them as Servian subjects, although he must have known of their true character as Croates. Armed with these passports the three agitators were able to enter the Monarchy without exciting attention, but they were ultimately recognised and arrested.

The foregoing is not sufficient to afford a complete idea of the "foreign" activity of the "Narodna."

For a long time past the Imperial and Royal Government had received confidential information that the "Narodna" was preparing its desired war against the Monarchy by resorting to military measures, that is to say, that the Society sent into the Monarchy, emissaries commissioned like the armed bands to attempt upon the outbreak of hostilities to destroy means of transport and communication, and to bring about revolts and panics.

The criminal proceedings instituted in 1913 by the court-martial at Sarajevo against Jovo Jajicic and his accomplices on charges of espionage, resulted in the corroboration of this confidential information. To-day, as at the time when it was founded, the preparation of the ground for war by armed bands still figures in the programme of the "Narodna," and this activity has been reinforced by widespread enterprise in the sphere of espionage. For this reason it is correct to speak of the "reorganised" programme of the "Narodna" as an *extended* programme. From this atmosphere of hatred which had been openly and in secret exasperated by these methods, and from an agitation, which was beyond all possibility of official control—manifestations, which regarded every weapon as just and legitimate in the struggle against Austria, including shameless resort to vulgar murder—acts of terrorism were ultimately bound to spring. On June 8, 1912, the man Jukic fired on the Royal Commissioner at Agram, de Cuvaj, and mortally wounded Councillor de Herwic, who was seated in the same carriage; in attempting to escape he killed a policeman, who was pursuing him, and wounded two others.

The proceedings disclosed the fact, that Jukic was imbued with the ideas and aspirations of the "Narodna," and that, even if Jukic had already for some time cherished the idea of making an attempt, these ideas had not matured until on April 18, 1912, he had accompanied the Agram students on their excursion to Belgrade to the festivities, which had been prepared in honour of the visitors; this Jukic established relations with various persons belonging to the circles of the "Narodna," and discussed politics with them. A few days later he returned to Belgrade and there he received from a surgeon-major, a bomb, and from a comrade a Browning pistol, with which he perpetrated the attempt. According to experts, the bomb, which was found at Agram, must have come from a military arsenal.

The exploit of the man, Jukic was still in men's minds, when on August 18, 1913, Stephan Dojcic, who had returned to Agram from

America, made an attempt upon the life of the Royal Commissioner, Baron Skerlacz, an attempt which was the fruit of the propaganda organised by the Serbs in Southern Slav circles in America, and this was the work of the foreign agitation of the "Narodna."

A pamphlet by the Servian, T. Dimitrijevitsh, printed at Chicago, containing unmeasured attacks upon His Imperial and Royal Majesty, and appeals to the Serbs in the Monarchy, referring to their impending "deliverance," and urging them to return to the Serb fold, shows the parallel lines on which the propaganda, freely conducted by the Serbs in America, and the agitation, which is conducted from Servia in the dominions of the Monarchy are based.

And again, scarcely a year later, Agram was the scene of a fresh attempt, which on this occasion failed.

On May 20, 1913, Jacob Schäfer made an attempt in the Agram theatre, on the Baron von Skerlacz, an attempt, which was frustrated at the last moment by a policeman. The inquiry disclosed the existence of a plot, the moving spirit in which was Rudolf Hercigonja. The declarations of this person and of the five others accused together with him, showed that this attempt also had its origin in Servia.

Hercigonja had taken part in an unsuccessful attempt to secure the release of Jukic, and had fled to Servia (October, 1912) where he associated with his accomplice, Maroan Jakic, certain komitadjis and members of the "Narodna." As frequently is the case with young minds, who have occupied themselves too early with political questions, this intercourse was attended by the worst results. Hercigonja returned home, full of the doctrine preached in Belgrade, that the Southern Slav region of the Monarchy ought to be separated from it and reunited with the Servian kingdom. He had, moreover, become persuaded, as the result of the teaching received from his friends, that this end ought to be pursued by means of attempts upon personages in high places, who took a share in directing the policy of the Monarchy.

It was in this state of mind, that Hercigonja exerted his influence on his friends at Agram and converted their views. Foremost, among his projects was the perpetration of an attempt upon the life of the heir to the throne.

A few months earlier, proceedings on a charge of high treason had been instituted against Suka Alginovic. In the course of these proceedings the witnesses declared that Alginovic had said in their presence that he had received 100 dinars from the "Narodna," and an equal sum from a secret association of students, in order to set on foot a propaganda, but chiefly in order to carry out an attempt on the Archduke Francis Ferdinand.

From these facts it may be seen to what extent the criminal agitation of the "Narodna" and of those who shared its views, had latterly concentrated itself upon the person of the Heir Presumptive.

From these established facts, the conclusion is reached, that the "Narodna" and the circles around it hostile to the Monarchy had begun to consider that the moment had arrived to translate their doctrine into practice.



It is noteworthy that the "Narodna" contents itself with giving the incitement to action, and that where this incitement had fallen upon fertile soil, with furnishing material assistance, but that it transfers the whole danger of this active propaganda of deeds solely to the shoulders of the youth of the Monarchy, stirred up and corrupted by this society, which ought to bear alone the burden of this deplorable "heroism."

All the characteristics of this method of procedure are further exemplified in the history and origin of the deeply regrettable crime committed on June 28, 1914.

Princip and Grabez are examples of this youth which has been poisoned from its school days by the ideas of the "Narodna." In Belgrade, where he frequented associations of students imbued with these ideas, Princip occupied himself with projects for an attempt upon the Heir Presumptive, against whom the lively hatred of the elements hostile to the Monarchy was particularly directed, upon the occasion of the Archduke's journey in the annexed provinces.

Princip struck up a friendship with Kabrinovitch, who frequented the same circles, and whose thoroughly revolutionary opinions, as he himself confessed, had led him to entertain the same hostile sentiments towards the Monarchy and to favour a propaganda of action. But however carefully this plot might have been prepared, and however decided the conspirators themselves might have been, the attempt would never have taken place if, as in the case of Jukic, persons had not been found to supply the conspirators with the means of executing their design, for Princip and Kabrinovitch explicitly admitted that they lacked both the necessary weapons and the money with which to buy them. It is interesting to observe where the conspirators procured their weapons. Milan Pribicevic and Zivojin Dacic, two of the leading men in the "Narodna," were the first to whom the conspirators applied in their extremity, in the manifest expectation that in them they would find ready coadjutors, doubtless because it had already become a matter of tradition among those who were prepared to commit crimes of this kind that it was possible to obtain from the representatives of the "Narodna" the instruments of murder. The accidental circumstance, that at the critical moment these two men did not happen to be in Belgrade, doubtless thwarted this project, but Princip and Kabrinovitch were not at a loss to find assistance in another quarter, namely, from Milan Ciganovic, a former komitadji, who was at that time a railway official at Belgrade, and a member of the "Narodna." This man and his friend, Major Voja Tankosic, who has already been mentioned, and who was also one of the leaders of the "Narodna," and who, in 1908, had been head of the school for armed bands at Kuprija, now stand disclosed as the moral ringleaders in the conspiracy. There was only one point with regard to which they felt at the outset a slight doubt, and that was whether the three conspirators were really determined to commit this act, but this doubt soon disappeared, thanks to their inspiration. From that moment they were ready to furnish every assistance; Tankosic procured four Browning pistols, ammunition and money for the journey. Six hand grenades which came from the stocks of the Servian army completed the

armament, a circumstance which recalls the case of Jukic. Concerned for the success of the enterprise, Tankosic provided for the training of the conspirators in shooting; but he and Ciganovic further took special precautions to secure the secrecy of the plot. They commissioned Zian Kali to see that the two conspirators committed suicide after perpetrating their crime, a measure of precaution which was designed primarily to profit them, since the secrecy thus secured would do away with even the slight risk which they had incurred in the enterprise. Certain death for the victims of its corrupting influence and complete security for itself, that is, as the world now knows, the motto of the "Narodna."

In order to render possible the execution of the attempt, it was necessary that the weapons and bombs should enter Bosnia under a false description and without being perceived. There, again, Ciganovic gave every possible assistance; he prescribed a fixed route for the conspirators and assured them of the protection of the Servian frontier authorities. The manner in which this journey, which was described by Princip as "mysterious," was organised and carried out leaves no doubt that the route fixed was secret and well prepared, and that it had already often been traversed by those whose business it was to promote the secret designs of the "Narodna." With a matter-of-fact assurance which could only have come from practice, the frontier captains at Sabak and Losnika lent their administrative organisation for the furtherance of the enterprise; the secret journey was effected without a hitch under the auspices of a complicated system of guides, who constantly changed, and who, summoned as if by a miracle, invariably presented themselves at the place where they were needed. Without inquiring into the object of this curious journey by a handful of suspiciously young students, the Servian authorities, upon receiving a hint from the former komitadji and from Ciganovic, the subordinate railway official, set in motion this machinery which worked so easily. As a matter of fact there was no need for them to ask any questions, since in view of the indications which they had received it was clear to them that they had once more to discharge a mission on behalf of the "Narodna." The sight of the arsenal of bombs and revolvers provoked from the overseer Grbic merely a benevolent smile of approval which fully proved how accustomed people along that route were to come across contraband of this kind.

The Royal Servian Government assumed a heavy load of responsibility in allowing all this to pass.

Although the Servian Government was bound to cultivate good neighbourly relations with Austria-Hungary, it has allowed the press to sow hatred against the Monarchy, it has tolerated a public campaign against the Monarchy by societies established on Servian soil under the leadership of officers of high rank, officials, schoolmasters and judges—a campaign which imbued its own citizens with revolutionary ideas—and did not prevent men who played a part in the direction of Servian military and civil administration from poisoning the public mind against every moral sentiment to such a pitch that in this conflict vulgar assassination by ambushed conspirators was made to appear the most legitimate weapon.

## No. 75 A.

*Semi-official Communiqué from the Press Bureau.**Vienna, July 28, 1914.*

The Austrian Minister in Belgrade presented the text of the Servian reply on his return from Vienna.

This reply is filled with a spirit lacking sincerity. It shows that the Servian Government does not seriously intend to put an end to the culpable tolerance thanks to which the anti-Austrian agitation has been possible. The Servian reply contains such restrictions and limitations, not only as to the principle itself of the Austrian démarche, but also with regard to the claims of Austria, that the concessions made are without importance—especially the refusal, on a vain pretext, to accept the co-operation of Austro-Hungarian officials with a view to the prosecution of the authors of outrages domiciled in Servia. In the same way the Servian reply to the Austrian demand, that she should put a stop to the hostile agitations of the Press, is tantamount to a refusal. The demand with regard to the steps to be taken to prevent associations hostile to Austria being able after their dissolution to continue their action under another name and form, has not even been considered. These claims constitute the minimum necessary to the restoration of permanent peace in the south-east of the monarchy, and therefore the Servian reply is regarded as being insufficient.

The Servian Government, moreover, appears to be aware of this, since it discusses the settlement of the conflict by means of arbitration, and since on the day upon which her reply was to have been presented, and before that presentation, she had given orders for mobilisation.

## No. 76.

*M. René Viviani, Prime Minister, to M. Bienvenu Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*On board the "France," July 28, 1914.*

I have received from Copenhagen your telegram summarising the events of Saturday, the telegram recounting the last visit of the German Ambassador, also the telegram with regard to the mediation Russia has advised Servia to ask for and to the British démarche in Berlin. I have also received this morning your despatch direct from the Eiffel Tower. I fully approve the reply you made to Baron von Schoen: the thesis you supported is as clear as day. In seeking a pacific solution of the struggle we are fully in agreement with Russia, who is not responsible for the present situation, and who has not yet allowed herself to take any step likely to arouse the least suspicion. But it is clear that, as a counterpart, Germany cannot refuse to give advice to the Austro-Hungarian Government, whose action opened the crisis.

It would, therefore, be well to continue to use this language to the German Ambassador. It is moreover in harmony with the two-fold English proposal, mentioned in your telegram. I entirely approve the combination suggested by Sir Edward Grey and I am asking M. Paul



Cambon directly to acquaint him with this fact. It is essential that it should be known in Berlin and in Vienna that our full co-operation is assured to the efforts of the British Government with a view to finding a solution of the Austro-Servian conflict. The action of the four less interested Powers, cannot, for the reasons given above, be exerted solely in Vienna and in St. Petersburg. In proposing to exert it in Belgrade as well, which in fact really means between Vienna and Belgrade, Sir Edward Grey strikes at the root of the matter, and by not excluding St. Petersburg he also offers Germany a means of receding with all dignity from the step by which the German Government informed Paris and London that it regarded the matter purely as an Austro-Servian matter, and as one deprived of a general character.

I beg you to communicate this telegram to our representatives with the Great Powers and to our Minister in Belgrade.

RENÉ VIVIANI.

No. 77.

*M. Bienvenu Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to M. René Viviani, Prime Minister, on board the "France."*

*Paris, July 28, 1914.*

In spite of the assurances given by German Agents both in Berlin and Paris as to the desire of their Government to assist in the maintenance of peace, no sincere action has been taken by them to restrain Austria. The English proposal, which consists of action by the four less interested Powers with a view to obtaining a stoppage of military operations in Vienna, Belgrade and St. Petersburg, and in a meeting in London of the German, French and Italian Ambassadors, under the Presidency of Sir Edward Grey, with a view to finding a solution of Austro-Servian difficulties, is meeting with objections in Berlin, which are likely to wreck it. The Austrian Ambassador has informed us that his Government will to-morrow take energetic measures to force Serbia to give her the satisfaction and guarantees she demands of that State. Count Szécsen did not explain himself as to these matters. According to our Military Attaché in Vienna mobilisation from July 28 seems certain.

BIENVENU MARTIN.

No. 78.

*M. Bienvenu Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to London, Berlin, St. Petersburg, Vienna and Rome.*

*Paris, July 28, 1914.*

I received a visit from the German Ambassador this morning. He told me that he had no communication, no official proposal to make to me, but that, as yesterday, he came to discuss the situation and the means to be adopted in order to avoid irreparable acts.

Questioned as to the intention of Austria, he declared that he was not acquainted with them and that he was not aware of the nature of the coercive measures she was preparing. Germany, according to Baron von Schoen, only wants to act with France for the maintenance of peace. It was pointed out to him that a project of four-Power mediation had been put forward by England to which France had adhered, and which had obtained the agreement, in principle, of Italy and Germany. The Ambassador said that the German Government doubtless desired nothing better than to associate itself with the action of the Powers, provided that that action did not take the form of arbitration or of a conference, which had been rejected by Austria. I pointed out that if it was only the name which stood in the way of the Austrian Government, the end might be reached by other means, that the German Government was in a good position to ask from Austria that she should give the Powers time to intervene and find a means of conciliation. Baron von Schoen thereupon remarked that he had no instructions, and only knew that Germany refused to exert pressure upon Austria, who did not want a conference. He reproached the French newspapers with attributing to Germany an attitude which was not hers, by making out that she was pushing Austria. No doubt she approved Austria's attitude, but she had not been aware of Austria's note. She could not pull up Austria too brusquely, for Austria had need of guarantees against Servian proceedings.

BIENVENU MARTIN.

No. 79.

*M. Bienvenu Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to M. Dumaine, French Ambassador in Vienna.*

Paris, July 28, 1914

You know by the despatches of our Embassies, which have been sent to you, the English proposal for four-Power mediation and a conference in London, as well as our adhesion to this suggestion, the conditional acceptance of Italy and the reservations of Berlin. I beg you to remain in contact on this point with your English colleague, who has received the necessary instructions to approach the Austro-Hungarian Government with the British suggestion immediately his three colleagues have been authorised to take the same step. You will model your attitude on his.

No. 80.

*M. Paul Cambon, French Ambassador in London, to M. Bienvenu Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

London, July 28, 1914.

Sir Edward Grey yesterday received my Austrian and German colleagues. The former continued to maintain that the Servian reply was unacceptable. The latter held language similar to that of Baron von

Schoen in Paris. He insisted upon the usefulness of English moderating action in St. Petersburg. Sir Edward Grey replied that Russia had shown herself very moderate since the opening of the crisis, and notably in her advice to the Servian Government, and that he would be much embarrassed in making pacific recommendations to the Russian Government. He added that it was in Vienna that action ought to be taken, and that the help of Germany was indispensable. On the other hand, the British Ambassador in St. Petersburg has telegraphed that M. Sazonof has suggested to the Austrian Ambassador a conversation with regard to the Servian affair. This news has been confirmed by the British Ambassador in Vienna, who reports that a first interview between the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs and Count Szapáry has produced a good effect at the Ballplatz. Sir Edward Grey and Sir Arthur Nicolson have told me that there would be reason for congratulation if agreement could be established directly between St. Petersburg and Vienna, but they raised some doubt as to the success of M. Sazonof's initiative. Questioned by Sir G. Buchanan as to the possible summoning in London of a conference of the representatives of England, France, Germany and Italy, with a view to seeking an issue from the present situation, M. Sazonof replied that he had begun *pourparlers* with the Austrian Ambassador, in what he hoped were favourable conditions, but, that he had nevertheless not received an answer to his proposals for the revision of the Servian note by the two Cabinets. If direct explanations with the Vienna Cabinet are impossible, M. Sazonof declares himself ready to accept the British proposal, or any other proposal likely to bring about a favourable settlement of the matter.

In any case, it would be very desirable that this direct negotiation, at a time when the slightest delay may have such grave consequences, should be conducted so as not to thwart the action of Sir Edward Grey, and so as not to furnish Austria with the pretext of evading the friendly intervention of the four Powers.

The British Ambassador in Berlin having endeavoured to obtain from Herr von Jagow adhesion to Sir Edward Grey's suggestion, the German Minister of Foreign Affairs replied that it would be well to await the result of the conversation begun between St. Petersburg and Vienna. Sir Edward Grey has in consequence instructed Sir Edward Goschen to suspend his efforts for the moment. Further, the announcement that Austria has officially notified her declaration of war upon Servia brings the whole question into another phase.

PAUL CAMBON.

No. 81.

*M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador in Berlin, to M. Bienvenu Martin,  
Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

Berlin, July 28, 1914.

Herr von Jagow has been informed by the Russian Chargé d'Affaires of the conversation which M. Sazonof has had with Count Szapáry. The Secretary of State told him, in conformity with the remarks of the German Ambassador in Russia, that since after the expiry of the Austrian



ultimatum the Vienna Government did not refuse to converse with the St. Petersburg Government, there was room for the hope that Count Berchtold on his side might seek M. Schébeko and that an issue from the present difficulties might be found. The Russian Chargé d'Affaires views with favour this frame of mind, which corresponds with Herr von Jagow's desire to see Vienna and St. Petersburg come to a direct understanding, and to disengage Germany. It must be asked, however, if Austria is not seeking time in order to make her preparations. I to-day supported the step of my British colleague with the Secretary of State. The latter replied to me, as he did to Sir Edward Goschen, that he could not possibly accept the idea of a sort of conference in London between the Ambassadors of four Powers, and that another form would have to be given to the British suggestion if it were to be realisable. I pointed out the danger of a delay which might lead to war, and asked him if he wanted war. He protested, and added that direct conversations between Vienna and St. Petersburg were begun, and that from now on he expected a favourable result. The British and Italian Ambassadors came together to see me this morning, in order to discuss with me the conversations they had yesterday with Herr von Jagow on the subject of Sir Edward Grey's proposal. The Secretary of State said on the whole pretty much what he said to me; he accepted the principle of joining in a *démarche* common to Italy, England, and ourselves, but rejected all idea of a conference. We are of opinion, my colleagues and I, that there is in this nothing but a question of form, and the British Ambassador is going to suggest to his Government that it should give another label to its proposal, which might take the character of a diplomatic *démarche* in Vienna and in St. Petersburg.

In view of the repugnance shown by Herr von Jagow to any step in Vienna, it was open to Sir Edward Grey to drive him into a corner by asking him to state himself how the diplomatic action of the Powers for the avoidance of war should be taken.

We ought to associate ourselves with every effort for peace compatible with our engagements towards our Ally, but in order to leave responsibility where it is, we should take care to ask Germany to define what she wants.

JULES CAMBON.

No. 82.

*M. Paléologue, French Ambassador in St. Petersburg to M. Bienvenu Martin,  
Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*St. Petersburg, July 28, 1914.*

The Austro-Hungarian Government has not yet replied to the proposal of the Russian Government for the opening of a direct conversation between St. Petersburg and Vienna. M. Sazonof this afternoon received the German and Austro-Hungarian Ambassadors. The impression he has received from his double interview is bad. "Decidedly," he

said to me, "Austria does not wish to talk." In consequence of a conversation I have just had with my two colleagues, I have the same impression of pessimism.

PALÉOLOGUE.

No. 83.

*M. Dumaine, French Ambassador in Vienna, to M. Bienvenu Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Vienna, July 28, 1914.*

Count Berchtold has just told Sir M. de Bunsen that all intervention for the resumption of the discussion between Austria and Servia on the basis of the Servian reply is useless, and moreover too late, war having been officially declared at noon.

My Russian colleague's attitude has not varied up to the present. In his view it was not a question of localising the conflict but of preventing it. The declaration of war will render very difficult the engagement of *pourparlers* between the four Powers, as well as the continuance of direct discussions between M. Sazonof and Count Szápáry. It is maintained here that the formula which appeared to be able to bring about the adhesion of Germany, "mediation between Austria and Russia," has the demerit of stating the existence of a conflict between these two Empires which up to the present does not exist. The most disturbing of the suspicions aroused by the sudden and violent resolve of Austria is that Germany may have urged her to aggression against Servia, so as to be able herself to enter the lists against France and Russia in circumstances which, she supposes, must be the most favourable for her and in conditions which have been deliberated.

DUMAINE.

## CHAPTER V.

## The Declaration of War by Austria to Servia (July 28, 1914) and the Ultimatum by Germany to Russia (July 31, 1914).

No. 84.

*M. Barrère, French Ambassador in Rome, to M. Bienvenu Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Rome, July 29, 1914.*

The Consulta thinks that in spite of the Austrian declaration of war on Servia the diplomatic efforts tending towards the meeting of a conference in London with a view to mediation should not be interrupted.

BARRÈRE.

No. 85.

*M. Bienvenu Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to St. Petersburg, London, Berlin, Rome, Vienna, Constantinople, and Belgrade.*

*Paris, July 29, 1914.*

The Austro-German attitude is becoming defined. Austria, disturbed by the Slav propaganda, has seized upon the opportunity of the Sarajevo attempt to punish Servian agitation and to take in this direction guarantees which may, whether events are allowed to develop or not, affect only the Servian Government and army, or may become territorial. Germany thrusts herself between her Ally and the other Powers and declares that the matter is only a local question, concerning the chastisement of a past political crime, and certain guarantees for the future that the anti-Austrian agitation shall be brought to an end. The German Government considers that Russia ought to be satisfied by Austria's official and formal assurances that she does not aim at territorial aggrandisement and that she will respect the integrity of Servia; and that in these conditions it is from Russia alone, if she attempted to intervene in a question so well-defined, that could come any danger of war. It is, therefore, in St. Petersburg that action should be taken for the maintenance of peace.

This sophism has been supported without success in Paris by Baron von Schoen, who has vainly tried to drag us into joint Franco-German action (*action solidaire*) in St. Petersburg. It has also been developed to Sir Edward Grey in London. In France, as in England, it was replied that from the outset St. Petersburg has given the greatest proofs of



her moderation, in particular in joining with the other Powers in advising Serbia to yield to the demands of the Austrian note. Russia, therefore, in no way threatens peace; it is at Vienna that action must be taken. It is from there that the danger comes, through the refusal of Austria to be satisfied with the almost complete submission of Serbia to unheard-of demands, by the determination not to accept the collaboration of the Powers in the discussion of the points which remain to be settled between Austria and Serbia, and, finally, by a declaration of war as precipitate and radical as was the original Austrian note. The attitude of Berlin, as well as of Vienna, is still dilatory. The former capital, while maintaining the German desire to safeguard general peace by the common action of the four Powers, rejects the idea of a conference, without making any suggestion as to other means and refuses to act in a positive manner in Vienna. In the Austrian capital, they wish to keep St. Petersburg amused by the illusion that an understanding might result from direct conversations, and, meanwhile, they are taking action against Serbia.

In these conditions it appears to be essential that St. Petersburg, whose desire for a peaceful settlement of the crisis is manifest, should immediately adhere to the British proposal.

It will be necessary to give this proposal very strong support in Berlin, in order to decide Herr von Jagow to take real action in Vienna calculated to stop Austria, and to prevent her diplomatic advantage being duplicated by a military success, after which, under the elastic name of guarantees, conditions would be imposed upon Serbia which, in spite of all assurances of territorial disinterestedness, would in fact modify the state of affairs in Eastern Europe, and would seriously threaten to compromise general peace, if not at present, at any rate in the near future.

BIENVENU MARTIN.

No. 86.

*M. Paléologue, French Ambassador in St. Petersburg, to M. Bienvenu Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*St. Petersburg, July 29, 1914.*

I am from this moment able to assure Your Excellency that the Russian Government acquiesces in any step which may be proposed to it by France and England for the safeguard of peace. My British colleague is telegraphing to the same effect to London.

No. 87.

*M. Klobukowski, French Minister in Brussels, to M. Bienvenu Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Brussels, July 29, 1914.*

I have gained the following impression from conversation with M. d'Avignon and various personages who are in a position to be accurately informed. The attitude of Germany is enigmatic and justifies

all apprehensions. It appears improbable that the Austrian Government should have taken an initiative leading it, in accordance with a preconceived plan, to a declaration of war, without previous agreement with the Emperor William. The German Government stands prepared, reserving according to circumstances her action for war or for peace, but the anxiety is such that in all quarters a brusque intervention against us would surprise no one here. My Russian and British colleagues share this opinion.

The Belgian Government is taking steps in conformity with the declaration made to me yesterday evening by M. d'Avignon that all would be got ready for the defence of the country's neutrality.

KLOBUKOWSKI.

No. 88.

*M. Ronssin, French Consul-General at Frankfort, to M. Bienvenu Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Frankfort, July 29, 1914.*

I draw your attention to important movements of troops yesterday and to-night. This morning several regiments arrived in field kit, chiefly along the roads from Darmstadt, Cassel and Mainz, which are filled with troops. On the pretext of preparing for the Autumn manœuvres, bridges and railways are guarded.

RONSSIN.

No. 89.

*M. Allizé, French Minister in Munich, to M. Bienvenu Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Munich, July 29, 1914.*

I am informed that the mills of Illkirch (Alsace-Lorraine) have been asked to stop delivery to their ordinary customers, and to reserve all their output for the army.

From Strassburg the transport of motor-lorries, used in connection with firing on aeroplanes and dirigibles, is reported. On the pretext of a change in the Autumn manœuvres, the non-commissioned officers and men of the Bavarian infantry at Metz, who were on leave in Bavaria on account of the harvest, yesterday received orders to return immediately.

ALLIZÉ.

No. 90.

*M. Dumaine, French Ambassador in Vienna, to M. Bienvenu Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Vienna, July 29, 1914.*

The French Consul at Prague confirms the reported mobilisation of the 8th Army Corps and that of the Landwehr division of that Army Corps. The Galician cavalry divisions are also mobilising. Vienna and

Budapest regiments and cavalry divisions have already been transported to the Russian frontier. Reservists are being convoked in these regions. It is rumoured that the Austrian Government intends to decide upon a general mobilisation of her armies on July 30 or August 1st, with a view to meeting any threat, and perhaps with a view to impressing St. Petersburg. It is certain, finally, that the Emperor will return to Vienna from Ischl to-morrow.

DUMAINE.

No. 91.

*M. Paléologue, French Minister in St. Petersburg, to M. Bienvenu Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*St. Petersburg, July 29, 1914.*

The direct conversations to which the Russian Government had amicably invited the Austro-Hungarian Government were refused by the latter. The Russian staff knows that Austria is hastening her military preparations against Russia, and her mobilisation, which has begun on the Galician frontier. In consequence, the mobilisation order will to-night be sent to the thirteen army corps destined, if need be, to operate against Austria. In spite of the check to his proposal, M. Sazonof accepts the idea of a conference of the four Powers in London. Moreover, he attaches no importance to the official title of this consultation, and will assist all English attempts in favour of peace.

PALÉOLOGUE.

No. 92.

*M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador in Berlin, to M. Bienvenu Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Berlin, July 29, 1914.*

I yesterday asked the Secretary of State what was happening to the direct conversations between Vienna and St. Petersburg which yesterday appeared to him to be the best means of reaching a détente. He replied that the feeling on this point was good in St. Petersburg and that he had asked Vienna to enter upon this path. He awaited the reply. The British Government, after having had rejected its suggestion of a Conference, had let it be known that it would view with favour the opening of these conversations between Austria and Russia, and had asked Germany to urge Austria to them. This the Imperial Government was not failing to do.

I asked Herr von Jagow if at last he had the reply of Servia to Austria, and what he thought of it. He replied that he saw in it a possible basis of negotiation. I remarked that it was exactly because of that that I considered Austria's rupture, after the receipt of such a document, inexplicable.

The Secretary of State thereupon remarked that with Eastern peoples one could never have enough guarantees, and that Austria wished to have, over the execution of the promises made to her, a control which Servia refused to give. This, in the eyes of the Secretary of State, is the capital



point. I replied to Herr von Jagow that if Serbia desired to remain independent she was bound to reject the control of a single Power, but that an International Commission would not present the same character. There was more than one in the Balkan States beginning with the financial commission in Athens. One might, for example, I said, imagine among other combinations a provisional International Commission entrusted with the duty of controlling the police inquiry demanded by Austria. It was clear from this example that the Servian reply opened the door to conversations and did not justify a rupture.

I then asked the Secretary of State if apart from the direct conversations between Vienna and St. Petersburg to which Sir Edward Grey had rallied, he did not think that the common action of the four Powers might be exerted through the intermediary of their Ambassadors. He replied affirmatively, adding that at the present moment the London Cabinet was confining itself to supporting direct conversations. At the end of the afternoon the Imperial Chancellor asked the British Ambassador to come and see him. He spoke to him of the proposal of Sir Edward Grey for a meeting of a conference. He told him that he had been unable to accept the proposal, which appeared to impose the authority of the Powers upon Austria. He assured my colleague of his sincere desire for peace and of the efforts he was making in Vienna, but he added that Russia alone had it in her power to maintain peace or to let loose war. Sir Edward Goschen replied that he did not share his feeling, and that if war broke out Austria would bear the greatest part of responsibility, for it was inadmissible that she should break with Serbia after Serbia's reply. Without discussing this point the Chancellor said he was pressing as much as he could for the direct conversations between Austria and Russia. He knew that England looked upon this conversation with a favourable eye; he added that his own action would be very difficult in Vienna if it were true that Russia had mobilised 14 army corps on the Austrian frontier. He begged my colleague to call the attention of Sir Edward Grey to all these observations. Sir E. Goschen has telegraphed to this effect to London.

The Chancellor's attitude is very probably the result of the last interview of Sir Edward Grey with Prince Lichnowsky. Up to these very last few days people have flattered themselves here that England would remain aloof, and the impression produced by her attitude upon the German Government and financiers and business men is profound.

JULES CAMBON.

No. 93.

*M. Dumaine, French Ambassador in Vienna, to M. Bienvenu Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Vienna, July 29, 1914.*

My English, Russian, and Italian colleagues agree with me as to the impossibility of preventing a first struggle between Austria and Serbia. all attempts to delay the shock have failed. M. Schébéko had asked that the *pourparlers* started in St. Petersburg between M. Sazonof and

M. Szapary should be continued and rendered more efficacious by conferring special powers upon the latter. This, Count Berchtold definitely refused. He showed thus, that Austria-Hungary would tolerate no intervention which would prevent her from inflicting chastisement and humiliation upon Serbia.

The Duke of Avarna thinks it very likely that the Monarchy's resolutions may have been hastened by the imminence of a general rising of its southern Slav subjects. He still clings to the hope that mediation may limit the struggle after a first success of the Austro-Hungarian army, but not before.

DUMAINE.

No. 94.

*M. Bienvenu Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to London, Berlin, St. Petersburg, Rome, Constantinople, and Belgrade.*

*Paris, July 29, 1914.*

This morning the following communication was made to me by the German Ambassador in a semi-official way: The German Government is conducting efforts with a view to bringing the Austrian Government to take part in a friendly conversation, which would allow the latter to make known exactly the aim and extent of the operations in Serbia. The Berlin Cabinet hopes to receive details which will be such as to give satisfaction to Russia. The German efforts are by no means impeded by the declaration of war which has intervened. A similar communication will be made in St. Petersburg.

In course of the conversation which followed, Baron von Schoen said that the German Government ignored the intentions of Vienna. When Berlin knew how far Austria wished to go there would be a basis for discussion which would facilitate conversations with a view to intervention. On my pointing out that the military operations begun would perhaps not leave time for talk, and that the German Government should use its influence in Vienna with a view to delaying them, the Ambassador replied that Berlin could not exert pressure, but hoped that the operations would not be prosecuted very actively.

BIENVENU MARTIN.

No. 95.

*M. Bienvenu Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to London, Berlin, St. Petersburg, Vienna, Constantinople, Rome, and Belgrade.*

*Paris, July 29, 1914.*

On instructions from his Government, M. Isvolsky has called upon me to communicate a telegram sent by M. Sazonof to Berlin. This communication shows that Russia, in consequence of the Austro-Hungarian declaration of war on Serbia, of the mobilisation measures already applied

to the greater portion of the Austro-Hungarian army, and, finally, of the refusal of Count Berchtold to continue the *pourparlers* between Vienna and St. Petersburg, has decided upon mobilisation in the districts of Odessa, Kieff, Moscow and Kazan. In bringing this fact to the knowledge of the German Government the Russian Ambassador in Berlin was instructed to add that these military precautions were in no way directed against Germany, and that they did not entail aggressive measures against Austria-Hungary; moreover, that the Russian Ambassador had not been recalled from his post.

The Russian Ambassador has also conveyed to me the tenor of two telegrams sent to London by M. Sazonof. The first, indicating that the declaration of war upon Serbia put an end to the conversations of the Russian Minister with the Austrian Ambassador, asked that England should exert her action as quickly as possible with a view to mediation, and the immediate stoppage of Austro-Hungarian operations, the continuance of which gives Austria time to crush Serbia while mediation is dragging on. The second telegram reported the impression gained by M. Sazonof from his conversation with the German Ambassador, which was that Germany favoured the obstinacy of Austria and was not exerting any action upon her. The Russian Minister regards Germany's attitude as very disturbing, and he believes that England is better able than the other Powers to take steps in Berlin with a view to action upon Vienna.

BIENVENU MARTIN.

No. 96.

*M. Barrère, French Minister in Rome, to M. Bienvenu Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

Rome, July 29, 1914.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs has been officially informed by the Russian Ambassador that his Government, following upon the Austrian declaration of war upon Serbia and the mobilisation steps taken at once by Austria, has ordered mobilisation in the districts of Kieff, Odessa, Moscow, and Kazan. He added, that this measure had not an aggressive character against Germany and that the Russian Ambassador in Vienna had not been recalled. Commenting upon this communication, the Marquis di San Giuliano said to me, that unfortunately in this whole affair it had been, and still was, the conviction of Austria and Germany, that Russia would not march. In this connection he read me a despatch from M. Bollati, reporting an interview he had to-day with Herr von Jagow, in which the latter again repeated that he did not believe that Russia would march. He based this belief upon the fact that the Russian Government has only just now sent an agent to Berlin to deal with certain financial matters. The Austrian Ambassador in Berlin has also said to his English colleague that he did not believe in a general war, Russia being neither in the temper nor in a condition to make war. The Marquis di San Giuliano, however, does not share his opinion. He con-



siders that if Austria confines herself to humiliating Serbia and to exacting, in addition to the acceptance of the note, certain material advantages not affecting Serbia's territory, Russia will still be able to find ground for a settlement with her. But if Austria wishes either to dismember Serbia or to destroy her as an independent state, he thinks it impossible for Russia not to intervene in a military manner.

In spite of the extreme gravity of the situation the Minister for Foreign Affairs does not seem to me to have given up hope in the possibility of an arrangement. He believes that England can still exert considerable influence in Berlin in a pacific direction. He had yesterday, he told me, a long conversation with the British Ambassador, Sir R. Rodd, in which he showed the Ambassador how efficacious British intervention might be. He told me in conclusion that if such is the opinion of your Government it, on its side, might insist in this sense in London.

BARRÈRE.

No. 97.

*M. René Viviani, Prime Minister and Minister, Foreign Affairs, to M. Paul Cambon, French Ambassador in London.*

*Paris, July 29, 1914.*

I shall be much obliged if you will ask Sir Edward Grey to resume as quickly as possible in the form which he may deem most opportune and most efficacious, his proposal for the mediation of the four Powers, which received the adhesion in principle of the German Government.

The Russian Government, for its part, will have expressed the same wish directly to the British Government. The Austrian declaration of war upon Serbia, the despatch of troops to the Austro-Russian frontier, the consequent Russian mobilisation on the Galician frontier, have indeed put an end to direct Austro-Russian conversation. The information which the German Government is going to demand in Vienna in conformity with the declaration of Baron von Schoen, of which you are informed, so as to ascertain the intentions of the Austrian Government, will allow the four Powers to exert useful action between Vienna and St. Petersburg for the maintenance of peace. I also beg you to point out to the English Secretary of State how important it would be that he should obtain from the Italian Government the continuance of her fullest co-operation in collaborating in the action of the four Powers in favour of peace.

RENÉ VIVIANI.

No. 98.

*M. Paul Cambon, French Ambassador in London, to M. Bienvenu Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*London, July 29, 1914.*

In the course of his interview with my German colleague to-day, Sir Edward Grey remarked that M. Sazonof's overture for a direct conversation between Russia and Austria not having been accepted in

Vienna, it would be well to return from it to his proposal for the friendly intervention of the four not directly interested Powers. This suggestion has been accepted in principle by the German Government, but it has raised objections to the idea of a conference or mediation. The Secretary of State has asked Prince Lichnowsky to beg his Government to suggest the formula itself. Whatever it may be, if it allow of the maintenance of peace, it will be agreed to by England, France and Italy. The German Ambassador will have immediately transmitted Sir Edward Grey's request to Berlin.

Telling me of this conversation, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs added that Germany's reply to this communication, as well as to that of Russia, relating to the mobilisation of four army corps on the Austrian frontier, would allow us to ascertain the intentions of the German Government. My German colleague, having questioned Sir Edward Grey as to the intentions of the British Government, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs replied that there was no need for him to pronounce himself on that matter for the present.

Sir Edward Grey did not hide from me that he found the situation very grave, and that he held but little hope of a pacific solution.

PAUL CAMDON.

No. 99.

*M. Boppe, French Minister in Belgrade, to M. Bienvenu Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Belgrade, July 29, 1914.*

The Crown Prince, immediately upon the presentation of the Austrian ultimatum, telegraphed to the Tsar to ask for his protection. My Russian colleague tells me that he has just communicated His Majesty's reply to M. Pashitch. The Tsar thanks the Prince for having turned to him on such a critical occasion. He states that all steps have been taken with a view to reaching a pacific solution of the conflict, and gives the Prince the formal assurance that if this end cannot be attained Russia will never cease to interest herself in the fate of Servia.

BOPPE.

No. 100.

*M. Paléologue, French Ambassador in St. Petersburg, to M. Bienvenu Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*St. Petersburg, July 29, 1914.*

The German Ambassador has called upon M. Sazonof to state that if Russia does not stop her military preparations the German army will be given the order of mobilisation. M. Sazonof replied that the Russian

preparations were due, on the one hand, to the persistent intransigence of Austria; and, on the other hand, to the fact that eight Austro-Hungarian army corps were already mobilised.

The tone with which Count De Pourtalès performed this task has decided the Russian Government to order this very evening the mobilisation of the thirteen corps destined to operate against Austria.

PALÉOLOGUE.

Nº. 101.

*M. René Viviani, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the French Ambassadors in St. Petersburg and London.*

*Paris, July 30, 1914.*

M. Isvolsky came to-night, to tell me that the German Ambassador has notified to M. Sazonof the decision of his Government to mobilise its armed forces if Russia does not stop her military preparations. The Tsar's Minister of Foreign Affairs pointed out that those preparations only began in consequence of the Austrian mobilisation of eight army corps, and of the refusal of that Power to settle pacifically her difficulties with Servia. M. Sazonof declares that in these conditions Russia could only hasten her armaments and envisage the imminence of war; that she counts upon the help of her Ally, France; and that she considers it desirable that England should join herself without loss of time to Russia and France.

France is resolved to fulfil all the obligations of her alliance.

She will also neglect no effort with a view to a solution of the dispute in the interests of general peace.

The conversation begun between the less directly interested Powers still permits of the hope that peace may perhaps be preserved. I therefore consider that it would be well that in the measures of precaution and defence to which Russia deems it necessary to proceed, she should take no immediate steps which might offer to Germany a pretext for the total or partial mobilisation of her forces.

The German Ambassador called upon me at the close of yesterday afternoon to discuss the military measures which the Government of the Republic was taking. He added that France was free to take this action, but that in Germany preparations could not remain secret, and that French opinion should not alarm itself if Germany adopted similar preparations.

I replied that the French Government had taken no measures which might alarm her neighbours, and that her desire to take part in any negotiations for the maintenance of peace could not be called into question.

RENÉ VIVIANI.



*M. Paléologue, French Ambassador in St. Petersburg, to M. René Viviani, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*St. Petersburg, July 30, 1914.*

M. Sazonof, whom I have informed of your desire to see avoided any military measure that might give Germany a pretext for general mobilisation, replied that in the course of last night the General Staff had suspended the execution of some precautionary military measures, so as to avoid any misunderstanding. Yesterday the Chief of the Russian General Staff summoned the German Military Attaché, and gave him his word of honour that the mobilisation ordered this morning was aimed solely at Austria.

However, in the course of conversation he had this afternoon with Count de Pourtalès, M. Sazonof must have convinced himself that Germany does not wish to utter the decisive words in Vienna which will safeguard peace. The Emperor Nicholas has the same impression from the exchange of telegrams which he has just had personally with the Emperor William.

On the other hand, the Russian General Staff and Admiralty have received alarming information as to the preparation of the German army and navy.

In giving me this information, M. Sazonof added that the Russian Government nevertheless was continuing its efforts for conciliation. He repeated to me, "I shall negotiate up to the last moment."

PALÉOLOGUE.

*M. Paléologue, French Ambassador in St. Petersburg, to M. René Viviani, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*St. Petersburg, July 30, 1914.*

The German Ambassador called to-night upon M. Sazonof to urge again, but in less categorical terms, that Russia should cease her military preparations, affirming that Austria would do nothing against the territorial integrity of Servia.

"It is not only the territorial integrity of Servia which we have to safeguard," replied M. Sazonof, "it is also her independence and her sovereignty. We cannot allow that Servia should become the vassal of Austria." M. Sazonof added: "The hour is too grave for me not to tell you all I think. In intervening in St. Petersburg, while refusing to intervene in Vienna, Germany is only seeking to gain time so as to allow Austria to crush the little Servian kingdom before Russia has had time to help it; but the desire of the Emperor Nicholas to avoid war is such that in his name I am going to make you a fresh proposal: If Austria,

recognising that her dispute with Serbia has assumed the character of a question of European interest, declares herself ready to eliminate from her ultimatum the clauses which affect the sovereignty of Serbia. Russia will undertake to stop all military measures." Count de Pourtalès promised to urge this proposal on his Government. In M. Sazonof's opinion, the acceptance of his proposal by Austria will have as logical consequence the opening of a deliberation of the Powers in London.

The Russian Government shows once again by its attitude that it is neglecting nothing which may put an end to the dispute.

PALÉOLOGUE.

No. 104.

*M. Dumaine, French Ambassador in Vienna, to M. René Viviani,  
Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Vienna, July 30, 1914.*

In spite of the communication made by the Russian Ambassador to several of my colleagues, including the German Ambassador, as to the partial mobilisation in Russia, the Vienna Press has abstained from publishing the news. The silence placed upon it has just been explained by a conversation of great importance between M. Schébéko and Count Berchtold, who considered at length the present redoubtable difficulties, with an equal desire to find reciprocally acceptable solutions for them. Russian military preparations, explained M. Schébéko, only aimed at replying to those of Austria, and at marking the intention and the rights of the Tsar to express his view in the settlement of the Servian question. Count Berchtold replied that the mobilisation steps taken in Galicia also implied no aggressive intentions, and only aimed at maintaining the situation on the same footing. On both sides steps will be taken that these measures shall not be interpreted as signs of hostilities.

With regard to the settlement of the Austro-Servian dispute, it has been agreed that the *pourparlers* shall be resumed in St. Petersburg between M. Sazonof and Count Szápáry. Their interruption was due to a misunderstanding, Count Berchtold believing that the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs demanded that his interlocutor should be given powers enabling him to modify the terms of the Austrian ultimatum. Count Szápáry will only be authorised to discuss what arrangement would be compatible with the dignity and prestige of the two Empires, which are to both of them an object of equal care.

For the moment, therefore, it will be in this direct form, confined to the two most interested parties, that will take place the examination of the situation which Sir Edward Grey proposed should be undertaken by the four not directly interested Powers.

Sir M. de Bunsen, who was with me, at once told M. Schébéko that the Foreign Office would entirely approve of this new procedure. Repeating the exposé he made at the Ballplatz, the Russian Ambassador stated that his Government would pay much more regard to the demands of the

Monarchy than was supposed. M. Schébéko neglected nothing to convince Count Berchtold of the sincerity of Russia's desire to reach an understanding acceptable to the two Empires.

The interview was conducted in a very friendly tone, and gave rise to the belief that all hope of localising the conflict was not lost, and then the news of the German mobilisation reached Vienna.

DUMAINE.

No. 105.

*M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador in Berlin, to M. René Viviani, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Berlin, July 30, 1914.*

Herr von Jagow has telephoned to me that the news of German mobilisation is false, and has begged me to inform you of this with all speed. The Imperial Government is seizing the special editions of the papers which announced the news. But neither this communication nor these steps diminish my apprehensions with regard to Germany's plans.

It appears certain that the Extraordinary Council held at Potsdam yesterday evening with the military authorities, under the presidency of the Emperor, has decided upon mobilisation, which explains the preparation of the *Lokal Anzeiger's* special edition, and that for various causes (declaration of England that she reserves her entire liberty of action, exchange of telegrams between the Tsar and William II.) these grave measures have been suspended.

One of the Ambassadors, with whom I am most intimate, saw Herr Zimmermann at two o'clock. According to the Under-Secretary of State the military authorities are urging strongly that mobilisation should be decreed, on the ground that any delay will lose Germany some of her advantages. Up to the present, however, people have been able successfully to resist the haste of the General Staff which, in mobilisation, sees war. However this may be, mobilisation may be decided upon at any moment. I do not know who has launched in the *Lokal Anzeiger*, generally a semi-official organ, premature news likely to inflame opinion in France.

I have the strongest reasons, moreover, for thinking that all the measures of mobilisation which could be taken before the publication of the order of general mobilisation have already been taken here, and that people would like us to be the first to publish our mobilisation so as to place upon us the responsibility.

JULES CAMBON.

No. 106.

*From M. René Viviani, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs, to M. Paul Cambon, French Ambassador in London.*

*Paris, July 30, 1914.*

I beg you to bring to the knowledge of Sir Edward Grey the following news regarding French and German military preparations. England will see that, although France is resolute, it is not she who is taking aggressive steps.



You will draw the attention of Sir Edward Grey to the decision taken at the Cabinet Council held this morning. Although Germany has taken her covering precautions up to within a few hundred mètres of the frontier along the whole front from Luxemburg to the Vosges, and has advanced her covering troops to their fighting positions, we have kept our troops at a distance of ten kilomètres of the frontier and have forbidden them to advance further.

Our plan, however, conceived in a spirit of offensive, provided for the fighting position of our covering troops being brought up as close as possible to the frontier. In thus leaving a strip of territory without defence against the sudden aggression of the enemy, the Government of the Republic is anxious to show that France, no more than Russia, is responsible for the attack.

In order to acquire certitude on this point it is only necessary to compare the steps taken on the two sides of our frontier. In France men on leave were only recalled after we had acquired the certainty that Germany had taken this step five days before.

In Germany the garrison troops of Metz have not only been brought up to the frontier, they have also been reinforced by elements transported by railway from garrisons in the interior, such as those of Treves and Cologne. Nothing similar has been done in France. The preparation in the fortresses (the cutting of wood, mounting of guns, construction of batteries, strengthening of wire entanglements) had already started in Germany on Saturday, the 25th. In France this work is going to be done, the country no longer being able to refrain from taking the same steps.

The stations were occupied by troops in Germany on Saturday, the 25th; In France on Tuesday, the 28th. Finally, in Germany reservists are being recalled by tens of thousands by individual appeals. Men of the classes from 1903 to 1911 residing abroad have been recalled; reservist officers have been called up; in the interior roads are barred; motor-cars only circulate with permits; it is the last stage before mobilisation. None of these steps has yet been taken in France.

The German Army's advance posts are at our frontier posts. On two occasions yesterday German patrols invaded our territory. The whole of the 16th Army Corps from Metz, reinforced by a portion of the 8th from Treves and Cologne, occupies the frontier from Metz to Luxemburg. The 15th Army Corps of Strassburg has been gathered to the frontier. The inhabitants of annexed Alsace-Lorraine are forbidden to cross the frontier under penalty of death.

RENÉ VIVIANI.

No. 107.

*M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador in Berlin, to M. René Viviani, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Berlin, July 30, 1914.*

The British Ambassador has not received communication of the German reply to Sir Edward Grey's request. He told me that Berlin had consulted Vienna and still awaited the views of her Ally

My Russian colleague has just told me on his side that Herr von Jagow (to whom Count de Pourtalés had communicated the formula of conciliation suggested by M. Sazonof for an Austro-Russian agreement) had just told him that he considered this proposal unacceptable to Austria, thus showing the negative action of German diplomacy in Vienna.

JULES CAMBON.

No. 108.

*M. Paul Cambon, French Minister in London, to M. René Viviani, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*London, July 30, 1914*

Prince Lichnowski has brought no reply to the request addressed to him yesterday by Sir Edward Grey, that he should obtain from the German Government a formula of intervention of the four Powers in the interests of peace. But my German colleague questioned the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs as to the military preparations of England.

Sir Edward Grey replied that they had no offensive character, but that in the present state of affairs on the Continent it was natural to take some precautions; that in England, as in France, the maintenance of peace was desired; and that if in England, as in France, defensive measures had been considered, it was not with a view to preparing an aggression. The information which your Excellency sent me as to German military preparations on the French frontier has enabled me to point out to Sir Edward Grey that it is no longer to-day only a question of conflict of influence between Russia and Austro-Hungary, but that there is danger of an attack being committed which might bring about a general war.

Sir Edward Grey perfectly understood my feeling, and with me thinks the time has come to examine all the hypotheses and to discuss them in common.

PAUL CAMBON.

No. 109.

*M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador in Berlin, to M. René Viviani, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Berlin, July 30, 1914.*

I asked Herr von Jagow what reply he had given Sir Edward Grey, who asked him to supply himself the formula for the intervention of the disinterested Powers. He replied that, "in order to gain time," he had decided to act directly, and that he had asked Austria on what ground one could converse with her. In effect this reply, under pretence of getting along more quickly, eliminates England, France and Italy, and confides the task of bringing Austria to a conciliatory attitude to Herr

von Tschirschsky, whose pan-German and Russophobe sentiments are known. Finally Herr von Jagow spoke of the Russian mobilisation on the Austrian frontier. He said that this mobilisation compromised the success of all intervention in Austria, and that everything depended on that.

Herr von Jagow added that he feared that Austria might mobilise completely in consequence of the partial Russian mobilisation, which might bring about the answering blow of total Russian mobilisation, and, in consequence, that of Germany.

I pointed out to the Secretary of State that he himself had said to me that Germany would not consider herself forced to mobilise unless Russia mobilised upon the German frontier, and that such was not the case. He replied that that was true, but that the heads of the army insisted that all delay was a loss of strength to the German army, and that "the words I recalled did not constitute a firm engagement on his side." This interview gave me the impression that the chances of peace were still further diminished.

JULES CAMBON.

No. 110.

*M. Paul Cambon, French Ambassador in London, to M. René Viviani,  
Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*London, July 31, 1914.*

At the outset of our conversation to-day, Sir Edward Grey told me that Prince Lichnowsky had asked him this morning, if England would preserve neutrality in the struggle which was preparing. The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs replied, that if the struggle became general England could not remain neutral, and especially if France were involved, England would be dragged in.

I then questioned Sir Edward Grey as to the deliberation of the Cabinet held this morning. He replied, that after having examined the situation, the Cabinet had thought that, for the moment, the British Government could not guarantee us its intervention; that he intended to intervene in order to obtain from Germany, and from France, an undertaking to respect Belgian neutrality; but that it would be well, before considering intervention, to wait for the situation to develop.

I asked Sir Edward Grey if the British Government would wait for the invasion of French territory before it intervened. I insisted on the fact that the steps already taken on our frontier by Germany revealed an intention to attack at an early date, and that if one wished to avoid the repetition of Europe's mistake in 1870 it would be well that England should now already consider the conditions upon which she would give us the support on which France relied.

Sir Edward Grey replied, that the opinion of the Cabinet had been formed only on the present situation; that this situation might change, in which event he would immediately summon the Cabinet Council to consider it.



Sir A. Nicolson, whom I saw on leaving the Secretary of State's room, told me that the Cabinet would meet again to-morrow, and confidentially gave me to understand that the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs would not fail to resume the discussion. In conformity with your instructions, I have taken the necessary steps to ensure that the autograph letter from the President of the Republic to His Majesty the King of England, shall be handed to the King this evening. This step, which will certainly be communicated to the Prime Minister to-morrow morning, will, I have no doubt, be taken into serious consideration by the British Cabinet.

PAUL CAMBON.

No. 111.

*M. Mollard, French Minister in Luxemburg, to M. René Viviani, Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs.*

*Luxemburg, July 31, 1914.*

The Minister of State is just leaving the Legation. He came to tell me that the Germans have closed the bridges of Schengen and Renich over the Meuse with carts, and that of Wormeldange with ropes. The bridges of Wasserbillig and Echternach are not closed, but the export from Prussia of wheat, cattle and motor-cars is forbidden.

M. Eyschen begged me, and herein lay the real aim of his visit, to ask you for an official declaration to the effect that France, in the event of a conflict, will respect the neutrality of Luxemburg. I asked him if he had received such a declaration from the German Government, and he told me that he was going to the German Minister to obtain the same declaration.

MOLLARD.

P.S.—M. Eyschen has returned from the German legation. He protested against the measures of suspicion taken against a neutral neighbour. The Minister of State asked the German Minister for an official declaration from his Government undertaking the engagement to respect neutrality. Herr de Buch is said to have replied "That goes without saying, but the French Government must undertake the same engagement."

No. 112.

*M. René Viviani, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the French Ambassadors in London, Berlin, Vienna, Rome and St. Petersburg.*

*Paris, July 31.*

The British Ambassador has handed me a note from his Government, asking the French Government to support in St. Petersburg the pro-

posal aiming at a peaceful solution of the Austro-Servian conflict. The note explains that the German Ambassador informed Sir Edward Grey of the intention of his Government to endeavour to act upon the Austro-Hungarian Government, after the capture of Belgrade and occupation of districts on the frontier, with a view to obtaining a promise that she will not advance further while the Powers are seeking to obtain that Serbia should give adequate satisfaction to Austria. The occupied territory will be evacuated once this satisfaction has been received. Sir Edward Grey made this suggestion on July 29; he expresses the hope that military preparations will be suspended on all sides. Although the Russian Ambassador in London has informed the Secretary of State that he fears that Russia's condition (if Austria, recognising that her dispute with Serbia has assumed the character of European interest, declares herself ready to eliminate from her ultimatum the points which affect the principle of Servian Sovereignty, Russia undertakes to stop all military preparations) cannot be modified, Sir Edward Grey thinks that if Austria stops her advance after the occupation of Belgrade, the Russian Government might agree to change its formula, so that the Powers could examine how Serbia could give complete satisfaction to Austria without affecting Servian Sovereignty or independence. If Austria, having occupied Belgrade and the neighbouring Servian territory, declares herself ready, in the interests of Europe, to stop her advance and to discuss how an arrangement can be reached, Russia also might agree to the discussion and to the suspension of her military preparations, provided that the other Powers do the same.

In conformity with the demand of Sir Edward Grey the French Government has rallied to the English suggestion, and has telegraphed in the following terms to its Ambassador in St. Petersburg to endeavour to obtain the assent of the Russian Government: I beg you at once to inform M. Sazonof that Sir Edward Grey's suggestion appears to me to furnish a useful basis for conversation between the Powers, who are equally desirous of working for an honourable settlement of the Austro-Servian dispute, and of thus avoiding the dangers which threaten general peace.

The plan suggested by the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in stopping the march in advance of the Austrian army, in entrusting to the Powers the duty of considering how Serbia might give full satisfaction to Austria without affecting the sovereign rights and independence of Serbia, thus enabling Russia to suspend all military preparations (the other Powers having to do the same), is calculated to give equal satisfaction to Russia and to Austria and to provide Serbia with an acceptable exit from the present difficulties. I beg you to take your stand upon the foregoing considerations in pressing M. Sazonof very instantly to give without delay his adhesion to Sir Edward Grey's proposal, of which no doubt he has been apprised.

## No. 113.

*M. Paléologue, French Ambassador in St. Petersburg, to M. Viviani, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*St. Petersburg, July 31, 1914.*

The news of the bombardment of Belgrade last night and morning has aroused the greatest feeling in Russia.

It is impossible to arrive at an explanation of the attitude of Austria, whose provocations have constantly, since the outset of the crisis, followed Russia's attempts at conciliation and the satisfactory conversations exchanged between St. Petersburg and Vienna.

Nevertheless, desirous of neglecting nothing in order to prove the sincerity of his desire to safeguard peace, M. Sazonof informs me that he has modified his formula, at the request of the British Ambassador, as follows:—

“If Austria agrees to stay the advance of her troops on Servian territory, and if, recognising that the Austro-Servian dispute has assumed the character of a question of European interest, she admits that the Great Powers shall examine the satisfaction which Serbia might give to the Austro-Hungarian Government without affecting her sovereign rights and independence, Russia undertakes to maintain her waiting attitude.”

PALÉOLOGUE.

## No. 114.

*M. Viviani, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs, to London, Berlin, St. Petersburg, Vienna, Rome and Constantinople.*

*Paris, July 31, 1914.*

The efforts made until now on parallel lines by England and by Russia with the eager assistance of France (pledged in advance to support any pacific effort), with a view to the direct understanding between Vienna and St. Petersburg or to mediation by the four Powers by the most appropriate means, meet to-day. Russia, giving a fresh proof of her desire for an understanding, has hastened to reply to the first overture made by Germany (as to the conditions under which Russia would stop her military preparations), by indicating a formula, and by subsequently changing it in conformity with England's request. The *pourparlers* having been resumed on the other hand between the Russian and Austrian Ambassadors, it may be hoped that English mediation will complete in London the effort of the direct negotiations between Vienna and St. Petersburg.

Nevertheless, the constant attitude of Germany, who since the outset of the dispute, while proclaiming without ceasing to everyone her pacific intentions, has in fact by her dilatory or negative attitude brought to



grief all the attempts at agreement by encouraging obstinacy in Vienna; her military preparations, begun from the very outset of the crisis and prosecuted since without a stop; her immediate opposition to the Russian formula, which Berlin declared to be unacceptable to Austria before she had even consulted this Power; and finally all the impressions gathered in Berlin, impose the conclusion that Germany has sought the humiliation of Russia, the splitting up of the Triple Entente, and, if these results could not be obtained—War.

RENÉ VIVIANI.

No. 115.

*M. Dumaine, French Ambassador in Vienna, to M. René Viviani, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Vienna, July 31, 1914.*

General mobilisation affecting all men from 19 to 42 years of age was decreed at an early hour this morning by the Austro-Hungarian Government.

My Russian colleague still thinks that this step is not in clear contradiction to Count Berchtold's statements yesterday.

DUMAINE.

No. 116.

*M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador in Berlin, to M. René Viviani, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Berlin, July 31, 1914.*

Herr von Jagow, having summoned me, has just told me that he greatly regretted to inform me that in view of the total mobilisation of the Russian army, Germany was obliged in the interests of the security of the Empire to take grave measures of precaution. What is called a *Kriegsgefahrzustand* (the state of danger of war) has been decreed. It allows the authorities if they think fit to declare martial law, to suspend certain public services, and to close the frontier.

At the same time St. Petersburg is being asked to demobilise both on the Austrian and on the German side of the frontier, failing which, Germany will be obliged to mobilise on her side. Herr von Jagow has informed me that Baron von Schoen has been instructed to inform the French Government of the decisions of the Berlin Cabinet, and to ask the French Government what attitude it is going to adopt.

JULES CAMBON.

*M. René Viviani, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs, to  
M. Paléologue, French Ambassador in St. Petersburg.*

*Paris, July 31, 1914.*

The German Government decided at noon to take all the military steps required by the so-called state of "Danger of war." Baron von Schoen, in informing me of this decision at 7 o'clock this evening, added that the Government at the same time demanded that Russia should demobilise. If the Russian Government has not given a satisfactory reply within 12 hours, Germany will mobilise in her turn.

I replied to the German Ambassador that I was in no way informed as to the alleged complete mobilisation of the Russian army and navy, which the German Government invoked as a reason for the fresh military measures which it is about to take from to-day on.

In conclusion, Baron von Schoen asked me, on behalf of his Government, what would be the attitude of France in the event of a conflict between Germany and Russia. He told me that he would call to receive my answer at one o'clock to-morrow (Saturday).

I do not intend to make any statement to him on this subject, and I shall confine myself to telling him that France will be inspired by her interests. The Government of the Republic, in effect, only owes to her ally a statement as to her intentions.

I beg you to bring what precedes to the knowledge of M. Sazonov immediately. As I have already informed you, I do not doubt that the Imperial Government in the superior interests of peace will avoid anything which might precipitate a crisis or render it inevitable.

RENÉ VIVIANI.

*M. Paléologue, French Ambassador in St. Petersburg, to M. Viviani, Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs.*

*St. Petersburg, July 31, 1914.*

In view of the general mobilisation of Austria, and of the measures of mobilisation taken secretly but continuously by Germany during the last six days, general mobilisation of the Russian army has been ordered, Russia not being able, without incurring the greatest danger, to allow herself to be still further outstripped. As a matter of fact, she is only taking military precautions corresponding to those taken by Germany.

For imperative strategic reasons, the Russian Government, knowing that Germany was arming, could not further delay converting her partial mobilisation into general mobilisation.

PALÉOLOGUE.

## No. 119.

*M. Klobukowski, French Minister in Brussels, to M. René Viviani, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs,*

*Brussels, July 31, 1914.*

The Agence Havas having announced that the state of danger of war has been decreed in Germany. I have told M. d'Avignon that I could give him the assurance that the Government of the Republic would respect Belgian neutrality. The Minister of Foreign Affairs replied that the Royal Government had always thought that this would be the case, and he thanked me. The Russian and British Ministers, whom I subsequently saw, were, in view of the circumstances, very satisfied that I had given this assurance, which, moreover, the British Minister told me, was in conformity with the declaration of Sir Edward Grey.

KLOBUKOWSKI.



## CHAPTER VI.

Declaration of War by Germany to Russia (7.10 p.m., August 1, 1914),  
and to France (6.45 p.m., August 3, 1914).

No. 120.

*M. René Viviani, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Rome,  
Vienna, St. Petersburg, London and Berlin.*

*Paris, August 1, 1914.*

Two steps were taken yesterday evening by the Austrian Ambassadors, the one fairly vague in Paris, and the other in St. Petersburg definitely, in a conciliatory direction.

Count Szécsen called upon me and declared that the Austro-Hungarian Government had officially informed Russia that it entertained no territorial ambition and would not touch the sovereignty of the State of Servia; that it also repudiated all intention of occupying the Sandjak; but that these declarations of disinterestedness would only preserve their value if the war remained localised to Austria and to Servia, a European war opening up eventualities which it was impossible to foresee. The Austrian Ambassador, in commenting on these declarations, let it be understood that his Government could not reply to the questions of the Powers speaking in their own names. It could doubtless reply to Servia or to a Power which asked its conditions on behalf of Servia. He added that here there might perhaps still be a possibility.

In St. Petersburg the Austrian Ambassador called on M. Sazonof and communicated to him the consent of his Government to enter upon a discussion as to the basis of the ultimatum addressed to Servia. The Russian Minister declared himself satisfied with this declaration, and proposed that the conversations should take place in London with the participation of the Powers. M. Sazonof has doubtless asked the British Government to take over the direction of the negotiations. He indicated that it would be very important that Austria should cease her operations with Servia.

These facts show that Austria appears to be inclined to an arrangement, and that the Russian Government is also ready to enter into negotiations on the basis of the English proposition.

Unfortunately these dispositions, which might justify hope in a pacific solution, appear in fact bound to be annulled by Germany's attitude. This Power has, indeed, delivered an ultimatum giving the Russian Government twelve hours in which to agree to demobilisation not only on the German frontier but also on the Austrian frontier. This

period expires at noon. The ultimatum is not justified, since Russia has accepted the English proposal, which implies a suspension in the military preparations of all the Powers.

Germany's attitude proves that she wants war, and she wants it against France. Yesterday, when Baron von Schoen came to inquire at the Quai d'Orsay what attitude France intended to adopt in case of a Russo-German conflict, although there was no direct dispute between France and Germany, and although we have been active since the outset of the crisis, and still direct all our efforts with a view to a pacific solution, he added that he begged me to present to the President of the Republic his homage and thanks, and asked that one would be good enough to take "measures for his person" (*des dispositions pour sa propre personne*). We also know that he has already put the archives of the Embassy in a place of safety. This attitude of a rupture of diplomatic relations without a direct dispute, and although a precise negative answer had not been given to him, is characteristic of the determined will of Germany to make war upon France. The insincerity of his pacific protestations is proved by the rupture it forces on Europe when negotiations had at last been accepted by Austria in agreement with Russia.

RENÉ VIVIANI.

No. 121.

*M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador in Berlin, to M. René Viviani, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Berlin, Aug. 1, 1914.*

My Russian colleague yesterday evening received two telegrams from M. Sazonof advising him that the Austrian Ambassador in St. Petersburg stated that the Austrian Government was ready to discuss with the Russian Government even the basis of the note to Servia. M. Sazonof replied that in his opinion these conversations should take place in London.

The ultimatum to Russia can but lessen the last chances of peace which seem to be held out by these conversations. It may be asked if in such circumstances Austria's acceptance was serious, and if its aim were not to make the responsibility for the struggle fall upon Russia.

To-night my British colleague has made a pressing appeal to Herr von Jagow's sentiments of humanity. The latter replied that the question was too involved, and that the Russian reply to the German ultimatum must be awaited. Moreover, he said to Sir E. Goschen that the ultimatum demanded the withdrawal of Russian mobilisation not only against Germany but also against Austria. My British colleague showed himself more than surprised, and told him that this last point appeared to be unacceptable to Russia.

The ultimatum of Germany, intervening just at the exact time at which agreement appeared on the point of being established between Vienna and St. Petersburg, is significant of her bellicose policy.

The dispute existed only between Russia and Austria, Germany only having to intervene as the ally of Austria. In these conditions the two Powers chiefly interested being ready to talk, if Germany did not want war on her own account, it would be incomprehensible that she should send an ultimatum to Russia, instead of continuing to work like all the other Powers for a peaceful solution.

JULES CAMBON.

No. 122.

*M. René Viviani, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs, to  
London, Berlin and Brussels.*

*Paris, August 1, 1914.*

The British Ambassador, acting on instructions from his Government, has called to ask me what would be the attitude of the French Government towards Belgium in the event of a conflict with Germany.

I declared that, as we had repeated on several occasions to the Belgian Government, we intend to respect her neutrality.

It would only be in the event of this neutrality being violated by another Power, that France, in order to fulfil her duties as a guaranteeing Power, could be led to enter Belgian territory.

RENÉ VIVIANI.

No. 123.

*M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador in Berlin, to M. René Viviani, Prime  
Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs*

*Berlin, August 1, 1914.*

The British Ambassador has been instructed by his Government to make the same démarche with the German Government as has been made with you on the subject of the neutrality of Belgium.

Herr von Jagow replied that he would take the orders of the Emperor and the Chancellor, but that he doubted the possibility of a reply, for Germany could not thus reveal her military plans. The British Ambassador will see Herr von Jagow again to-morrow afternoon.

JULES CAMBON.

No. 124.

*M. Barrère, French Ambassador in Rome, to M. René Viviani, Prime  
Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Rome, August 1, 1914*

At half-past eight this morning, I called upon the Marquis di San Giuliano to learn from him exactly what would be the attitude of Italy in the presence of the provocative acts of Germany and the consequences they might have.



The Minister of Foreign Affairs replied to me that he yesterday evening received a visit from the German Ambassador. Herr von Flotow informed him that Germany had asked the Russian Government to suspend its mobilisation, and had asked the French Government to say what it intended to do. Germany had given to France a period of 18 hours and Russia a period of 12 hours in which to reply.

Herr von Flotow asked, after this communication, what were the intentions of the Italian Government. The Marquis di San Giuliano replied that as the war undertaken by Austria, especially in view of the consequences which, according to the words of the German Ambassador, might result from it, had an aggressive character, and was not in accordance with the purely defensive character of the Triple Alliance, Italy could not take part in the war.

BARRÈRE.

No. 125.

*M. René Viviani, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs, to  
St. Petersburg, London, Berlin, Rome, Madrid, Vienna,  
and Constantinople.*

*Paris, August 1, 1914.*

The German Ambassador returned to see me this morning at 11 o'clock. After having recalled all the efforts made by France with a view to an honourable settlement of the Austro-Servian dispute and of the difficulties which had arisen between Austria and Russia, I acquainted him with the *pourparlers* which have continued since yesterday:—

(1) The British compromise proposal provided, among other things, for the suspension by Russia of military preparations on condition that the other Powers do as much; adhesion of Russia to this proposal.

(2) Communications from the Austrian Government declaring that she neither desires to aggrandise herself in Servia nor even to enter the Sandjak, and that she is ready to discuss with the other Powers in London *even the basis* of the Austro-Servian question.

I laid before him the German attitude, which, abandoning all *pourparlers*, presented an ultimatum to Russia at the very moment when Russia had accepted the British formula (implying the stoppage of military preparations in all mobilised countries), and which envisaged as imminent a diplomatic rupture with France.

But Baron von Schoen replied that he was unaware of the developments which had arisen in this matter during the last 24 hours, that there was perhaps "a gleam of hope" for an arrangement, that he had received no fresh communication from his Government, and that he would enquire. He again protested his sincere desire to join his efforts to those of France, in order to reach a solution of the conflict. I insisted upon the grave responsibility which the Imperial Government would assume if in such circumstances it took unjustified an initiative such as to compromise peace beyond repair.

Baron von Schoen made no further allusion to his immediate departure and did not again ask me to reply to his question regarding the attitude of France in the event of an Austro-Russian conflict. He confined himself to saying on his own initiative that it was not in doubt.

It is well in no way to exaggerate the possibilities which may result from my conversation with the German Ambassador, for the Imperial Government on its side continues to make most dangerous preparations on our frontier. We must not neglect them, however, and we must not cease to work for an arrangement. France on her side is taking all military measures necessary to guarantee her against too great an advance in German military preparations. She considers that her attempts at conciliation are only likely to succeed in the measure in which she finds herself ready and resolute if the struggle be forced upon her.

RENÉ VIVIANI.

No. 126.

*M. Paul Cambon, French Ambassador in London, to M. René Viviani, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*London, August 1, 1914.*

Sir Edward Grey has told me that, in the Council this morning, the Cabinet considered afresh the situation. Germany having demanded from England a declaration of neutrality, and not having obtained it, the British Government remained master of its actions, and these might be displayed in various eventualities.

In the first place, Belgian neutrality means much to England. France has immediately renewed her engagement to respect it. Germany has declared herself "not in a position to reply." Sir Edward Grey will inform the Cabinet of this reply, and will ask for authority to tell the House of Commons on Monday that the British Government will not permit a violation of Belgian neutrality.

In the second place, the English squadrons are mobilised, and Sir Edward Grey will propose to his colleagues that they should declare that the fleet will oppose the passage of the German squadrons through the Straits; or, if they passed the Straits, to any demonstration on the French coasts. The Council, on Monday, will discuss these two questions. I have pointed out to the Principal Secretary of State that if, between now and then, any grave incident should occur, it would not do to be taken by surprise, and that it would be well to consider intervening in time.

PAUL CAMBON.

No. 127.

*M. René Viviani, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs, to M. Paul Cambon, French Ambassador in London.*

*Paris, August 1, 1914.*

We are informed from several sources that the German and Austrian Governments are endeavouring at this moment to make an impression

on England by trying to make her believe that the responsibility for war, if it break out, will fall upon Russia. An effort is being made to obtain England's neutrality by distorting the truth. France, together with England, has throughout given constant counsels of moderation to St. Petersburg. Those counsels have been heeded.

From the outset, M. Sazonof has pressed Servia to accept all the clauses of the ultimatum compatible with her sovereignty.

He subsequently began a direct conversation with Austria, which was fresh evidence of his conciliatory spirit. Finally, he agreed to allow the less interested Powers to seek for the means to soothe the trouble. In conformity with a desire expressed to him by Sir George Buchanan, M. Sazonof has agreed to modify the first formula he had presented, and has drafted another which does not sensibly differ from the declaration made yesterday by Count Szécsen to M. de Margerie. Count Szécsen declares that Austria has no intention of making territorial acquisitions, and that she does not wish to touch the sovereignty of Servia. He expressly adds that Austria has no aim upon the Sandjak of Novi-Bazar.

It would seem, therefore, that it would be easy to have reached an agreement between the suggestion of Sir Edward Grey, the formula of M. Sazonof, and the declaration of Austria.

France, with England, is resolved to pursue to the end the realisation of this agreement.

But while negotiations were proceeding, and while Russia was giving evidence of incontestable goodwill in the negotiations, Austria began general mobilisation, being first to take such action.

Russia has seen herself forced to imitate Austria in order not to find herself in a state of inferiority, but she is still ready to negotiate.

I need not repeat that as to ourselves we continue to work with England for the success of these *pourparlers*.

But the attitude of Germany has absolutely forced us to issue to-day a decree of mobilisation. Long before Russian mobilisation, on Wednesday last, as I have already telegraphed to you, Baron von Schoen announced to me the forthcoming proclamation of the *Kriegsgefahrzustand*. This step has been taken by Germany, and sheltered by this screen, she immediately began her real mobilisation.

M. Paléologue has telegraphed to-day that the Count de Pourtalès has announced the German mobilisation to the Russian Government.

Information received by the Minister of War confirms that this is effectively in full swing. Our decree of mobilisation is therefore an *essential measure* of preservation. The Government has accompanied it by a proclamation, signed by the President of the Republic and all the Ministers, in which it explains that mobilisation is not war; that in the present state of affairs it is the best means of safeguarding peace; and that the Government of the Republic will multiply its efforts with a view to the success of the negotiations.

Please immediately transmit these remarks to Sir Edward Grey, and give him to understand that we have constantly been at pains to commit no act of provocation.



I am persuaded that if war does break out, English opinion will clearly see from what side the aggression comes, and that it will grasp the very strong reasons we have given to Sir Edward Grey in our demand for the armed intervention of England in the interests of the future of European equilibrium.

RENÉ VIVIANI.

No. 128.

*M. Mollard, French Minister in Luxemburg, to M. Viviani, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Luxemburg, August 1, 1914.*

The Minister of State has requested me to demand from the French Government an assurance of neutrality similar to that given to Belgium. M. Eyschen declared that at present, in view of the fact that it was the French Minister in Brussels who made the declaration in question to the Prime Minister of the Belgian Government, he was of opinion that the same procedure would be best suited towards the Grand Duchy.

It is for this reason that he refrained from making his demand direct to the Government of the Republic. As the Chamber of Deputies meets on Monday M. Eyschen desires to be in receipt of the reply by that date. A similar démarche has been made at the same time to the German Minister in Luxemburg.

MOLLARD.

No. 129.

*M. Viviani, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs, to M. Mollard, French Minister in Luxemburg.*

*Paris, August 1, 1914.*

Please state to the Prime Minister that in conformity with the Treaty of London of 1867 the Government of the Republic intends to respect the neutrality of the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg, as it has shown by its attitude. A German violation of this neutrality, however, would be of a nature to force France to act thereafter in accordance with the requirements of her defence and her interests.

RENÉ VIVIANI.

No. 130.

*M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador in Berlin, to M. René Viviani, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Berlin, August 1, 1914.*

Special editions of the newspapers that are being distributed in the streets of Berlin announce that the general mobilisation of the Army and the Navy is decreed, and that the first day of the mobilisation is Sunday, August 2.

JULES CAMBON.

## No. 131.

*M. Eyschen, Minister of State in Luxembourg,, to M. René Viviani, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Luxembourg, August 2, 1914.*

I have the honour to bring the following facts to the knowledge of Your Excellency: According to the news which up to the present has reached the Grand-Ducal Government, early in the morning of Sunday, August 2, German troops entered Luxembourg territory by the Wasserbillig and Remich bridges, moving especially towards the south of the country and the town of Luxembourg. A certain number of armoured trains with troops and stores have been sent along the railway line towards Luxembourg, where their arrival is expected at any moment.

These facts imply acts which are manifestly against the neutrality of the Grand Duchy as guaranteed by the Treaty of London of 1867. The Luxembourg Government has not failed to make an energetic protest against this aggression to the representatives in Luxembourg of His Majesty the German Emperor. An identical protest will be telegraphed to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in Berlin.

EYSCHEN.

## No. 132.

*M. Mollard, French Ambassador at Luxembourg, to M. Viviani, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Luxembourg, August 2, 1914.*

The Minister of State in Luxembourg, M. Eyschen, has just received through the German Minister at Luxembourg, Herr de Buch, a telegram from the Chancellor of the German Empire, Herr von Bethmann Hollweg, stating that the military measures taken in Luxembourg do not constitute a hostile act against Luxembourg, but are solely intended to protect against any attack by a French army the exploitation of the railways leased to the Empire. Luxembourg will receive full indemnity for any damage done.

MOLLARD.

## No. 133.

*Note presented by the German Ambassador.*

*Paris, August 2, 1914.*

The German Ambassador has just been ordered and hastens to inform the Minister of Foreign Affairs that the military steps taken by Germany in the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg do not constitute an act of hostility. They must be considered as being purely preventive measures taken for the protection of the railways which under existing treaties between Germany and the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg are under German administration.

## No. 134.

*M. Paléologue, French Ambassador in St. Petersburg, to M. Viviani, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*St. Petersburg, August 2, 1914.*

The German Ambassador, at 7.10 p.m. yesterday, handed a declaration of War to M. Sazonof. He leaves St. Petersburg to-day.

The Austrian Ambassador has received no instructions from his Government to declare war.

PALÉOLOGUE.

## No. 135.

*M. René Viviani, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs, to French representatives abroad.*

*Paris, August 2, 1914.*

The Russian Ambassador informs me that Germany has just declared war upon Russia in spite of the negotiations in progress, and at the moment when Austria-Hungary agreed to discuss with the Powers even the root of her dispute with Servia.

RENÉ VIVIANI.

## No. 136.

*M. Viviani, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs, to London, Rome, Berlin, Vienna, St. Petersburg, Constantinople and Madrid.*

*Paris, August 2, 1914.*

French territory was violated by German troops this morning at Cirey and near Longwy. They are marching on the forts bearing the latter name. Further, the customs post at Delle has been attacked by rifle fire. Finally, German troops this morning also violated the neutral territory of Luxemburg.

You will use this information without delay, in order that it may be seen how the German Government is committing acts of war against France without provocation on our part, while we have scrupulously respected the zone of 10 kilomètres which we have kept between our troops and the frontier since mobilisation.

RENÉ VIVIANI.

## No. 137.

*M. Paul Cambon, French Ambassador in London, to M. René Viviani, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*London, August 2, 1914.*

At the close of the Cabinet Council held this morning Sir Edward Grey made to me the following declaration:—

“I am authorised to give the assurance that if the German Fleet enter the Channel or cross the North Sea in order to undertake acts



of war against the French coasts or the French mercantile marine, the British Fleet will give every protection in its power.

"This assurance is, naturally, given conditionally on the policy of His Majesty's Government being approved by the British Parliament, and should not be considered as obliging His Majesty's Government to act until the above-mentioned eventuality of the German Fleet's action has occurred."

Speaking to me afterwards of the neutrality of Belgium, and that of Luxemburg, the Principal Secretary of State reminded me that the Convention of 1867 relative to the Grand Duchy differed from the Treaty relative to Belgium in this sense, that England was bound to uphold this latter agreement without the support of the other guaranteeing Powers. while, for Luxemburg, all the guaranteeing Powers must act in concert.

The preservation of Belgian neutrality is considered here so important that England would look upon its violation by Germany as a *casus belli*. This is a peculiarly English interest, and one cannot doubt that the British Government, faithful to the traditions of its policy, will make it prevail, even if the business world, where German influence makes tenacious efforts, tried to exert pressure to hinder the Government from engaging itself against Germany.

PAUL CAMBON.

No. 138.

*M. René Viviani, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs, to  
M. Paul Cambon, French Ambassador in London.*

*Paris, August 2, 1914.*

I note the information contained in your telegrams of the 27th, 30th, 31st July, and the 1st August, and in that you have addressed to me to-day.

In communicating to the Chambers the same declaration that Sir Edward Grey has made to you, of which your last telegram gives me the text, I will add that we have therein obtained from Great Britain a first support, the value of which is precious to us.

I propose, moreover, to indicate that the assistance which Great Britain has the intention of giving to France, with the view of protecting the French coasts or the French mercantile marine, would be so exerted as to afford equal support to our Navy by the English Fleet, in the case of a Franco-German conflict, in the Atlantic as well as in the North Sea and in the English Channel. I will, moreover, mention that English ports cannot be used as points for the revictualling of the German Fleet.

RENÉ VIVIANI.

No. 139.

*M. Viviani, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs, to M. Jules  
Cambon, French Ambassador in Berlin.*

*Paris, August 2, 1914.*

German troops having to-day violated the eastern frontier at several points. I beg you to protest in writing without delay to the German

Government. Be good enough to be guided by the following note, which, in view of the uncertainty of communications between Paris and Berlin, I have sent direct to the German Ambassador here. "The French administrative and military authorities in the region of the East have just reported several facts which I have ordered the Ambassador of the Republic in Berlin to bring to the notice of the Imperial Government. One happened at Delle, in the district of Belfort. On two occasions the French customs officers posted in this part were fired on by a detachment of German soldiers. To the north of Delle, two German patrols of the 5th Mounted Chasseurs crossed the frontier this morning, and advanced as far as the villages of Joncherey and Baron, over ten kilometres from the frontier. The officer who commanded the former blew out the brains of a French soldier. The German cavalry took away the horses which the French mayor of Suarce was engaged in collecting, and forced the inhabitants of the Commune to lead these horses away.

The Ambassador of the Republic in Berlin has been ordered to protest formally to the Imperial Government against facts which constitute a clear violation of the frontier by German troops under arms and which nothing in the present state of affairs can justify. The Government of the Republic can only leave the Imperial Government to bear the entire responsibility of these acts."

RENÉ VIVIANI.

No. 140.

*M. Pellet, French Minister at The Hague, to M. Viviani, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*The Hague, August 3, 1914.*

The German Minister called upon the Minister of Foreign Affairs yesterday in order, he said, to explain the necessity for the violation of Luxemburg neutrality by Germany. He added that to-day he would have a further communication to make to him. This morning, indeed, he announced the entry of German troops into Belgium in order, he declared, to avoid an occupation of that country by France.

PELLET.

No. 141.

*M. Klubukowski, French Minister in Brussels, to René Viviani, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Brussels, August 3, 1914.*

The German Minister yesterday handed an ultimatum to the Belgian Government, in which it is said that the German Government, having learnt that France was preparing to operate in the regions of Givet and Namur, found itself under the necessity to take steps, the first of which was to ask the Belgian Government to inform it within seven hours if it were willing to facilitate military operations against France in Belgium. In the event of a refusal the fate of arms would decide. The

King's Government has replied that the news as to French movements seemed to be inexact, in view of the formal and still recent assurances given by France; that Belgium, who since her constitution had sought to safeguard her dignity and her interests, and had devoted all her efforts to the peaceful development of progress, strongly protested against all violation of her territory, no matter whence it came, and that, in such an event, she would know how to defend energetically her neutrality, which was guaranteed by the Powers, and notably by the King of Prussia.

KLUBUKOWSKI.

No. 142.

*M. Klubukowski, French Minister in Brussels, to M. Viviani, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Brussels, August 3, 1914.*

To the assurance which I gave him that if Belgium appealed to the guarantee of the Powers against the violation of her neutrality by Germany, France would immediately respond to her appeal, the Minister of Foreign Affairs replied: "It is with all sincerity that we thank the Government of the Republic for the eventual support which it may offer us, but in the actual circumstance we do not appeal to the guarantee of the Powers. Later on, the King's Government will appreciate what is to be done."

No. 143.

*M. Paul Cambon, French Ambassador in London, to M. Viviani, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*London, August 3, 1914.*

Sir Edward Grey has authorised me to tell you that you may inform Parliament that to-day he made declarations in the Commons as to the present attitude of the British Government, and that the chief of these declarations was as follows: "If the German fleet cross the Straits, or go north in the North Sea in order to double the British Isles, with a view to attacking the French coasts or the French Navy, or to disturbing the French mercantile marine, the British fleet will intervene in order to give the French marine entire protection, so that from that moment on England and Germany would be in a state of war."

Sir E. Grey pointed out that the mention of operations through the North Sea implied protection against a demonstration in the Atlantic Ocean.

The declaration with regard to the intervention of the British Fleet, of which I gave you the text in my telegram of August 2, is to be regarded as binding the British Government. Sir Edward Grey assured me of this, and added, that the French Government was therefore in a position to bring it to the knowledge of the Chambers.

On my return to the Embassy I learned from your telephonic communication of the German ultimatum addressed to Belgium. I immediately informed Sir E. Grey of it.

PAUL CAMBON.



No. 144.

*M. Paul Cambon, French Minister in London, to M. Viviani, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*London, August 3, 1914.*

Just as Sir E. Grey was leaving this morning for the Cabinet Council my German colleague, who had already seen him yesterday, called to press him to say that the neutrality of England did not depend on respect for Belgian neutrality.

Sir E. Grey refused to discuss the matter.

The German Ambassador has sent a communiqué to the Press stating that if England remain neutral Germany will forgo all naval operations and will not use the Belgian coasts as supporting base. I am making the reply that respect for coasts is not respect for the neutrality of territory, and that the German ultimatum is already a violation of neutrality.

PAUL CAMBON.

No. 145.

*M. Paul Cambon, French Ambassador in London, to M. René Viviani, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*London, August 3, 1914.*

Sir Edward Grey has made a declaration with regard to the intervention of the British fleet. In view of events, he rendered more precise the declarations he intended to make on the subject of Belgian neutrality. The reading of a letter from King Albert asking for the support of England made a deep impression on the House. The House will this evening vote credits asked for; from now on its support is acquired to the policy of the Government, which, following public opinion, is growing more and more in our favour.

PAUL CAMBON.

No. 146.

*M. René Viviani, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs, to M. Paul Cambon, French Ambassador in London.*

*Paris, August 3, 1914.*

It has been reported to me that the German Ambassador informed the Foreign Office yesterday morning that 80 French officers in Prussian uniform endeavoured to cross the German frontier at Walbeck and to the west of Geldern in 12 motor-cars, and that this constituted a grave violation of neutrality on the part of France.

Please immediately deny this statement as a pure invention, and draw the attention of the Foreign Office to the German campaign of false news which is beginning.

RENÉ VIVIANI.

## No. 147.

*Letter handed by German Ambassador to M. René Viviani during his farewell audience, August 3, 1914, at 6.45 p.m.*

*Paris, August 3, 1914.*

‘ M. le Président,

“ The German administrative and military authorities have remarked a certain number of definitely hostile acts committed on German territory by French military airmen. Several of these latter have manifestly violated the neutrality of Belgium by flying over the territory of that country. One has endeavoured to destroy buildings near Wesel; others have been seen in the Eifel region; another has thrown bombs on the railway line near Carlsruhe and Nuremberg. I am ordered, and I have the honour, to inform your Excellency that in view of these aggressions the German Empire considers itself to be in a state of war with France by the act of this latter Power.

“ At the same time I have the honour to inform your Excellency that the German authorities will detain French merchant ships in German ports, but that they will release them if, within 48 hours, complete reciprocity be assured.

“ My diplomatic mission having come to an end, I have but to ask your Excellency to be good enough to furnish me with my passports, and to take the steps which may seem necessary to your Excellency to assure my return to Germany with the staff of the Embassy, as well as with the staff of the Bavarian Legation and of the German Consulate-General in Paris. Pray accept, Monsieur le Président, the expression of my very high consideration.

“ (Signed) SCHOEN.”

## No. 148.

*M. René Viviani, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs, to French representatives abroad.*

*Paris, August 3, 1914.*

The German Ambassador has asked for his passports and is leaving this evening with the staff of the Embassy and the German Consulate-General and of the Bavarian Legation. Baron von Schoen gave as pretext the knowledge by German administrative and military authorities of hostile acts which are alleged to have been committed on German territory by French military aviators, who are accused of having flown over the territory of the Empire and of having thrown bombs. The Ambassador adds that the aviators have also violated the neutrality of Belgium by flying over Belgian territory. “ In view of these aggressions,” says Baron von Schoen’s letter, “ the German Empire considers itself to be in a state of war with France by the act of the latter Power.”

I formally challenged the inaccurate assertion of the Ambassador, and for my part reminded him that already, yesterday, I had sent him a note protesting against definite violations of the French frontier committed during the last two days by detachments of German troops.

RENÉ VIVIANI.

## No. 149.

*M. René Viviani, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs, to  
M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador in Berlin.*

*Paris, August 3, 1914.*

I ask you to demand your passports and to quit Berlin immediately with the staff of the Embassy, leaving the care of French interests and the charge of the archives with the Spanish Ambassador. I beg you to protest, in writing, at the same time against the violation of Luxemburg neutrality by German troops reported by the Luxemburg Prime Minister; against the ultimatum sent to the Belgian Government by the German Minister in Brussels with a view to forcing upon it the violation of the neutrality of Belgium and to exacting from Belgium that she should facilitate military operations against France on Belgian territory; and, finally, against the false allegations, of a supposed plan of invasion of those two countries by the French armies, by which the German Government has endeavoured to justify the state of war which it declares henceforward to exist between Germany and France.

RENÉ VIVIANI.

## No. 150.

*M. Viviani, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs, to M. Allizé,  
French Minister at Munich.*

*Paris, August 3, 1914.*

Please inform the Royal Bavarian Government that you have been instructed to conform your attitude with that of the Ambassador of the Republic in Berlin and to leave Munich.

RENÉ VIVIANI.

## No. 151.

*M. Viviani, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs, to St. Petersburg, Rome, Vienna, London, Constantinople, Berne, Madrid, The Hague, Copenhagen, Christiania, Stockholm, Bukarest, Athens and Belgrade.*

*Paris, August 3, 1914.*

I learn from a Belgian official source that German troops have violated Belgian territory at Gemmerich, in the neighbourhood of Verviers.

VIVIANI.



No. 152.

*M. Klobukowski, French Minister in Brussels, to René Viviani, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs,*

BRUSSELS, August 4, 1914.

The Chef de Cabinet of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has handed me a letter, in which "the King's Government declares itself firmly resolved to resist the aggression of Germany by all means in its power. Belgium appeals to England, France and Russia as guarantors to co-operate in the defence of her territory. There would be concerted and common action with a view to resisting the measures of force used by Germany against Belgium, and at the same time with a view to guaranteeing the maintenance of the independence and integrity of Belgium in the future.

"Belgium is happy to be able to declare that she will undertake the defence of her fortified towns."

KLOBUKOWSKI.

No. 153.

*M. Paul Cambon, French Ambassador in London, to M. René Viviani, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

LONDON, August 4, 1914.

Sir Edward Grey has asked me to come and see him at once in order to tell me that the Prime Minister will, this afternoon, announce in the House that Germany had been called upon to withdraw her ultimatum to Belgium, and to give a reply to England before midnight to-night.

PAUL CAMBON.

No. 154.

*M. Klobukowski, French Minister in Brussels, to M. René Viviani, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

BRUSSELS, August 4, 1914.

The German Minister this morning informed the Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs, that in consequence of the refusal of the Belgian Government, the Imperial Government sees itself obliged to execute, by force of arms, the measures of security which are indispensable in view of French menaces.

KLOBUKOWSKI.

*M. Bapst, French Minister in Copenhagen, to M. Doumergue, Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Copenhagen, August 6, 1914.*

The French Ambassador in Berlin begs me to communicate the following telegram to your Excellency: "I have been sent to Denmark by the German Government. I have just arrived at Copenhagen. All the staff of the Embassy and the Russian chargé d'affaires at Darmstadt with his family accompanied me. Such behaviour was shown towards us that I think it well to make a complete report to your Excellency by telegraph.

On Monday morning, August 3, after, in conformity with your instructions, I had sent to Herr von Jagow a protest against the acts of aggression committed on French territory by German troops, the Secretary of State came to see me.

Herr von Jagow came to complain of acts of aggression, which he alleged had been committed in Germany, notably at Nuremberg and Coblenz, by French aviators who, according to him, "had come from Belgium." I replied that I had not the slightest knowledge of the facts which he wished to report, the improbability of which appeared evident to me. In my turn I asked him if he had become acquainted with the note which I had sent him on the subject of the invasion of our territory by detachments of the German Army. As the Secretary of State told me that he had not yet read this note, I acquainted him with its contents. I called his attention to the act committed by the officer in command of one of these detachments, who had advanced as far as the French village of Joncherey, 10 kilomètres inside our frontiers, and had blown out the brains of a French soldier whom he met there. After having given my opinion of this act I added, "You will admit that in no case can such an action be compared with an aeroplane fight over foreign territory, by private persons actuated by that spirit of individual daring which characterises aviators. This aggression, committed on the territory of a neighbour by detachments of regular troops commanded by officers, is much more serious."

Herr von Jagow declared that he knew nothing of the facts of which I spoke, and concluded that it was difficult to avoid acts of this nature being committed, when two armies, inspired by the feelings which animate our troops, stood face to face on each side of the frontier.

At this moment the crowd, which had gathered on the Pariser Platz in front of the Embassy, and which we saw through the open window of my cabinet, raised shouts against France. I asked the Secretary of State when all this was going to stop?

"The Government has not yet made any decision," replied Herr von Jagow. "It is probable that Baron von Schoen will to-day be instructed to ask for his passports, and subsequently you shall receive yours."

The Secretary of State assured me, moreover, that I need not in

any way worry about my departure, and that all the rules of good behaviour would be observed with regard to me and to my staff. We were to see each other no more, and took leave of each other after an interview which had been courteous, and which could not lead me to foresee what was in store for me.

Before leaving Herr von Jagow I expressed to him my desire to pay a personal visit to the Imperial Chancellor, as it would be the last time I should have an opportunity of seeing him.

Herr von Jagow, in reply, begged me not to proceed with this intention, for the interview could serve no purpose and could only be painful.

At six o'clock in the evening Baron von Langwerth brought me my passports. In the name of his Government he refused to agree to the wish I expressed to him that I should be allowed to leave by Holland or by Belgium. He suggested that I should leave by Copenhagen, although he could not assure me of the free passage by sea, or by Switzerland, via Constance. I accepted this latter route. Baron von Langwerth having asked me to leave as quickly as possible, it was agreed that, in view of the necessity of coming to an understanding with the Spanish Ambassador, who has taken our interests in charge, I should leave the Embassy the next day, Tuesday, August 4, at ten o'clock in the evening.

An hour after the departure of Baron von Langwerth, at seven o'clock, M. Lancken, former councillor of the Embassy at Paris, on behalf of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs requested me to ask the staff of my Embassy to cease taking its meals in the restaurants. This order was so strict that the next day, Tuesday, I had to resort to the authority of the Wilhelmstrasse so that the Hotel Bristol should send us our meals to the Embassy.

The same evening, Monday, at eleven o'clock, Baron von Langwerth came back to tell me that his Government refused to allow me to return via Switzerland, on the pretext that it would require three days and three nights to take me to Constance. He told me that I should be sent to Vienna. I only agreed to this change under reserve and at one o'clock in the morning I wrote the following letter to Baron von Langwerth:—

*“Berlin, August 3, 1914.*

“MONSIEUR LE BARON,

“I have thought about the route which you mentioned to me this evening for my return to my country. You propose that I should pass through Vienna. I am exposed to finding myself detained in that city, if not by the Act of the Austrian Government at least by the circumstances of mobilisation, which cause difficulties in train traffic similar to those of Germany. In these conditions I feel I must demand that the German Government shall pledge its honour that the Austrian Government shall send me to Switzerland, and that the Swiss Government shall not close the frontier, which, in fact, I am informed has been closed to foreigners, either to me or to the persons accompanying me. I cannot



therefore accept the proposals you have made to me unless I have the guarantees I have asked of you, and unless I am assured that I shall not be kept out of my country for several months.

JULES CAMBON."

The next morning, Tuesday, August 4, Baron von Langwerth, in reply to this letter, gave me in writing the assurance that the Austrian and Swiss authorities had received the necessary communications.

At the same time M. Miladowski, attached to the Consulate in Berlin, was arrested in bed at his house as well as other Frenchmen. M. Miladowski, for whom a diplomatic passport had been asked, was released at the end of four hours.

I was prepared to leave for Vienna when at 4.45 Baron von Langwerth returned to tell me that I must leave with persons accompanying me at ten o'clock in the evening, but that I should be taken to Denmark. In view of this fresh demand I asked if I should be put into a fortress in the event of my not accepting. Baron von Langwerth simply replied that he would return to receive my answer in half-an-hour. I did not wish to give the German Government a pretext for saying that I had refused to leave Germany. I therefore told Baron von Langwerth when he returned that I would submit to the order given by him, but that I protested.

I at once wrote a letter to Herr von Jagow, of which the following is a copy:—

*"Berlin, August 4, 1914.*

"M. LE SECRETAIRE D'ETAT,

"Your Excellency has said on several occasions that the Imperial Government, in conformity with the usages of International courtesy, would facilitate my return to my country and would give me every means of returning to it rapidly. Nevertheless, yesterday, after having refused me access to Belgium and Holland, Baron von Langwerth informed me that I should pass through Switzerland via Constance. During the night I was informed that I should be sent to Austria, a country which is taking part in the present war at the side of Germany. As I was ignorant of the intentions of Austria with regard to me since, on her soil I am nothing but a private individual, I wrote to Baron von Langwerth asking him if the Imperial Government could undertake that the Imperial and Royal Austrian authorities should give me all possible facilities for continuing my journey and that Switzerland should not be closed to me. Baron von Langwerth was good enough to reply to me in writing that I should be assured of an easy journey and that the Austrian authorities would do all that was necessary.

"It was nearly five o'clock when Baron von Langwerth came to tell me that I should be sent to Denmark. In view of events, I am not certain of finding a vessel to take me to England and it is this consideration which in agreement with Baron von Langwerth made me reject this proposal.

"In reality I am left no liberty and am treated almost as a prisoner. I am obliged to submit, having no means of obtaining an assurance that the rules of International courtesy shall be observed with regard to me, but I should like to protest through your Excellency against the way in which I am treated.

"Pray accept, M. le Secrétaire d'Etat, the assurances of my feelings of esteem."

While my letter was being carried I was informed that our journey would not be accomplished direct, but *via* Schleswig. At ten o'clock in the evening I left the Embassy with my staff amidst great forces of foot and mounted police.

The furniture and works of art belonging to the State being possessed of considerable value, I have left, at the Embassy, my *maitre d'hôtel*, who is of Spanish nationality, to guard them and look after them.

At the station only a subordinate employé of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs represented that administration.

Our journey was accomplished with extreme slowness. We took over twenty-four hours to reach the frontier. It seemed as though at each station we were waiting for orders to start again. I was accompanied by Major von Rheinbaden, of the Alexander Regiment of the Guard, and by a police functionary. In the neighbourhood of the Kiel Canal soldiers invaded our carriages. The windows were closed and the curtains of the carriages drawn. Each of us had to remain alone in his compartment, and was forbidden to rise or to touch his bags. In the lobby of the coaches, before the open door of each of our compartments, stood a soldier, revolver in hand and a finger on the trigger. The Russian *chargé d'affaires*, the women, children, everybody was submitted to the same treatment.

At the last German station, at 11 o'clock in the evening, Major von Rheinbaden came to take leave of me. I handed him the following letter for Herr von Jagow:—

*Wednesday evening, August 5, 1914.*

MONSIEUR LE SECRÉTAIRE D'ÉTAT,

Yesterday, before leaving Berlin, I protested in writing against the successive changes in direction which were imposed upon me by the Imperial Government for my departure from Germany.

To-day, while the train which was taking me was passing above the Kiel Canal, there was a desire to inspect our luggage as though we might have hidden some engine of destruction. Thanks to the intervention of Major von Rheinbaden we were spared this affront.

But, worse was to come.

Each of us was forced to remain in his compartment, the windows and curtains of which were closed. During this time, in the corridor of the coaches, at the door of each compartment and facing each of us, soldiers stood for nearly half-an-hour, revolver in hand and finger on the trigger.

I feel I must protest against this threat of violence towards the Ambassador of the Republic and the staff of his Embassy, violence which nothing had even led me to expect. I had the honour to write your Excellency yesterday that I was treated almost as a prisoner. To-day it is as a dangerous prisoner that I have been treated. I must note that in the course of journey, which from Berlin to Denmark has taken twenty-four hours, no meal had been prepared or supplied to me, or to the persons taken with me, as far as to the frontier. Please accept, etc."

I thought all was over, when shortly afterwards Major von Rheinbaden, a little confused, came to tell me that the train would not proceed to the Danish frontier unless I paid the cost of it. I expressed my surprise that I had not been made to pay in Berlin, and that in any case I had not been warned. I suggested paying by cheque on one of the biggest banks in Berlin. This facility was refused me. With the help of my companions I was able to collect the sum in cash which was immediately required of me. It amounted to 3,611 marks 75 pf., or about 5,000 francs at the present rate of exchange.\*

After this last incident I thought it necessary to ask Herr von Rheinbaden for his word, as an officer and gentleman, that I should be taken as far as the Danish frontier. He gave his word, and I demanded that the policeman that was with us should accompany us. Thus we arrived at the first Danish station where the Danish Government had prepared a train to take us to Copenhagen.

I am told that my British colleague and the Belgian Minister, who left Berlin after me, departed directly to Holland. I am struck by this difference of treatment, and as Denmark and Norway are at present filled with spies, if I should succeed in embarking in Norway it is feared that I may be arrested at sea with the officers who accompany me.

I cannot finish this despatch without reporting to Your Excellency the devotion and energy displayed by the whole staff of the Embassy throughout the whole period of this crisis. I should be glad if the services they have rendered on this occasion to the Government of the Republic may be borne in mind, particularly those rendered by the Secretaries of the Embassy, and by the Military Attaché and by the Naval Attaché.

JULES CAMBON.

No. 156.

*M. Mollard, French Minister in Luxemburg, to M. Doumergue, Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Paris, August 5, 1914.*

The Minister of State called towards half-past eight o'clock on Tuesday morning, August 4, to notify me that the German military

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\* Subsequently the sum was returned to the Spanish Embassy, which was entrusted with French interests, for transmission to the French Ambassador. The French Government begged the Spanish Government to devote the sum to the relief of French subjects in Germany.



authorities demanded my departure. On my replying that I would yield only to force, he replied that he knew my feelings, and that that was why he had come himself to make this communication, which pained him greatly. It was indeed under compulsion that he wished me to depart. He added that he was going to give me written proof of that. I did not conceal from M. Eyschen the sorrow and anxiety I felt in leaving my compatriots without defence, and I begged him to take upon himself their protection, to which he agreed.

At the moment of my departure he handed me the enclosed letter (Annexe No. 1), which is the reply of the Luxemburg Government to the declaration I made the previous evening, in accordance with the telegraphic instructions of M. Viviani.

Towards ten o'clock he came to the Legation again and left a certified copy of the letter which had been addressed to him by the German Minister on the subject of my departure from Luxemburg (Annexes 2 and 3).

He also told me that he had informed Herr von Buch that the Luxemburg Government would be entrusted with the protection of French subjects, and would take care of the Legation and Chancellery. This news did not appear to please my German colleague, who advised M. Eyschen to urge me to confide this task to the Belgian Minister. I explained to the Minister of State that the situation was peculiar. Being accredited to Her Royal Highness the Grand Duchess, and my country not being at war with Luxemburg, it was clearly indicated that the Luxemburg Government should ensure the safeguard of my compatriots. M. Eyschen did not insist, and again accepted the mission I confided to him.

The Minister of State then asked me to be good enough to go without disturbance so as to avoid manifestations, which he told me would not fail to bring about reprisals on Frenchmen from the German military authorities. I replied that I attached too much value to the security of my compatriots to compromise them, and that there was nothing for him to fear.

My departure, which was demanded at the earliest possible moment, was fixed for two o'clock, and it was agreed that I should leave in my motor car. As to the safe conduct M. Eyschen told me that the German Minister had gone to the German Headquarters to get it, and that he would let me have it in good time.

At a quarter past two the Secretary of State, accompanied by M. Henrion, Government Councillor, came to bid me adieu, and to receive the keys of the Legation and the Chancellery.

He informed me that orders had been given for my free passage, and that I was to reach Arlon by the Merle, Mamers and Arlon roads. He added that a German officer would await me at the Merle road in order to precede my car. I then left the Legation and proceeded to Arlon by the route fixed, but I met no one.

Your Excellency will find herewith (Annexe 4) the text of the letter I handed to M. Eyschen before leaving my post.

## ANNEXE 1.

*M. Eyshen, Minister of State, Prime Minister, to M. Mollard, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of France in Luxemburg.*

*Luxemburg, August 4, 1914.*

MONSIEUR LE MINISTRE.

By your verbal communication of yesterday evening Your Excellency had the great kindness to inform me that, in conformity with the Treaty of London of 1867, the Government of the Republic intended to respect the neutrality of the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg as had appeared from its attitude, but that the violation of this neutrality by Germany was nevertheless of a nature to force France henceforward to be actuated in this regard by care for her defence and interests.

You will allow me to point out, Monsieur le Ministre, that the decision of the Government of the Republic is solely based upon the act of a third Power for which the Grand Duchy is certainly not responsible.

The rights of Luxemburg must therefore remain intact.

The German Empire has formally declared that only a temporary occupation enters into its intentions.

I am glad to think, Monsieur le Ministre, that the Government of the Republic will have no difficulty in agreeing with me that at all times and in all circumstances the Grand Duchy has entirely and loyally fulfilled all obligations of whatever nature which rested upon it in virtue of the Treaty of 1867.

Pray accept, etc.

The Minister of State, President of the Government.

(Signed) EYSCHEN.

## ANNEXE 2.

*Private letter sent by M. Eyschen, Minister of State, President of the Government, to M. Mollard, French Minister in Luxemburg.*

MONSIEUR LE MINISTRE,

Just now I had the great regret of communicating to you the intentions of General von Fuchs as to your stay in Luxemburg. As I had the honour to tell you, I had asked for a written statement of the decision taken by the military authority in this respect.

Enclosed is a copy of a letter I have just received from the German Minister.

I have been assured that in carrying out the measure the respect due to your quality and person will not be lacking.

Pray accept the renewed expression of my regret and my best sentiments.

(Signed) EYSCHEN.

## ANNEXE 3.

*To His Excellency the Minister of State, Doctor Eyschen.*

EXCELLENCY,

I have the honour, in conformity with the instructions of His Excellency, General Fuchs, to beg you to be good enough to ask the French Minister, M. Mollard, to leave Luxemburg as quickly as possible and to proceed to France. Otherwise the military authorities will be under the painful duty of placing M. Mollard under the observation of a military escort, and in the last resort to proceed to his arrest.

I beg your Excellency to be good enough to accept on this occasion the assurance of my most distinguished esteem.

(Signed) VON BUCH.

## ANNEXE 4.

*M. Mollard, French Minister in Luxemburg, to His Excellency M. Eyschen,  
President of the Government of Luxemburg.*

*Luxemburg, August 4, 1914.*

MONSIEUR LE MINISTRE,

I have just received your communication, and I bow to force. Before leaving Luxemburg it is my duty to concern myself with the fate and security of my compatriots. Knowing the spirit of justice and equity of the Luxemburg Government, I have the honour to beg your Excellency to take them under your high protection, and to watch over the safeguard of their lives and property.

I will also ask your Excellency to see to the safety of the Legation and the Chancellery offices.

I shall be much obliged if your Excellency would be good enough to express to the Grand Duchess my deep respect, and all my excuses at having been unable to express it myself.

In thanking you, M. le Ministre, for all the marks of sympathy you have given me, I beg you to accept the renewed assurance of my high esteem.

(Signed) ARMAND MOLLARD.



*Notification of the French Government to the Representatives of the Powers.*

The Imperial German Government—after having allowed its armed forces to cross the frontier and to commit various acts of murder and of pillage; after having violated the neutrality of Luxemburg, in defiance of the stipulations of the Convention of London of May 11, 1867, and of the Convention of the Hague of October, 1907, on the rights and duties of Powers and persons in case of land war (Articles 1 and 2), conventions signed by it; after having sent an ultimatum to the Royal Government of Belgium demanding the passage of German forces through Belgian territory in violation of the Treaties of April 19, 1839, also signed by it, and of the above mentioned Hague Convention—declared war upon France at 6.45 p.m. on August 3, 1914.

The Government of the Republic sees itself in these circumstances obliged on its side to have recourse to the force of arms.

It has, in consequence, the honour of making known by the present communication to the ..... Government that a state of war exists between France and Germany as from 6.45 on August 3, 1914.

The Government of the Republic protests to all civilised nations, and especially to the Governments signatory to the Conventions and Treaties recalled, against the violation by Germany of her international engagements; it makes all reserves as to the reprisals which it may be lead to use against an enemy so little heedful of a given word.

The Government of the Republic, which intends to observe the principles of international law, will conform during the hostilities and under reserve of reciprocity to the provisions of the International Conventions signed by France, regarding the rules of land and sea warfare.

The present notification made in conformity with Article 2 of the 3rd Hague Convention of October 18, 1907, relating to the opening of hostilities is handed to. . . . .

Paris, August 4, 1914, at 2 o'clock.

*Message from M. Poincaré, President of the Republic, to the Extraordinary Session of Parliament, August 4, 1914.*

(The Chamber listened to the message standing.)

MESSIEURS LES DEPUTES,

France has just been the object of a brutal and premeditated aggression which is an insolent challenge to the rights of humanity. Before a declaration of war had been addressed to us, before even the German Ambassador had demanded his passports, our territory has been violated. The German Empire yesterday evening only tardily gave the true name to a state of fact which it had already created.

For over forty years the French in their sincere love of peace have repressed in their hearts their desire for legitimate reparation.

They have set to the world the example of a great nation which, definitely raised up from defeat by the power of will, patience, and industry, has used its renewed and rejuvenated energy solely in the interests of peace and for the good of humanity

Since the Austrian ultimatum opened a crisis which threatened the whole of Europe, France has devoted herself to pursuing and to recommending everywhere a policy of prudence, wisdom and moderation.

No one can impute to her any act, any gesture, any word which was not pacific and conciliatory.

At the moment of the first encounters she has the right solemnly to claim this justice for herself, that she made up to the last moment supreme efforts to avert the war which has just broken out, and of which Germany will have to bear the crushing responsibility in history. (Unanimous and repeated applause.)

On the morrow of the day in which our Allies and ourselves publicly expressed the hope of seeing peacefully carried on the negotiations begun under the auspices of the London Cabinet, Germany suddenly declared war upon Russia. She has invaded the territory of Luxemburg, she has outrageously insulted the noble Belgian nation, our neighbour and our friend, and she has treacherously endeavoured to surprise us in the midst of diplomatic negotiations. But France was watching, as alert as pacific. She was prepared, and our enemies will meet on their path our brave covering troops, who are at their post of battle, and under whose shelter the mobilisation of all our national forces will be methodically completed.

Our fine and courageous army, which France to-day accompanies with motherly thought, has arisen, eager to defend the honour of the flag and the soil of the country.

The President of the Republic, who voices the unanimity of the country, expresses to our troops, who will fight by land and sea, the admiration and confidence of all Frenchmen. Closely knit by one sentiment, the nation will maintain the calm of which she has given daily proof since the beginning of the crisis. France will, as ever, combine the most generous impulses and the most enthusiastic spirit with that self-command which betokens lasting energy and the best guarantee of victory. In the war upon which she is entering France will have on her side that right which peoples, no more than individuals, may despise with impunity—eternal moral power. She will be heroically defended by all her sons, whose sacred union in face of the enemy nothing can destroy, and who to-day are fraternally bound together by the same indignation against the aggressor, and by the same patriotic faith. She is faithfully supported by Russia, her ally, she is upheld by the loyal friendship of England, and already from all parts of the civilised world come to her sympathy and good wishes, for she represents once more, to-day, before the world, Liberty, Justice and Reason. *Haut les coeurs, et vive la France!*

*Speech delivered by M. Viviani, Prime Minister, in the Chamber of Deputies, August 4, 1914.*

*(Journal Officiel, August 5, 1914.)*

M. RENÉ VIVIANI, PRIME MINISTER,

Gentlemen, the German Ambassador left Paris yesterday, after having notified to us the state of war.

The Government owes Parliament a truthful recital of the events which in less than ten days have unchained European war and have obliged France, pacific and strong, to defend her frontier against an aggression the odious injustice of which is underlined by its calculated suddenness. This aggression, which nothing excuses, and which was begun before a declaration of war had notified it to us, is the last act in a plan the origin and aim of which I intend to state to our democracy and to civilised opinion.

As the result of the abominable crime which cost the life of the Hereditary Archduke of Austria-Hungary and of the Duchess von Hohenberg, difficulties arose between the Cabinet of Vienna and the Cabinet of Belgrade.

The majority of the Powers were only semi-officially informed of these difficulties until Friday, July 24, when the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador handed them a note which has been published by the Press.

The object of this circular was to explain and to justify an ultimatum sent the previous evening to Servia by the Austro-Hungarian Minister in Belgrade. This ultimatum, in affirming the guilt of many Servian subjects and societies in the Sarajevo crime, insinuated that Servian official authorities themselves were not foreign to it. It demanded a reply from Servia by six o'clock on the evening of Saturday, July 25. The satisfactions claimed, or at least several of them, indisputably affected the rights of a Sovereign state. In spite of their excessive character, on July 25, Servia notified her submission almost without any reserve. The advice of France, Russia, and Great Britain, given in Belgrade from the very first, was not for nothing in this submission, which constituted a success for Austro-Hungary and a guarantee for European peace.

These counsels were all the more valuable, as the Austro-Hungarian demands had been dissimulated to the Chancelleries of the Triple Entente, to whom, in the three preceding weeks, the Austro-Hungarian Government had on several occasions given the assurance that its claims would be extremely moderate.

It was, therefore, with just surprise that the Cabinets of Paris, St. Petersburg and London learned, on July 26, that the Austrian Minister in Belgrade after a few minutes' examination had declared the Servian reply to be unacceptable, and had broken off diplomatic relations. This surprise was rendered greater by the fact that already, on Friday, 24th, the German Ambassador had read to the French Minister of Foreign Affairs a verbal note declaring that the Austro-Servian dispute must remain localised without intervention by the Great Powers, as otherwise



"incalculable consequences" were to be feared. A similar step was taken on Saturday, the 25th, in London and St. Petersburg.

Is it necessary, gentlemen, to point out to you the contrast between the threatening terms used by the German Ambassador in Paris and the conciliatory sentiments of which the Powers of the Triple Entente had just given proof by the counsels of submission that had been given to Serbia?

Nevertheless, without losing time over the abnormal character of the German action, in agreement with our allies and friends, we immediately began conciliatory action and asked Germany to associate herself in it.

From the very first moment we have had the regret of noting that our dispositions and our efforts met with no echo in Berlin.

Not only did Germany appear in no way disposed to give to Austria-Hungary the friendly counsels which her situation authorised her to formulate, but from that moment, and still more in the following days, she appeared to thrust herself between the Vienna Cabinet and the proposals for a compromise which emanated from the other Powers.

On Tuesday, July 28, Austria-Hungary declared war on Serbia. This declaration of war, aggravating within a space of forty-eight hours the state of affairs created by the rupture of diplomatic relations, authorised the belief in a considered desire for war, in a systematic programme tending towards the enslavement of Serbia. Thus was called into question not only the independence of a brave people but the balance in the Balkans, laid down in the Treaty of Bukarest in 1913, and consecrated by the moral adhesion of all the great Powers.

Nevertheless, at the suggestion of the British Government, always most firmly attached to the maintenance of European peace, the negotiations proceeded, or more correctly, the Powers of the Triple Entente endeavoured to carry them on.

From this common desire arose the proposal for action by four Powers, England, France, Germany and Italy, an action intended to bring about an equitable settlement of the dispute in assuring to Austria every legitimate satisfaction.

On Wednesday, the 29th, the Russian Government, perceiving the persistent rebuff of all these attempts in view of the Austrian mobilisation and declaration of war, and fearing that Serbia would be crushed by arms, decided as a precautionary measure to mobilise the troops of four military districts, that is to say, the forces stationed exclusively along the Austro-Hungarian frontier.

In doing this it took care to inform the German Government that this limited step, devoid of offensive character towards Austria, was in no way directed against Germany. In conversation with the Russian Ambassador in Berlin, the German Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs raised no difficulty in recognising this.

On the other side, everything which Great Britain attempted to do, with the adhesion of Russia and the support of France, in order to restore contact between Austria and Serbia under the moral patronage of Europe, met in Berlin with a negative "*parti pris*," of which the diplomatic despatches furnish peremptory proof. This was a disturbing

situation, which rendered probable the existence in Berlin of certain *arrivées pensées*. A few hours afterwards these hypotheses and fears were to become certainties.

The negative attitude of Germany, indeed, made way, 36 hours later, to justly alarming initiative. On July 31, Germany, by proclaiming the state of war, cut all communications between herself and the rest of Europe and gave herself complete freedom to proceed in absolute secrecy with the military preparations against France which, as you have seen, nothing could justify.

Several days before, in conditions which it is difficult to explain, Germany had prepared to bring her army from the footing of peace to the footing of war.

Already on the morning of July 25, that is to say even before the expiry of the time-limit given to Servia by Austria, the garrisons of Alsace-Lorraine were kept to barracks. The same day she placed the fortified works in the neighbourhood of the frontier in a state of defence. On the 26th she ordered the railways to make the preparatory measures for concentration. On the 27th she made requisitions and had placed her covering troops on their positions. On the 28th individual summonses to reservists had begun and forces distant from the frontier had been moved nearer to it.

All these steps being taken with implacable method, could they leave us in any doubt as to the intentions of Germany?

Such was the situation, when on the evening of July 31 the German Government, which since the 24th had taken no positive part in the pacific conciliatory efforts of the Triple Entente, sent an ultimatum to the Russian Government, under pretext that Russia had ordered a general mobilisation of her armies, demanding stoppage of this mobilisation within twelve hours.

This demand, all the more wounding in its form, since a few hours earlier the Emperor Nicholas, with a gesture of spontaneous confidence, had asked the German Emperor for his mediation, came at a time when, at the request of England and with the knowledge of Germany, the Russian Government had agreed to a formula such as to lead to a friendly settlement of the Austro-Servian dispute and of Austro-Russian difficulties by the simultaneous stoppage of military operations and preparations.

The same day this unfriendly step with regard to Russia was duplicated by definitely hostile acts towards France—interruption of communications by road, railway, telegraph and telephone, seizure of French locomotives on their arrival at the frontier, placing of mitrailleuses in the middle of the railway line which had been cut, and concentration of troops on this frontier.

From this time on we were no longer able to believe in the sincerity of the pacific declarations which the representative of Germany continued to lavish upon us. (Sensation.)

We knew that under the shelter of the state of war proclaimed Germany was mobilising.

We learned that six classes of reservists had been summoned and that concentration movements were proceeding which affected even army corps stationed at a considerable distance from the frontier.

As these events were occurring the Government watched them with vigilance, and was taking from day to day, and even from hour to hour, the measures of security demanded by the situation. The general mobilisation of our land and sea armies was ordered.

The same evening, at half-past seven, Germany, without regard to the St. Petersburg Cabinet's acceptance of the English proposal, which I recalled above, declared war upon Russia.

The next day, Sunday, August 2, without regard to the extreme moderation of France, in contradiction with the pacific declarations of the German Ambassador in Paris, in defiance of the rules of international law German troops crossed our frontier at three different points.

At the same time in violation of the treaty of 1867, which guarantees the neutrality of Luxemburg with the signature of Prussia, they invaded the territory of the Grand Duchy thus giving rise to the protest of the Luxemburg Government.

Finally, even the neutrality of Belgium was threatened. On the evening of August 2, the German Minister handed to the Belgian Government an ultimatum calling upon it to facilitate in Belgium military operations against France on the lying pretext that Belgian neutrality was threatened by us. The Belgian Government refused, declaring that it was resolved energetically to defend its neutrality, which was respected by France and guaranteed by treaties and in particular by the King of Prussia. (Unanimous and prolonged applause.)

Since then, Gentlemen, the aggressions have been renewed, multiplied and accentuated. Our frontier has been violated in more than fifteen places. Shots have been fired upon our soldiers and upon our customs-officers; there have been killed and wounded. Yesterday a German military aviator threw three bombs on Lunéville.

The German Ambassador to whom, as well as to all the great Powers, we communicated these facts, has not denied them and has not expressed regret. On the contrary, he came yesterday evening to ask me for his passports and to notify us of the state of war, taking as pretext against all truth alleged acts of hostility committed by a French aviator on German soil in the district of Eifel and even on the railway near Carlsruhe and near Nuremberg. This is the letter he handed me on this subject:—

M. LE PRESIDENT,

The German administrative military authorities have remarked a certain number of definitely hostile acts committed on German territory by French military airmen. Several of these latter have manifestly violated the neutrality of Belgium by flying over the territory of that country. One has endeavoured to destroy buildings near Wesel; others have been seen in the Eifel region; another has thrown bombs on the railway line near Carlsruhe and Nuremberg. I am ordered, and I have the honour to inform your Excellency, that in view of these aggressions the German Empire considers itself to be in a state of war with France by the act of the latter Power.



At the same time I have the honour to inform your Excellency that the German authorities will detain French merchant ships in German ports but that they will release them if within 48 hours complete reciprocity is assured.

My diplomatic mission having come to an end I have but to ask your Excellency to be good enough to furnish me with my passports and to take steps which may seem necessary to your Excellency to assure my return to Germany with the staff of the Embassy, as well as with the staff of the Bavarian Legation, and of the German Consulate-General in Paris. Pray accept, Monsieur le Président, the expression of my very high esteem.

(Signed) SCHOEN.

Need I, Gentleman, insist on the absurdity of these pretexts which are put forward as matters of complaint. At no time has any French aviator been into Belgium, no French aviator has committed any hostile act either in Bavaria or in any other part of Germany. European opinion has already done justice to these wretched inventions. (Loud and unanimous applause.)

Against these attacks which violate all the laws of equity and all the rules of international law, we have now taken the necessary steps which are being carried out with rigorous method and absolute calm.

The mobilisation of the Russian army is also proceeding with remarkable energy and boundless enthusiasm. (The entire house rose: Unanimous and prolonged applause.)

The Belgian army, mobilised to a strength of 250,000 men, is preparing to defend with magnificent ardour the neutrality and independence of its country. (Renewed loud and unanimous applause.)

The entire British fleet is mobilised and the order has been given to mobilise the land army. (All the Deputies rose: Prolonged applause.)

In 1912 conversations took place between the English and French General Staffs which concluded in an exchange of letters between Sir Edward Grey and M. Paul Cambon. The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs yesterday evening communicated the letters exchanged to the House of Commons, and I have the honour, in agreement with the British Government, to bring to your knowledge the contents of these two documents.

1.

*Foreign Office, November 22, 1912.*

MY DEAR AMBASSADOR,

From time to time in recent years the French and British naval and military experts have consulted together. It has always been understood that such consultation does not restrict the freedom of either Government to decide at any future time whether or not to assist the other by armed force. We have agreed that consultation between experts is not, and ought not to be regarded as, an engagement that commits either Government to action in a contingency that has not arisen and

may never arise. The disposition, for instance, of the French and British fleets respectively at the present moment is not based upon an engagement to co-operate in war.

You have, however, pointed out that, if either Government had grave reason to expect an unprovoked attack by a third Power, it might become essential to know whether it could in that event depend upon the armed assistance of the other.

I agree that, if either Government had grave reason to expect an unprovoked attack by a third Power, or something that threatened the general peace, it should immediately discuss with the other whether both Governments should act together to prevent aggression and to preserve peace, and, if so, what measures they would be prepared to take in common. If these measures involved action, the plans of the General Staffs would at once be taken into consideration, and the Governments would then decide what effect should be given to them.

Sincerely yours,

(Signed) E. GREY.

2.

*Our Ambassador, M. Paul Cambon, replied on November 23, 1912:*

*Londres, le 23 novembre, 1912.*

Cher Sir Edward,—Par votre lettre en date d'hier, 22 novembre, vous m'avez rappelé que, dans ces dernières années, les autorités militaires et navales de la France et de la Grande-Bretagne s'étaient consultées de temps en temps; qu'il avait toujours été entendu que ces consultations ne restreignaient pas la liberté, pour chaque Gouvernement, de décider dans l'avenir s'ils se prêteraient l'un l'autre le concours de leurs forces armées; que, de part et d'autre, ces consultations entre spécialistes n'étaient et ne devaient pas être considérées comme des engagements obligeant nos Gouvernements à agir dans certains cas; que cependant je vous avais fait observer que, si l'un ou l'autre des deux Gouvernements avait de graves raisons d'appréhender une attaque non provoquée de la part d'une tierce Puissance, il deviendrait essentiel de savoir s'il pourrait compter sur l'assistance armée de l'autre.

Votre lettre répond à cette observation, et je suis autorisé à vous déclarer que, dans le cas où l'un de nos deux Gouvernements aurait un motif grave d'appréhender soit l'agression d'une tierce Puissance, soit quelque événement menaçant pour la paix générale, ce Gouvernement examinerait immédiatement avec l'autre si les deux Gouvernements doivent agir de concert en vue de prévenir l'agression ou de sauvegarder la paix. Dans ce cas, les deux Gouvernements délibéreraient sur les mesures qu'ils seraient disposés à prendre en commun; si ces mesures comportaient une action, les deux Gouvernements prendraient aussitôt en considération les plans de leurs états majors et décideraient alors de la suite qui devrait être donnée à ces plans.

Sincèrement à vous,

(Signé) PAUL CAMBON.

[TRANSLATION.]

*London, November 23, 1912.*

Dear Sir Edward,—You reminded me in your letter of yesterday, 22nd November, that during the last few years the military and naval authorities of France and Great Britain had consulted with each other from time to time; that it had always been understood that these consultations should not restrict the liberty of either Government to decide in the future whether they should lend each other the support of their armed forces; that, on either side, these consultations between experts were not and should not be considered as engagements binding our Governments to take action in certain eventualities; that, however, I had remarked to you that, if one or other of the two Governments had grave reasons to fear an unprovoked attack on the part of a third Power, it would become essential to know whether it could count on the armed support of the other.

Your letter answers that point, and I am authorised to state that, in the event of one of our two Governments having grave reasons to fear either an attack from a third Power, or some event threatening the general peace, that Government would immediately examine with the other the question whether both Governments should act together in order to prevent aggression or preserve peace. If so, the two Governments would deliberate as to the measures which they would be prepared to take in common; if those measures involved action, the two Governments would take into immediate consideration the plans of their general staffs, and would then decide as to the effect to be given to those plans.

Sincerely yours,

*(Signed)* PAUL CAMBON.

In the House of Commons the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs has spoken of France, amid the cheers of the Members, in lofty and cordial terms, and his language has already struck deep into all French hearts. (Loud and unanimous applause.)

I desire from this Tribune, on behalf of the Government of Republic, to thank the British Government for the cordiality of its words, and the French Parliament will join with me in this sentiment. (Renewed loud and prolonged applause.)

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, in particular, made the following declaration: "If the German fleet crosses the Straits or goes north in the North Sea in order to double the British Isles with a view to attacking the French coasts or the French navy, or to attacking the merchant marine, the British fleet will intervene in order to give the French marine its entire protection, so that from that moment on England and Germany will be in a state of war." (Renewed and prolonged applause.)

From now on, therefore, the British fleet covers our northern and western coasts.



Gentlemen, these are the facts. I believe that in their rigorous sequence they suffice to justify the acts of the Government of the Republic. From this recital, however, I desire to draw the conclusion to show the true meaning of the unheard-of aggression of which France is the victim.

The victors of 1870, as you know, have on several occasions had the wish to repeat the blows they gave us. In 1875 the war, intended to finish off conquered France, was only prevented by the intervention of the two Powers to whom later on bonds of friendship and of alliance were to unite us—(unanimous applause)—by the intervention of Russia and by that of Great Britain. (All the Deputies rose: Prolonged applause.)

Since then the French Republic, by the restoration of her national forces, by the conclusion of diplomatic agreements, which have always been observed, has succeeded in freeing herself from the yoke which even in time of full peace Pismarck had been able to make heavy upon Europe. She has re-established the balance in Europe, which is the guarantee of the freedom and dignity of all.

Gentlemen, I do not know if I am mistaken, but it appears to me that it is this work of pacific reparation, of liberation, and of dignity, definitely sealed in 1904 and in 1907 with the genial assistance of Edward VII. of England and of the Government of the Crown—(loud cheers)—which the German Empire wishes to destroy to-day by an audacious *coup de force*.

Germany can reproach us with nothing.

We have made to peace a sacrifice without precedent, bearing in silence in our side for half a century the wound she opened. (Loud applause.)

We have made other sacrifices in all the discussions which, since 1904, the Imperial diplomacy has systematically provoked in Morocco, as elsewhere, in 1905, and in 1906, 1908, 1911.

Russia had also given proof, in 1908, as in the present crisis, of great moderation. She has shown the same moderation, and the Triple Entente with her, in the course of the Eastern crisis of 1912, when Austria and Germany made claims upon Servia and upon Greece, claims which, as events have shown, were open to discussion. Useless sacrifices, sterile compromises and vain efforts, since to-day our Allies and we are attacked by surprise. (Prolonged applause.) No one in good faith can believe that we are the aggressors.

Vainly one endeavours to disturb the sacred principles of right and freedom which govern nations as they govern individuals. Italy, in the clear conscience of Latin genius, informs us that she intends to observe neutrality. (All the Deputies rose: Prolonged applause.)

This decision has roused throughout France the echo of most sincere joy. I have interpreted this feeling to the Italian chargé d'affaires in saying to him how greatly I congratulated myself that the two Latin sisters, who have the same origin and the same ideal, did not find themselves opposed to each other. (Renewed applause.)

What is being attacked, Gentlemen—I declare it loudly—is the independence and dignity and security which the Triple Entente through the

equilibrium has won back to the service of peace. What is being attacked is the freedom of Europe, of which France, her Allies, and her friends, are proud to be the defenders. (Loud applause.)

Those liberties we are going to defend, for it is they that are in question and all the rest has been but pretext.

France, unjustly provoked, did not want war; she has done everything to avoid it. Since it is forced upon her, she will defend herself against Germany and against any Power which, not yet having made known its decision, may range herself upon the side of Germany in the struggle between the two countries. (All the Deputies rose and applauded.)

A free and strong people, supported by an ancient ideal and united in every way for the safeguard of its existence, a democracy which has been able to discipline its military effort and which did not fear last year to add to its burden in response to neighbouring armaments, an armed nation struggling for its own life and for the independence of Europe—such is the spectacle we have the honour to offer witnesses of this formidable struggle which for some days past has been prepared in the most methodical calm. We are without reproach; we shall be without fear. (All the Deputies rose and applauded.)

France has often shown in less favourable conditions she is the most redoubtable adversary when she fights, as is the case to-day, for freedom and for right. (Cheers.)

In submitting to you our acts, Gentlemen—to you who are our judges—we have, in bearing the weight of our heavy responsibility, the support of an untroubled conscience and the certainty of duty done. (All the Deputies rose again, and applauded for a long time.)

## CHAPTER VII.

Declaration by the Triple Entente (September 4, 1914).

No. 160.

## DECLARATION.

*M. Delcassé, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Ambassadors of France and Ministers of France abroad.*

*Paris, September 4, 1914.*

The following declaration was signed this morning at the Foreign Office in London.

“The undersigned, duly authorised by their respective Governments, make the following declaration:—

“The Governments of Great Britain, France, and Russia mutually undertake not to conclude a separate peace during the course of the present war.

“The three Governments agree that when an occasion arises to discuss the terms of peace, none of the Allied Powers shall offer conditions of peace without having secured beforehand the agreement of each of the other Allies.

“*(Signed)* PAUL CAMBON.  
COUNT BENCKENDORFF.  
EDWARD GREY.”

This declaration will be published to-day.

DELCASSÉ.



## ANNEXED DOCUMENTS.

Extracts from the "Blue Book" (British), from the "Grey Book" (Belgian), from the "White Book" (German), and from the "Orange Book" (Russian).

## ANNEXE 1.

Extracts from the "Blue Book" relating to the attitude assumed by the British Government towards Russia, Germany, and France, during the pourparlers which preceded the War.

## No. 6.

*Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador in St. Petersburg, to Sir Edward Grey.  
St. Petersburg, July 24, 1914.*

I had a telephone message this morning from M. Sazonof to the effect that the text of the Austrian ultimatum had just reached him.

His Excellency added that a reply within 48 hours was demanded, and he begged me to meet him at the French Embassy to discuss matters, as Austrian step clearly meant that war was imminent.

Minister for Foreign Affairs said that Austria's conduct was both provocative and immoral; she would never have taken such action unless Germany had first been consulted; some of her demands were quite impossible of acceptance. He hoped that His Majesty's Government would not fail to proclaim their solidarity with Russia and France.

The French Ambassador gave me to understand that France would fulfil all the obligations entailed by her alliance with Russia, if necessity arose, besides supporting Russia strongly in any negotiations.

I said that I would telegraph a full report to you of what their Excellencies had just said to me. I could not, of course, speak in the name of His Majesty's Government, but, personally, I saw no reason to expect any declaration of solidarity from His Majesty's Government that would entail an unconditional engagement on their part to support Russia and France by force of arms. Direct British interests in Serbia were nil, and a war on behalf of that country would never be sanctioned by British public opinion. To this, M. Sazonof replied that we must not forget that the general European question was involved, the Servian question being but a part of the former, and that Great Britain could not afford to efface herself from the problems now at issue.

In reply to these remarks I observed, that I gathered from what he said, that His Excellency was suggesting that Great Britain should join on making a communication to Austria to the effect that active intervention by her in the internal affairs of Serbia could not be tolerated. But supposing Austria, nevertheless, proceeded to embark on military measures against Serbia in spite of our representations, was it the intention of the Russian Government forthwith to declare war on Austria?

M. Sazonof said that he himself thought that Russian mobilisation would at any rate have to be carried out; but a Council of Ministers was being held this afternoon to consider the whole question. A further Council would be held probably to-morrow, at which the Emperor would preside, when a decision would be come to.

I said that it seemed to me that the important point was to induce Austria to extend the time limit, and that the first thing to do was to bring an influence to bear on Austria with that end in view; French Ambassador, however, thought that either Austria had made up her mind to act at once or that she was bluffing. Whichever it might be, our only chance of averting war was for us to adopt a firm and united attitude. He did not think there was time to carry out my suggestion. Thereupon, I said that it seemed to me desirable that we should just know how far Serbia was prepared to go to meet the demands formulated by Austria in her Note. M. Sazonof replied that he must first consult his colleagues on this point, but doubtless some of the Austrian demands could be accepted by Serbia.

French Ambassador and M. Sazonof both continue to press me for a complete declaration of complete solidarity of His Majesty's Government with French and Russian Government; and I, therefore, said that it seemed to me possible that you might perhaps be willing to make strong representations to both German and Austrian Governments, urging upon them that an attack by Austria upon Serbia would endanger the whole peace of Europe.

Perhaps you might see your way to saying to them that such action on the part of Austria would probably mean Russian intervention, which would involve France and Germany, and that it would be difficult for Great Britain to keep out if the war were to become general. M. Sazonof answered that we would sooner or later be dragged into war if it did break out; we should have rendered war more likely if we did not from the outset make common cause with his country and with France; at any rate he hoped His Majesty's Government would express strong reprobation of action taken by Austria.

President of French Republic and President of the Council cannot reach France on their return from Russia for four or five days, and it looks as though Austria purposely chose this moment to present their ultimatum.

G. BUCHANAN.

No. 87.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris.*

*Foreign Office, July 29, 1914.*

SIR,

After telling M. Cambon (French Ambassador in London) to-day how grave the situation seemed to be, I told him that I meant to tell the German Ambassador to-day that he must not be misled by the friendly conversations into any sense of false security, that we should stand aside if all the efforts to preserve the peace, which we were now making in common with Germany, now failed. But I went on to say to M. Cambon that I thought it necessary to tell him also, that public opinion here approached the present difficulty from a quite different point of view from that taken during the difficulty as to Morocco, a few years ago. In the case of Morocco, the dispute was one in which France was primarily interested and in which it appeared that Germany, in an attempt to crush France, was fastening a quarrel on France on a question that was

the subject of a special agreement between France and us. In the present case the dispute between Austria and Servia was not one in which we felt called to take a hand. Even if the question became one between Austria and Russia we should not feel called upon to take a hand in it. It would then be a question of the supremacy of Teuton or Slav—a struggle for supremacy in the Balkans; and our idea had always been to avoid being drawn into a war over a Balkan question. If Germany became involved, and France became involved, we had not made up our minds what we should do; it was a case that we should have to consider. France would then have been drawn into a quarrel which was not hers, but in which, owing to her alliance, her honour and interest obliged her to engage. We were free from engagements, and we should have to decide what British interests required us to do. I thought it necessary to say that because, as he knew, we were taking all precautions with regard to our Fleet, and I was about to warn Prince Lichnowsky (German Ambassador in London) not to count on our standing aside, but it would not be fair that I should let M. Cambon be misled into supposing that this meant that we had decided what to do in a contingency that I still hoped might not arise.

M. Cambon said that I had explained the situation very clearly. He understood it to be that in a Balkan, and in a struggle for supremacy between Teuton and Slav, we should not feel called to intervene; should other issues be raised, and Germany and France become involved, so that the question became one of the hegemony of Europe, we should decide what it was necessary for us to do. He seemed quite prepared for this announcement and made no criticism upon it.

He said French opinion was calm, but decided. He anticipated a demand from Germany, that France would be neutral while Germany attacked Russia. This assurance, of course, France could not give; she was bound to help Russia, if Russia was attacked.

E. GREY.

No. 89.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador in Berlin.*

*Foreign Office, July 29, 1914.*

SIR,

After speaking to the German Ambassador this afternoon about the European situation I said that I wished to say to him in a quite private and friendly way something that was on my mind. The situation was very grave. While it was restricted to the issues at present actually involved we had no thought of interfering in it. But if Germany became involved in it and then France the issue might be so great that it would involve all European interests; and I did not wish him to be misled by the friendly tone of our conversation—which I hoped would continue—into thinking that we should stand aside.

He said that he quite understood this, but he asked whether I meant that we should under certain circumstances intervene?

I replied that I did not wish to say that, or to use anything that was like a threat or an attempt to apply pressure by saying that if things



became worse we should intervene. There would be no question of our intervening if Germany was not involved, or even if France was not involved. But we knew very well, that if the issue did become such that we thought British interests required us to intervene, we must intervene at once and the decision would have to be very rapid just as the decisions of other Powers had to be. I hoped that the friendly tone of our conversations would continue as at present and that I should be able to keep as closely in touch with the German Government in working for peace. But if we failed in our efforts to keep the peace and if the issue spread so that it involved practically every European interest I did not wish to be open to any reproach from him that the friendly tone of all our conversations had misled him or his Government into supposing that we should not take action and to the reproach that if they had not been so misled the course of things might have been different.

The German Ambassador took no exception to what I said. Indeed he told me that it accorded with what he had already given in Berlin as his view of the situation.

E. GREY.

No. 99.

*Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, to Sir Edward Grey.*

*Paris, July 30, 1914.*

President of the Republic tells me that the Russian Government have been informed by the German Government that, unless Russia stops her mobilisation, Germany would mobilise. But a further report since received from St. Petersburg, states that the German communication had been modified and was now a request to be informed on what conditions Russia would consent to demobilisation. The answer given is that she agrees to do so on condition that Austria-Hungary gives an assurance that she will respect the sovereignty of Serbia and submit certain of the demands of the Austrian Note which Serbia has not accepted to an international discussion.

President thinks that these conditions will not be accepted by Austria. He is convinced that peace between the Powers is in the hands of Great Britain. If His Majesty's Government announce that England would come to the aid of France in the event of a conflict between France and Germany as a result of the present differences between Austria and Serbia, there would be no war, for Germany would at once modify her attitude.

I explained to him how difficult it would be for His Majesty's Government to make such an announcement, but he said that he must maintain that it would be in the interests of peace. France, he said, is pacific. She does not desire war, and all that she has done at present is to make preparations for mobilisation, so as not to be taken unawares. The French Government will keep His Majesty's Government informed of everything that may be done in that way. They have reliable information that the German troops are concentrated round Thionville and Metz

ready for war. If there were a general war on the Continent, it would inevitably draw England into it for the protection of her vital interests. A declaration now of her intention to support France, whose desire it is that peace should be maintained, would almost certainly prevent Germany from going to war.

F. BERTIE.

No. 119.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris.*

*Foreign Office, July 31, 1914.*

SIR,

M. Cambon (French Ambassador in London) referred to-day to a telegram that had been shown to Sir Arthur Nicolson (British Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs) this morning from the French Ambassador in Berlin, saying, that it was the uncertainty with regard to whether we would intervene, which was the encouraging element in Berlin, and that if we would only declare definitely on the side of Russia it would decide the German attitude in favour of peace.

I said that it was quite wrong to suppose that we had left Germany under the impression that we would not intervene. I had refused overtures to promise that we should remain neutral. I had even gone so far, this morning, as to say to the German Ambassador, that if France and Germany became involved in war we should be drawn into it. That, of course, was not the same thing as taking an engagement to France, and I told M. Cambon of it, only to show that we had not left Germany under the impression that we would stand aside.

M. Cambon then asked me for my reply to what he had said yesterday.

I said that we had come to the conclusion, in the Cabinet to-day, that we could not give any pledge at the present time. Though we should have to put our policy before Parliament, we could not pledge Parliament in advance. Up to the present moment we did not feel, and public opinion did not feel, that any treaties or obligations of this country were involved. Further developments might alter this situation and cause the Government and Parliament to take the view that intervention was justified. The preservation of the neutrality of Belgium might be, I would not say a decisive, but an important factor in determining our attitude. Whether we propose to Parliament to intervene or not to intervene in a war, Parliament would wish to know how we stood with regard to the neutrality of Belgium, and it might be that I should ask both France and Germany whether each was prepared to undertake an engagement that she would not be the first to violate the neutrality of Belgium.

M. Cambon repeated his question, whether we would help France, if Germany made an attack on her?

I said that I could only adhere to the answer, that as far as things had gone at present, we could not take any engagement.

M. Cambon urged that Germany had, from the beginning, rejected proposals that might have made for peace. It could not be to England's interest that France should be crushed by Germany. We should then be in a very diminished position with regard to Germany. In 1870 we had made a great mistake in allowing an enormous increase of German strength and we should now be repeating the mistake. He asked me whether I could not submit his question to the Cabinet again.

I said that the Cabinet would certainly be summoned as soon as there was some new development, but at the present moment the only answer I could give was that we could not undertake any definite engagement.

E. GREY.

No. 148.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris.*

*Foreign Office, August 2, 1914.*

After the Cabinet this morning I gave M. Cambon (French Ambassador in London) the following Memorandum:—

"I am authorised to give an assurance that if the German Fleet comes into the Channel or in the North Sea to undertake hostile operations against French coasts or shipping the British Fleet will give all protection in its power.

"This assurance is, of course, subject to the policy of His Majesty's Government receiving the support of Parliament, and must not be taken as binding His Majesty's Government until the above contingency of action by the German Fleet takes place."

I pointed out that we had very large questions and most difficult issues to consider, and that the Government felt that they could not bind themselves to declare war upon Germany necessarily if war broke out between France and Germany to-morrow, but it was essential to the French Government, whose fleet had long been concentrated in the Mediterranean, to know how to make their dispositions with their north coast entirely undefended. We therefore thought it necessary to give them this assurance. It did not bind us to go to war with Germany unless the German Fleet took the action indicated, but it gave a security to France that would enable her to settle the disposition of her own Mediterranean Fleet.

M. Cambon asked me about the violation of Luxemburg. I told him the doctrine on that point laid down by Lord Derby and Lord Clarendon in 1867. He asked me what we should say about the violation of the neutrality of Belgium. I said that it was a much more important matter; we were considering what statement we should make in Parliament to-morrow—in effect, whether we should declare violation of Belgian neutrality to be a *casus belli*. I told him what had been said to the German Ambassador on this point.

E. GREY.



## ANNEXE 2.

Extracts from the "Blue Book" relating to the Proposals made by the German Government to the British Government with a view of securing the Neutrality of Great Britain.

No. 85.

*Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey.*

*Berlin, July 29, 1914.*

I was asked to call upon the Chancellor to-night. His Excellency had just returned from Potsdam.

He said that should Austria be attacked by Russia a European conflagration might, he feared, become inevitable, owing to Germany's obligations as Austria's ally, in spite of his continued efforts to maintain peace. He then proceeded to make the following strong bid for British neutrality. He said that it was clear, so far as he was able to judge the main principles which govern British policy, that Great Britain would never stand by and allow France to be crushed in any conflict there might be. That, however, was not the object at which Germany aimed. Provided that neutrality of Great Britain were certain, every assurance would be given to the British Government that the Imperial Government aimed at no territorial acquisitions at the expense of France should they prove victorious in any war that might ensue.

I questioned His Excellency about the French Colonies, and he said that he was unable to give a similar undertaking in that respect. As regards Holland, however, His Excellency said that so long as Germany's adversaries respected the integrity and neutrality of the Netherlands Germany was ready to give His Majesty's Government an assurance that she would do likewise. It depended upon the action of France what operations Germany might be forced to enter upon in Belgium, but when the war was over Belgian integrity would be respected if she had not sided against Germany.

His Excellency ended by saying that ever since he had been Chancellor the object of his policy had been, as you were aware, to bring about an understanding with England; he trusted that these assurances might form the basis of that understanding which he so much desired. He had in mind a general neutrality agreement between Germany and England, though it was, of course, at the present, too early to discuss details, and an assurance of British neutrality in the conflict which the present crisis might possibly produce would enable him to look forward to the realization of his desire.

In reply to His Excellency's inquiry how I thought his request would appeal to you, I said that I did not think it probable that at this stage of events you would care to bind yourself to any course of action, and that I was of opinion that you would desire to retain full liberty.

E. GOSCHEN.

*Sir E. Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin.*

*Foreign Office, July 30, 1914.*

His Majesty's Government cannot for a moment entertain the Chancellor's proposal that they should bind themselves to neutrality on such terms.

What he asks us, in effect, is to engage to stand by while French Colonies are taken and France is beaten so long as Germany does not take French territory, as distinct from the Colonies.

From the material point of view, such a proposal is unacceptable for France. without further territory in Europe being taken from her could be so crushed as to lose her position as a great Power and become subordinate to German policy.

Altogether apart from that, it would be a disgrace for us to make this bargain with Germany at the expense of France, a disgrace from which the good name of this country would never recover.

The Chancellor also, in effect, asks us to bargain away whatever obligation or interest we have as regards the neutrality of Belgium. We could not entertain that bargain either.

Having said so much it is unnecessary to examine whether the prospect of a future general neutrality agreement between England and Germany offered positive advantages, sufficient to compensate us for tying our hands now. We must preserve our full freedom, to act as circumstances may seem to us to require in any such unfavourable and regrettable development of the present crisis as the Chancellor contemplated.

You should speak to the Chancellor in the above sense, and add, most earnestly, that the one way of maintaining the good relations between England and Germany is that they should continue to work together to preserve the peace of Europe. If we succeed in this object, the mutual relations of Germany and England will, I believe, be *ipso facto* improved and strengthened. For that object, His Majesty's Government will work in that way with all sincerity and good will.

And I will say this: If the peace of Europe can be preserved and the present crisis safely passed, my own endeavour will be to promote some arrangement, to which Germany would be a party, by which she could be assured that no aggressive or hostile policy would be pursued against her or her allies by France, Russia and ourselves, jointly or separately. I have desired this, and worked for it as far as I could through the last Balkan crisis, and Germany having a corresponding object our relations sensibly improved. The idea has hitherto been too Utopian to form the subject of definite proposals, but if this present crisis, so much more acute than any that Europe has gone through for generations, is safely passed, I am hopeful that the relief and reaction which will follow may make possible some more definite rapprochement between the Powers than has been possible hitherto.

E. GREY.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador in Berlin.*

*Foreign Office, August 1, 1914.*

SIR,

I told the German Ambassador to-day, that the reply of the German Government with regard to the neutrality of Belgium was a matter of very great regret, because the neutrality of Belgium affected feeling in this country. If Germany could see her way to give the same assurance as that which had been given by France, it would materially contribute to relieve anxiety and tension here. On the other hand, if there were a violation of the neutrality of Belgium by one combatant while the other respected it, it would be extremely difficult to restrain public feeling in this country. I said that we had been discussing this question at a Cabinet meeting, and as I was authorised to tell him this, I gave him a memorandum of it.

He asked me whether, if Germany gave the promise not to violate Belgium neutrality, we would engage to remain neutral. I replied that I could not say that; our hands were still free and we were considering what our attitude should be. All I could say was, that our attitude would be determined largely by public opinion here, and that the neutrality of Belgium would appeal very strongly to public opinion here. I did not think that we could give a promise of neutrality on that condition alone.

The Ambassador pressed me as to whether I could not formulate conditions on which we would remain neutral. He even suggested that the integrity of France and her Colonies might be guaranteed.

I said that I felt obliged to refuse, definitely, any promise to remain neutral on similar terms, and I could only say that we must keep our hands free.

E. GREY.



## ANNEXE 2. A.

German attempt to obtain, on the pretext of a "misunderstanding," a guarantee by Great Britain, of the neutrality of France, in a war between Germany and Russia.

(Semi-official Publication in the "North German Gazette," August 20, 1914.)

## No. 1.

*Prince Lichnowsky, German Ambassador in London, to Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg, German Imperial Chancellor.*

*London, July 31, 1914.*

Sir Edward Grey has just called me to the telephone and asked me if I thought I could declare that we will not attack France, if France remains neutral in a war between Germany and Russia. I said I thought that I could take the responsibility of making this declaration.

LICHNOWSKY.

## No. 2.

*Telegram from the Emperor William to King George V.*

*Berlin, August 1, 1914.*

I have just received a communication from your Government, offering me the neutrality of France with a guarantee by Great Britain. To this offer was attached an inquiry as to whether, in view of this condition, Germany would be prepared not to attack France. For technical reasons my mobilisation, orders for which on both fronts, east and west, were given this afternoon, must take its course, in accordance with the preparations begun.

These orders cannot be cancelled, and your telegram has, unhappily, come too late. But if France offers to remain neutral, and if her neutrality is guaranteed by the British Navy and Army, I shall refrain from attacking France and shall employ my troops elsewhere. I trust that France will exhibit no nervousness. The troops on my frontier have, at this moment, received orders by telegraph and by telephone to arrest their advance across the French frontier.

WILLIAM.

## No. 3.

*Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg, German Imperial Chancellor, to Prince Lichnowsky, German Ambassador in London.*

*Berlin, August 1, 1914.*

Germany is ready to assent to the British proposals if Great Britain guarantees, with her military and naval forces, the neutrality of

France in the Russo-German conflict. The mobilisation of the German Army took place to-day, as a reply to Russian provocations, and before the receipt of the British proposals. Our concentration on the French frontier consequently cannot be modified. But we guarantee that the French frontier will not be crossed, if an affirmative reply from Great Britain reaches us between now and 7 o'clock p.m., on Monday, August 3.

BETHMANN-HOLLWEG.

No. 4.

*Telegram from King George V. to the Emperor William.*

*London, August 1, 1914.*

In reply to your telegram, which has just reached me, I think that a misunderstanding has arisen, with regard to the suggestion which appears to have been made in the course of a friendly conversation between Prince Lichnowsky and Sir Edward Grey, in which they discussed how an armed conflict between Germany and France could be retarded until a basis of understanding between Austria-Hungary and Russia had been found. Sir Edward Grey will see Prince Lichnowsky to-morrow morning, in order to make clear that there has been a misunderstanding on the part of the latter.

GEORGE.

No. 5.

*Prince Lichnowsky, German Ambassador in London, to Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg, German Imperial Chancellor.*

*London, August 2, 1914.*

Sir Edward Grey's suggestions on behalf of Great Britain, founded on the desire to remain neutral, were made without any previous agreement with France and have since been abandoned as futile.

LICHNOWSKY.

## ANNEXE 3.

Extracts from "Blue Book," relating to the refusal of Great Britain to admit the German point of view with regard to the violation of Belgian neutrality.

No. 153.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador in Berlin.*

*Foreign Office, August 4, 1914.*

The King of the Belgians has made an appeal to His Majesty the King for diplomatic intervention on behalf of Belgium on the following terms:—

Remembering the numerous proofs of your Majesty's friendship, and that of your predecessor, and the friendly attitude of England in 1870, and the proof of friendship you have just given us again, I make a supreme appeal to the diplomatic intervention of your Majesty's Government to safeguard the integrity of Belgium.

His Majesty's Government are also informed that the German Government have delivered to the Belgian Government a Note proposing friendly neutrality, entailing free passage through Belgian territory and promising to maintain the independence and integrity of the Kingdom and its possessions at the conclusion of peace, threatening, in case of refusal, to treat Belgium as an enemy. An answer was requested within 12 hours.

We also understand that Belgium has categorically refused this, as a flagrant violation of the Law of Nations.

His Majesty's Government are bound to protest against this violation of a treaty to which Germany is a party in common with themselves, and must request an assurance that the demand made upon Belgium will not be proceeded with, and that her neutrality will be respected by Germany. You should ask for an immediate reply.

E. GREY.

No. 155.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Villiers, British Minister at Brussels.*

*Foreign Office, August 4, 1914.*

You should inform Belgian Government that if pressure is applied to them by Germany to induce them to depart from neutrality, His Majesty's Government expect that they will resist by any means in their power, and that His Majesty's Government will support them in offering such resistance, and that His Majesty's Government, in this event, are prepared to join Russia and France, if desired, in offering to the Belgian Government, at once, common action for the purpose of resisting use of force by Germany against them, and a guarantee to maintain their independence and integrity in future years.

E. GREY.



No. 157.

*German Foreign Secretary to Prince Lichnowsky, German Ambassador in London.*

*(Communicated by German Embassy, August 4.)*

*Berlin, August 4, 1914.*

Please dispel any mistrust that may subsist on the part of the British Government with regard to our intentions, by repeating most positively formal assurance that, even in case of armed conflict with Belgium, Germany will, under no pretence whatever, annex Belgian territory. Sincerity of this declaration is borne out by fact that we solemnly pledged our word to Holland strictly to respect her neutrality. It is obvious *that we could not profitably annex Belgian territory* without making at the same time territorial acquisitions at expense of Holland. Please impress upon Sir E. Grey that German Army could not be exposed to French attack across Belgium, which was planned, according to absolutely unimpeachable information. Germany had consequently to disregard Belgian neutrality, it being for her a question of life or death to prevent French advance.

JAGOW.

No. 159.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador in Berlin.*

*Foreign Office, August 4, 1914.*

We hear that Germany has addressed note to Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, stating that German Government will be compelled to carry out, if necessary, by force of arms, the measures considered to be indispensable.

We are also informed, that Belgian territory has been violated at Gemmerich. In these circumstances, and in view of the fact that Germany declines to give the same assurance respecting Belgium as France gave last week in reply to our request, made simultaneously at Berlin and Paris, we must repeat that request, and ask that a satisfactory reply to it and to my telegram of this morning be received here by 12 o'clock to-night. If not, you are instructed to ask for your passports, and to say that His Majesty's Government feel bound to take all steps in their power to uphold the neutrality of Belgium, and the observance of a treaty to which Germany is as much a party as ourselves.

E. GREY.

No. 160.

*Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey.*

*London, August 8, 1914.*

SIR,

In accordance with the instructions, contained in your telegram of the 4th instant, I called upon the Secretary of State that afternoon, and

inquired, in the name of His Majesty's Government, whether the Imperial Government would refrain from violating Belgian neutrality. Herr von Jagow (German Secretary of State) at once replied, that he was sorry to say that his answer must be, "No," as, in consequence of the German troops having crossed the frontier that morning, Belgian neutrality had been already violated. Herr von Jagow again went into the reasons why the Imperial Government had been obliged to take this step, namely, that they had to advance into France by the quickest and easiest way, so as to be able to get well ahead with their operations, and endeavour to strike some decisive blow as early as possible. It was a matter of life and death for them, as if they had gone by the more southern route, they could not have hoped, in view of the paucity of roads and the strength of the fortresses, to have got through without formidable opposition, entailing great loss of time. This loss of time would have meant time gained by the Russians for bringing up their troops to the German frontier. Rapidity of action was the great German asset, while that of Russia was an inexhaustible supply of troops. I pointed out to Herr von Jagow that this *fait accompli* of the violation of the Belgian frontier, rendered, as he would readily understand, the situation exceedingly grave, and I asked him whether there was not still time to draw back and avoid possible consequences which both he and I would deplore. He replied that, for the reasons he had given me, it was now impossible for them to draw back.

During the afternoon I received your further telegram of the same date, and, in compliance with the instructions therein contained, I again proceeded to the Imperial Foreign Office and informed the Secretary of State that, unless the Imperial Government could give the assurance by 12 o'clock that night that they would proceed no further with their violation of the Belgian frontier and stop their advance, I had been instructed to demand my passports and inform the Imperial Government that His Majesty's Government would have to take all steps in their power to uphold the neutrality of Belgium and the observance of a treaty to which Germany was as much a party as themselves.

Herr von Jagow replied that, to his great regret, he could give no other answer than that which he had given me earlier in the day, namely, that the safety of the Empire rendered it absolutely necessary that the Imperial troops should advance through Belgium. I gave His Excellency a written summary of your telegram, and pointed out that you had mentioned 12 o'clock as the time when His Majesty's Government would expect an answer, asked him whether, in view of the terrible consequences which would necessarily ensue, it were not possible, even at the last moment, that their answer could be reconsidered. He replied that if the time given were even 24 hours, or more, his answer must be the same. I said that, in that case, I should have to demand my passports. This interview took place at about seven o'clock. In a short conversation which ensued, Herr von Jagow expressed his poignant regret at the crumbling of his entire policy, and that of the Chancellor, which had been to make friends with Great Britain, and then, through Great Britain, to get closer to France. I said that this sudden end to my work in Berlin was to me, also, a matter of deep regret and disappointment,

but that he must understand that under the circumstances, and in view of our engagements, His Majesty's Government could not possibly have acted otherwise than they had done.

I then said that I should like to go and see the Chancellor, as it might be, perhaps, the last time I should have an opportunity of seeing him. He begged me to do so. I found the Chancellor very agitated. His Excellency at once began a harangue, which lasted for about 20 minutes. He said that the step taken by his Majesty's Government was terrible to a degree; just for a word—"neutrality," a word which in war time had so often been disregarded—just for a scrap of paper, Great Britain was going to make war on a kindred nation, who desired nothing better than to be friends with her. All his efforts in that direction had been rendered useless by this last terrible step, and the policy to which, as I knew, he had devoted himself since his accession to office, had tumbled down like a house of cards. What we had done was unthinkable; it was like striking a man from behind while he was fighting for his life against two assailants. He held Great Britain responsible for all the terrible events that might happen. I protested strongly against that statement, and said that, in the same way as he and Herr von Jagow wished me to understand that for strategical reasons it was a matter of life and death for Germany to advance through Belgium, and so violate the latter's neutrality, so I would wish him to understand that it was, so to speak, a matter of "life and death" for the honour of Great Britain that she should keep her solemn engagement to do her utmost to defend Belgian neutrality, if attacked. That solemn compact simply had to be kept, or what confidence could anyone have in engagements given by Great Britain in the future? The Chancellor said, "But at what price will that compact have been kept? Has the British Government thought of that?" I hinted to His Excellency, as plainly as I could, that fear of consequences could hardly be regarded as an excuse for breaking solemn engagements; but His Excellency was so excited, so evidently overcome by the news of our action, and so little disposed to hear reasons, that I refrained from adding fuel to the flame by further argument. As I was leaving, he said that the blow of Great Britain joining Germany's enemies was all the greater, that almost up to the last moment he and his Government had been working with us and supporting our efforts to maintain peace between Austria and Russia. I said that this was part of the tragedy which saw the two nations fall apart, just at the moment when the relations between them had been more friendly and cordial than they had been for years. Unfortunately, notwithstanding our efforts to maintain peace between Russia and Austria, the war had spread, and had brought us face to face with a situation which, if we held to our engagements, we could not possibly avoid, and which, unfortunately, entailed our separation from our late fellow-workers. He would readily understand that no one regretted this more than I.

After this somewhat painful interview, I returned to the Embassy and drew up a telegraphic report of what had passed. This telegram was handed in at the Central Telegraph Office a little before 9 p.m. It was accepted by that office, but apparently never dispatched.



At about 9.30 p.m. Herr von Zimmermann, the Under-Secretary of State, came to see me. After expressing his very deep regret that the very friendly official and personal relations between us were about to cease, he asked me casually, whether a demand for passports was equivalent to a declaration of war. I said that such an authority on International Law, as he was known to be, must know as well or better than I what was usual in such cases. I added that there were many cases where diplomatic relations had been broken off and nevertheless war had not ensued: but that in this case, he would have seen from my instructions, of which I had given Herr von Jagow a written summary, that His Majesty's Government expected an answer to a definite question by twelve o'clock that night, and that in default of a satisfactory answer they would be forced to take such steps as their engagements required. Herr Zimmermann said that that was, in fact, a declaration of war, as the Imperial Government could not possibly give the assurance required either that night or any other night.

E. GOSCHEN.

## ANNEXE 4.

Extracts from "Grey Book" shewing circumstances in which Germany violated Belgian Neutrality.

## No. 2.

*Letter addressed by M. D'Avignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Belgian Ministers in Paris, Berlin, London, Vienna and St. Petersburg.*

*Brussels, July 24, 1914.*

SIR,

The Belgian Government has been considering whether, in existing circumstances, it would not be advisable to address to the Powers which have guaranteed the independence and the neutrality of Belgium a communication, confirming her determination to fulfil the international obligations which are imposed upon her by treaty, in the event of the outbreak of war on her frontiers.

The Government has come to the conclusion that a communication of this kind would be premature at the present moment, but that events well might move more rapidly and might not leave them sufficient time to transmit, at the required moment, the necessary instructions to their representatives abroad.

In these circumstances, I have proposed to His Majesty the King and to my colleagues in the Cabinet, who concurred with my views, to give you at once precise indications with regard to the steps which you would have to take if the menace of war between France and Germany became more imminent.

You will find enclosed herewith a letter, signed but not dated, which you will read to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, with whom you will also leave a copy of the document, if circumstances should require a communication of this kind to be made.

I shall let you know, by telegram, the moment at which you are to act. The telegram will be addressed to you at the moment when the mobilisation of the Belgian Army shall have been decreed, if, contrary to our sincere hope and to present prospects of a peaceful solution, our information should induce us to take this extreme measure of precaution.

D'AVIGNON.

*Enclosure in No. 2.*

SIR,

The international situation is serious; the eventuality of a conflict among several Powers cannot be excluded from the anxieties which beset His Majesty's Government.

Belgium has observed, with the most scrupulous exactitude, the obligations of a neutral State, which are imposed upon her by the treaties of

April 19, 1839. These obligations she will remain at unalterable pains to fulfil, whatever circumstances may be.

The friendly disposition of the Powers towards her have been asserted so often that Belgium is confident that she will see her territory remain inviolate if hostilities should break out upon her frontiers.

All the measures which are necessary in order to procure the observance of her neutrality have none the less been taken by the Belgian Government. The Belgian Army has been mobilised, and is proceeding to take up the strategic positions, which have been selected, in order to ensure the defence of the country and respect for its neutrality. The forts of Antwerp, and of the Meuse, have been placed in a state of defence.

It is scarcely necessary to insist upon the significance of these measures. Their sole object is to place Belgium in a position to fulfil her international obligations; it goes without saying they have not been, and could not have been, inspired, either by an intention to take part in the armed conflict of the Powers, or by any sentiment of mistrust towards any one of them.

In accordance with the instructions which I have received, I have the honour to transmit to your Excellency a copy of the declaration by His Majesty's Government, and to beg your Excellency to be good enough to take cognizance of it.

An identical communication has been made to the other Powers which guaranteed the neutrality of Belgium.

#### No. 8.

*Letter addressed by M. D'Avignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Belgian Ministers in Berlin, Paris, London, Vienna, St. Petersburg, Rome, The Hague, and Luxemburg.*

*Brussels, July 29, 1914.*

SIR,

His Majesty's Government has decided to place the army on the reinforced peace footing.

This measure is in no wise to be confounded with mobilisation.

In consequence of the restricted area of her territory, the whole of Belgium constitutes, in a sense, a frontier region. Her army, on the ordinary peace footing, consists only of one class of militia under arms. On the reinforced peace footing the divisions of her army and her cavalry divisions, thanks to the calling-up of three classes, show an effective strength similar to that of the forces permanently maintained in the frontier regions by the neighbouring Powers.

This information would permit you to reply to questions which might be put to you.

D'AVIGNON.



## No. 9.

*Letter addressed by M. D'Avignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Belgian Ministers in Berlin, Paris and London.*

*Brussels, July 31, 1914.*

SIR,

The French Minister came to show me a telegram, from the Havas Agency, announcing that a state of war had been declared in Germany, and said:—"I take this occasion of declaring that no incursion into Belgium will be made by French troops, even if considerable forces were massed on the frontiers of your country. France does not wish to incur the responsibility of committing the first act of hostility against Belgium. Instructions in this sense will be issued to the French authorities."

I thanked M. Klobukowski for his communication, and I considered it my duty to draw his attention to the fact that we had always reposed the greatest confidence in the fidelity with which our two neighbouring States would devote themselves to fulfilment of their engagements towards us. We have also every reason to believe that the attitude of the German Government will be identical with that of the Government of the French Republic.

D'AVIGNON.

## No. 11.

*Letter addressed by M. D'Avignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Belgian Ministers in Berlin, London and Paris.*

*Brussels, July 31, 1914.*

The British Minister asked to see me on a matter of urgent importance, and delivered the following communication, which already for some days past he had been hoping to be able to make to me. In view of the possibility of European war, Sir Edward Grey asked the French and German Governments, separately, if each of them would be ready to respect the neutrality of Belgium, provided that no other Power violated it.

"In view of existing treaties, I am instructed to inform the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs of the above, and to say that Sir Edward Grey presumes that Belgium will do everything in her power to maintain her neutrality, and that he desires and expects that the other Powers will observe and maintain it."

I hastened to thank Sir Francis Villiers for this communication, which the Belgian Government particularly appreciates, and I added that Great Britain and the other nations which have guaranteed our independence, might be assured that we would leave nothing undone in order to maintain our neutrality, and that we were convinced that the other Powers, in view of the excellent relations of friendship and of confidence, which we had always entertained with them, would observe and maintain this neutrality.

I did not fail to declare that our military forces, which had been considerably developed, as a result of the recent reorganisation of our defences, were capable of allowing us to defend ourselves energetically, in the event of a violation of our territory.

In the course of the conversation which followed, Sir Francis appeared to me to be a little surprised at the rapidity with which we had decided upon the mobilisation of our army. I pointed out, that the Netherlands had decided to take similar steps before we had done anything, and that moreover the recent date at which our new military régime had come into effect, and the provisional measures which we had to decide upon on that occasion, compelled us to take urgent and complete precautions. Our neighbours and guarantors ought to regard this decision as a desire on our part to manifest our profound determination to maintain our neutrality unaided.

Sir Francis seemed to be satisfied with my reply, and informed me that his Government was awaiting this reply in order to continue negotiations with France and with Germany; and that the conclusion of these negotiations would be communicated to me.

D'AVIGNON.

No. 12.

*Letter addressed by M. D'Avignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Belgian Ministers in Berlin, London and Paris.*

*Brussels, July 31, 1914.*

SIR,

In the course of the conversation which the Secretary-General of my Department had this morning with Herr von Below (German Minister at Brussels), he explained to the latter the bearing of the military measures which we had taken, and said to him, that they represented a consequence of our determination to fulfil our international obligations, and that they in no wise implied an attitude of mistrust towards our neighbours.

The Secretary-General then asked the German Minister if he were acquainted with the conversation which he (the Secretary-General) had had with his predecessor, Herr von Flotow, and with the reply which the German Imperial Chancellor had instructed the latter to return.

In the course of the discussion which was excited in 1911, by the introduction of the Dutch proposals for the fortification of Flushing, certain journals had asserted that, in the event of a Franco-German war, our neutrality would be violated by Germany.

The Department for Foreign Affairs had put forward the suggestion, that a declaration made in the German Parliament, on the occasion of a debate on foreign policy, would be calculated to tranquillise public opinion and to allay its mistrust, which was so regrettable from the point of view of the relations between the two countries.

Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg intimated, in reply, that he had been extremely sensible to the sentiments which had inspired our suggestions. He declared that Germany had no intention of violating our neutrality,

but he expressed the opinion, that if Germany were to make a public declaration she would weaken her military situation with regard to France, who would be relieved of anxiety as to her northern frontier, and would concentrate all her forces towards the east.

Baron van der Elst (the Belgian Secretary-General), continuing, said that he fully understood the objections which Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg had raised against the suggested public declaration, and he recalled the fact that subsequently, in 1913, Herr von Jagow (German Foreign Secretary) had made before the Budget Committee of the Reichstag reassuring statements with regard to the observance of the neutrality of Belgium.

Herr von Below replied, that he was acquainted with the conversation with Herr von Flotow, and that he was certain that the sentiments expressed at that time had not changed.

D'AVIGNON.

*Enclosure in No. 12.*

*Letter addressed by the Belgian Minister in Berlin to M. D'Avignon,  
Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Berlin, May 2, 1913.*

SIR,

I have the honour to acquaint you on the authority of the semi-official North German Gazette with the declaration made in the course of the sitting of the Budget Committee of the Reichstag of April 29 by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and the Minister of War, with regard to the neutrality of Belgium.

A member of the Social Democratic Party said:—

In Belgium, the approach of a Franco-German war is viewed with apprehension, since it is feared that Germany will not respect the neutrality of Belgium.

Herr von Jagow, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, replied:—

The neutrality of Belgium is defined by international conventions, and Germany is determined to respect these conventions.

This declaration did not satisfy another member of the Social Democratic Party. Herr von Jagow thereupon observed that he had nothing to add to the plain statement which he had delivered with regard to the relations between Germany and Belgium.

In reply to fresh questions by a member of the Social Democratic Party, General von Heeringen, Minister for War, said:—

Belgium bears no part of the responsibility for the proposals for German military reorganisation; the warrant for proposals is to be found in the situation in the East. Germany will not lose sight of the fact that Belgian neutrality is guaranteed by international treaties.

A member of the Radical Party having once more spoken of Belgium, Herr von Jagow again pointed out that his declaration concerning Belgium was sufficiently clear.

BARON BEYENS.



## No. 13.

*Telegram addressed by Comte de Lalaing, Belgian Minister in London, to  
M. D'Avignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*London, August 1, 1914.*

Great Britain has inquired separately of France and of Germany whether they would respect the territory of Belgium if their adversary did not violate it. The German reply is awaited. France has accepted.

## No. 14.

*Telegram addressed by Baron Beyens, Belgian Minister in Berlin, to  
M. D'Avignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Berlin, August 1, 1914.*

The British Ambassador has been instructed to ask the Minister for Foreign Affairs whether, in the event of war, Germany would respect the neutrality of Belgium, and the Minister is said to have replied that he cannot answer this question.

## No. 15.

*Letter addressed by M. D'Avignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to  
the Belgian Ministers in Berlin, Paris and London.*

*Brussels, August 1, 1914.*

SIR,

I have the honour to inform you that the French Minister has made the following verbal communication to me:—

“I am authorised to declare, that in the event of an international conflict, the Government of the Republic, as they have always proclaimed, will respect the neutrality of Belgium. If this neutrality should not be respected by another Power, the French Government, in self-defence, might be compelled to modify its attitude.”

I thanked His Excellency, and I added that on our side we had taken, without delay, all the measures which were necessary, in order to procure respect for our independence and our frontiers.

D'AVIGNON.

## No. 19.

*Letter addressed by M. D'Avignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to  
the Belgian Ministers in Paris, Berlin, London, Vienna, and  
St. Petersburg.*

*Brussels, August 2, 1914.*

SIR,

I have been careful to intimate to the German Minister through M. de Bassompierre, that a communiqué from M. Klobukowski, the

French Minister, to the Brussels Press, would make public the formal declaration, which the latter made to me on August 1. Meeting Herr von Below, the latter thanked me for this attention, and added that for the moment he had not been instructed to make any official communication, but that we were acquainted with his personal opinion, as to the security with which we were entitled to contemplate our Eastern neighbours. I immediately replied, that all that we knew with regard to the intentions of the latter—intentions which had been indicated in a multiplicity of earlier conversations—did not permit us to question their perfect correctness with regard to Belgium; I nevertheless desired to add, that we would attach greatest value to being in possession of a formal declaration, which the nation would receive with joy and gratitude.

D'AVIGNON

No. 20.

*Note delivered at 7.0 p.m. on August 2 by Herr von Below Saleske, German Minister at Brussels, to M. D'Avignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Brussels, August 2, 1914.*

The German Government has received trustworthy information, according to which, the French forces intend to march on the Meuse, by way of Givet and Namur. This information leaves no doubt with regard to the intentions of France to march against Germany through Belgian territory. The German Imperial Government cannot resist the apprehension, that Belgium, with the best will in the world, will not be in a position to repel, unaided, a French advance of so great an extent. In this fact there is sufficient certitude of a threat against Germany. In self-defence, Germany is bound to anticipate the enemy's attack. It would consequently cause the German Government very great regret, if Belgium were to regard it as an act of hostility against herself that Germany is compelled, by the measures taken by her enemies, to parry these by setting foot herself on Belgian territory.

In order to preclude every misinterpretation, the Imperial Government makes the following declaration:—

(1) Germany contemplates no hostilities against Belgium. If, in the impending campaign, Belgium is willing to assume an attitude of benevolent neutrality towards Germany, the German Government undertake, upon the conclusion of peace, to guarantee to the fullest extent, the integrity and independence of the kingdom.

(2) Subject to the above condition, Germany pledges herself to evacuate the territory of the kingdom as soon as peace has been concluded.

(3) If Belgium adopt a friendly attitude, Germany is prepared, in agreement with the Royal Belgian authorities, to meet all requirements of the German troops by cash payments, and to make good any damage that might be caused in Belgium.

(4) If Belgium should adopt a hostile attitude towards the German troops, in particular, if she should place obstacles in their way, by ordering the Meuse forts to oppose their advance, or by destroying railways, roads, tunnels or other engineering works, Germany will be compelled to regard the kingdom as an enemy. In this case, Germany would assume no obligations towards Belgium, but would leave to the arbitrament of arms the subsequent settlement of the relations between the two States.

The Imperial Government cherishes the confident expectation that this eventuality will not arise, and that the Royal Belgian Government will be able to adopt the measures which are necessary in order to prevent the occurrence of events, such as have been described above. In this case the friendly ties which unite the two neighbouring States would become stronger and permanent.

No. 22.

*Note delivered by M. D'Avignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Herr von Below Saleske, German Minister at Brussels.*

*Brussels, August 3, 1914. (7.0 a.m.)*

The German Government, by its note of August 2, 1914, intimated that, according to trustworthy information, the French forces are to be credited with the intention of marching on the Meuse through Givet and Namur, and that Belgium, with the best will in the world, would not be in a position to repel unaided an advance by the French troops.

The German Government conceives it to be its duty to forestall this attack, and to violate Belgian territory. In these circumstances, Germany invites His Majesty's Government to adopt a friendly attitude towards Germany, and pledges itself, when peace is concluded, to guarantee the integrity of Belgium and of her dominions to the fullest extent. The note adds that if Belgium opposes any obstacles to the advance of the German troops Germany will be compelled to regard her as an enemy, and to leave to the arbitrament of arms the subsequent settlement of the relations between the two States.

This note has profoundly and painfully surprised His Majesty's Government.

The intentions which the note attributes to France are opposed to the formal declarations which were made to us, on August 1, in the name of the Government of the Republic.

Apart from these declarations, if, contrary to our expectation, Belgian neutrality were to be violated by France, Belgium would fulfil her international obligations, and her army would make the most vigorous resistance to the invader.

The treaties of 1839, confirmed by the treaties of 1870, consecrate the independence and neutrality of Belgium under the guarantee of the Powers, and, in particular, of the Government of His Majesty the King



of Prussia. Belgium has always remained faithful to her international obligations; she has fulfilled her duties in a spirit of loyal impartiality; she has left nothing undone in order to maintain or to secure respect of her neutrality.

The attack upon her independence with which the German Government threatens Belgium would constitute a flagrant violation of International Law. No strategic interest justifies the violation of the law.

If the Belgian Government accepted the proposals which are put forward in the German note, it would sacrifice the honour of the nation, and would, at the same time, betray its trust towards Europe.

Mindful of the part which Belgium has played for more than 50 years in the civilisation of the world, the Belgian Government refuses to believe that the independence of Belgium can only be preserved at the price of the violation of her neutrality.

If this hope should not be realised, the Belgian Government is resolutely determined to repel, by every means in its power, every attack upon its rights.

D'AVIGNON.

No. 27.

*Letter addressed by Herr von Below Saleske, German Minister in Brussels, to M. D'Avignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Brussels, August 4, 1914. (6.0 a.m.)*

SIR,

I have been instructed, and I have the honour to inform your Excellency, that in consequence of the refusal, which His Majesty's Government has returned to the well-intentioned proposals which have been submitted by the Imperial Government, the latter, to its deep regret, will see itself compelled to carry out—if necessary by force of arms—the measures of security which have been explained to be indispensable in the face of the French menace.

I beg you, M. le Ministre, to accept the assurance of my high esteem.

VON BELOW.

No. 28.

*Note delivered by Sir Francis H. Villiers, British Minister in Brussels, to M. D'Avignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Brussels, August 4, 1914.*

I am instructed to inform the Belgian Government, that if Germany exerts pressure, with the object of compelling Belgium to abandon her part as a neutral country, the Government of His Britannic Majesty expects that Belgium will resist by every means in her power.

In this event the Government of His Britannic Majesty is prepared to join Russia and France, if Belgium desires it, in order to offer to the Belgian Government, without delay, its co-operation, with a view to resisting the measures of compulsion employed by Germany against Belgium, and at the same time to offer a guarantee for the maintenance of the independence and integrity of Belgium in future years.

FRANCIS H. VILLIERS.

No. 30.

*Telegram addressed by M. D'Avignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Belgian Ministers in London and Paris.*

Brussels, August 4, 1914.

The General Staff announces that Belgian national territory has been violated at Gemmerich.

D'AVIGNON.

No. 31.

*Letter addressed by M. D'Avignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Herr von Below Saleske, German Minister in Brussels.*

Brussels, August 4, 1914.

SIR,

I have the honour to inform your Excellency, that from to-day forward, His Majesty's Government is unable to accord you diplomatic privilege, and herewith breaks off official relations with you. Your Excellency will find enclosed the passports, which are necessary for your own departure, and for that of the staff of the Legation.

I am, etc.,

D'AVIGNON.

No. 35.

*Letter addressed by the Belgian Minister in Berlin to M. D'Avignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

Berlin, August 4, 1914.

SIR,

I have the honour to transmit herewith a translation of part of a speech delivered to-day at the Tribune of the Reichstag, by the Imperial Chancellor, with regard to the odious violation of our neutrality:—

“We are in a state of legitimate self-defence, and necessity knows no law.

“Our troops have occupied Luxemburg, and have, perhaps, already penetrated into Belgium. That is contrary to the rule of

International Law. France has, it is true declared in Brussels, that she is determined to respect the neutrality of Belgium, as long as it is respected by the enemy. But we knew that France was holding herself ready to invade Belgium. France could wait. We could not. A French attack on our flank in the region of the Lower Rhine, might have become fatal. That is how we have been compelled to disregard the justified protests of the Governments of Luxemburg and Belgium. The injustice which we are committing we will repair, as soon as our military object has been attained.

“Those who are threatened as we are, and who are fighting for their highest interests, cannot allow themselves to consider anything else, except the means of extricating themselves; we take our stand by the side of Austria.”

It is to be observed, that Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg admits, without the slightest equivocation, that Germany is violating International Law, by invading Belgian territory, and that she is committing an injustice towards us.

I am, etc.,

BARON BEYENS.

#### No. 39.

*Telegram addressed by the Belgian Minister in London to M. D'Avignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*London, August 4, 1914.*

Great Britain, this morning, called upon Germany to respect Belgian neutrality. The ultimatum says, that in view of the note addressed by Germany to Belgium, threatening the latter with the use of armed force if she opposes the passage of German troops, in view of the violation of Belgian territory at Gemmerich, in view of the fact that Germany has refused to give Great Britain the same assurance as that given last week by France, Great Britain is bound to demand once more a satisfactory reply with regard to the observance of Belgian neutrality and of a treaty of which Germany is a signatory as well as she herself. The ultimatum expires at midnight.

In consequence of Great Britain's ultimatum to Germany, the British proposals, which I transmitted to you by telegram, stand for the moment annulled.

COMTE DE LALAING.

#### No. 40.

*Letter addressed by M. D'Avignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Ministers of Great Britain, France and Russia, in Brussels.*

*Brussels, August 4, 1914.*

The Belgian Government regrets to have to announce to your Excellency that, this morning the armed forces of Germany penetrated into Belgian territory in violation of the engagements which have been taken by treaty.



His Majesty's Government is firmly resolved to resist by every means in its power.

Belgium appeals to Great Britain, France and Russia, as guarantors, to co-operate in the defence of her territory.

There would be concerted and common action with a view to resisting the measures of force employed by Germany against Belgium, and with a view, at the same time, of guaranteeing the maintenance of the independence and integrity of Belgium in future years.

Belgium is happy to be able to declare that she will assume the defence of her fortified towns.

I am, etc.,

D'AVIGNON.

No. 41.

*Telegram addressed by the Belgian Minister in London to M. D'Avignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

London, August 5, 1914.

Germany having rejected the British proposals, Great Britain has informed her that after 11 o'clock a state of war existed between the two countries.

COMTE DE LALAING.

No. 44.

*Letter addressed by M. D'Avignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Heads of Missions in all States maintaining Diplomatic Relations with Belgium.*

Brussels, August 5, 1914.

SIR,

By the Treaty of April 18, 1839, Prussia, France, Great Britain, Austria and Russia declared themselves to be guarantors of the treaties, concluded the same day, between His Majesty the King of the Belgians and His Majesty the King of the Netherlands. This Treaty provides:—

“Belgium shall form an independent and perpetually neutral State.”

Belgium has fulfilled all her international obligations; she has performed her duties in a spirit of loyal impartiality, and has left nothing undone in order to maintain and to secure respect for her neutrality.

It is therefore, with painful emotions, that His Majesty's Government have learned that the armed forces of Germany, a Power which is among the guarantors of our neutrality, have penetrated into Belgian territory, in violation of the engagements which have been taken by treaty.

It is our duty to protest, with indignation, against an attack upon the Law of Nations, which no act on our part has sought to provoke.

His Majesty's Government is firmly resolved to repel, by every means in its power, the attack upon Belgian neutrality, and it recalls the fact, that by virtue of Article 10 of the Hague Convention of 1907, with regard

to the rights and duties of neutral Powers and persons, in the event of war on land the action of a neutral Power in the repelling, even by force, attacks upon its neutrality, cannot be regarded as an act of hostility.

You will urgently request an audience of the Minister for Foreign Affairs, and you will read to His Excellency these presents, of which you will leave him a copy. If the audience cannot be accorded to you at once you will make this communication in writing.

I am, etc.,

D'AVIGNON.

No. 48.

*Communication made on August 5, by Sir Francis Villiers, British Minister in Brussels, to M. D'Avignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

I am instructed to inform the Belgian Government that the Government of His Britannic Majesty considers that common action, with a view to resisting Germany, is in force and is warranted by the Treaty of 1839.

No. 52.

*Letter addressed by M. D'Avignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Belgian Ministers in Paris, London and St. Petersburg.*

*Brussels, August 5, 1914.*

SIR,

I have the honour to inform you that the Ministers of France and Russia have this morning approached me, in order to acquaint me with the willingness of their Governments to respond to our appeal, and to co-operate with Great Britain in defence of our territory.

I am, etc.,

D'AVIGNON.

No. 60.

*Telegram addressed by the Belgian Minister at the Hague to M. D'Avignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*The Hague, August 9, 1914.*

The Minister for Foreign Affairs has requested me to transmit to you the following information, since the American Ambassador in Brussels declines to do so.

The fortress of Liège has been stormed, after a gallant defence. The German Government very deeply regrets that, in consequence of the attitude of the Belgian Government towards Germany, sanguinary

encounters have taken place. Germany has not entered Belgium as an enemy; it is only force of circumstances which have compelled her, in view of French military measures, to take the serious step of entering Belgium, and occupying Liège as a *point d'appui* for her subsequent military operations. Now that the Belgian army, by its heroic resistance against greatly superior forces, has maintained the honour of its arms, the German Government begs the King of the Belgians and the Belgian Government to spare Belgium the further horrors of war. The Government is ready to conclude with Belgium any agreement which could be reconciled with its arrangements with France. Germany offers, further, the solemn assurance that she has no intention of appropriating Belgian territory, and that any such intention is far from her thoughts. Germany is always ready to evacuate Belgium as soon as the state of the campaign permits it.

The American Minister had begged his colleagues to undertake this attempt at mediation. The Minister for Foreign Affairs accepted this mission without enthusiasm. I have undertaken it as a favour to him.

BARON FALLON.

No. 71.

*Telegram addressed by M. D'Avignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Baron Fallon, Belgian Minister at the Hague.*

*Brussels, August 12, 1914.*

Please hand the following telegram to the Minister for Foreign Affairs:—

“The proposal which the German Government makes to us reproduces the proposal which had been formulated in the ultimatum of August 2. Faithful to her international obligations, Belgium can only reiterate her reply to that ultimatum, all the more, in view of the fact that, since August 3, her neutrality has been violated, a grievous war has been transferred to her territory, and the guarantors of her neutrality have loyally and immediately responded to her appeal.”

D'AVIGNON.



## ANNEXE 5.

Telegrams exchanged between the Emperor William II. and  
the Emperor Nicholas II.

(Extracts from the German White Book.)

## No. 1.

*The Emperor William to the Emperor Nicholas.*

July 28, 1914. (10.45 p.m.)

It is with the liveliest anxiety that I have learned of the impression which has been produced in your Empire by the advance of Austria-Hungary against Serbia. The unscrupulous agitation which has been pursued in Serbia for years has led to a monstrous attempt, to which the Archduke Francis Ferdinand has fallen a victim. The spirit which led the Servians to assassinate their own King and his Consort still reigns in their country. You will no doubt agree with me, that both of us, you as well as I, have, like all other Sovereigns, a common interest in insisting that those who are morally responsible for this terrible murder shall receive the punishment they deserve.

On the other hand, I do not in any way ignore the fact that it is extremely difficult for you and your Government to resist the manifestations of public opinion. In memory of the cordial friendship which has united us intimately for so long, I am using all my influence to persuade Austria-Hungary to arrive at a loyal and satisfactory understanding with Russia. I count, confidently, upon your seconding me in my efforts to remove all the difficulties which might yet arise.

Your very sincere and devoted friend and cousin,

WILLIAM.

## No. 2.

*The Emperor Nicholas to the Emperor William.*

Peterhof Palace, July 29, 1914. (1.0 p.m.)

I am glad that you have returned to Germany. At this very serious moment, I earnestly ask you to help me. A shameful war has been declared upon a weak nation; I entirely share the indignation in Russia, which is immense.

I foresee that, very soon, I shall no longer be able to resist the pressure which is being brought to bear on me, and that I shall be compelled to take measures which will lead to war.

In order to avert the calamity of a European war, I beg of you, in the name of our old friendship, to do everything you can to prevent your Ally from going too far.

NICHOLAS.

## No. 3.

*The Emperor William to the Emperor Nicholas.*

July 29, 1914. (6.30 p.m.)

I have received your telegram, and I share your desire for the maintenance of peace.

Nevertheless, as I said in my first telegram, I cannot consider the advance of Austria-Hungary as a "shameful war." Austria-Hungary knows by experience that it is absolutely impossible to trust the promises of Serbia so long as they exist merely on paper.

In my opinion, the action of Austria-Hungary is to be regarded as an attempt to obtain every guarantee that the promises of Serbia will, in fact, be fulfilled. The declaration of the Austrian Government strengthens me in my opinion that Austria-Hungary is not aiming at any territorial acquisition at the expense of Serbia.

I think, therefore, that it is quite possible for Russia, in presence of the Austro-Servian war, to continue to play the part of a spectator, without dragging Europe into the most awful war that it has ever seen.

I believe that a direct understanding between your Government and Vienna is possible and desirable, seeing that, as I have already telegraphed to you, my Government is endeavouring, with all its strength, to promote it.

Naturally, military measures on the part of Russia, which Austria-Hungary might consider as a menace, would precipitate a calamity, which both of us are trying to avoid; and would also render impossible the mission of mediator which I hastened to accept when you appealed to my friendship and assistance.

WILLIAM.

## No. 4.

*The Emperor William to the Emperor Nicholas.*

July 30, 1914. (1.0 a.m.)

My Ambassador has been instructed to call the attention of your Government to the dangers and grave consequences of a mobilisation; that is what I said to you in my last telegram.

Austria-Hungary has mobilised only against Serbia, and only a part of her army. If, as according to your telegram and the communication of your Government appears to be the case, Russia mobilises against Austria-Hungary, the mission of mediator, with which you entrusted me in a friendly spirit, and which I accepted at your urgent request, will be compromised, if not rendered altogether impossible.

All the weight of the decision to be taken rests, at this moment, on your shoulders, which will have to bear the responsibility for war or peace.

WILLIAM.

## No. 5.

*The Emperor Nicholas to the Emperor William.*

*Peterhof, July 30, 1914. (1.20 p.m.)*

I thank you cordially for your prompt reply. I am sending Tatichoff this evening with my instructions. The military measures which are now being taken were already adopted five days ago, in order to meet the preparations of Austria.

With all my heart I hope that these measures will have no influence upon your rôle as mediator, which I appreciate very much. We need your energetic intervention with Austria, in order that she may come to an understanding with us.

NICHOLAS.

## No. 6.

*The Emperor Nicholas to the Emperor William.*

*July 31, 1914.*

With all my heart I thank you for your intentions, which show the glimmer of a hope that everything will still end well. Technically, it is impossible to suspend our military preparations, which were dictated by the mobilisation of Austria.

We are far from desiring war; as long as the *pourparlers* with Austria with regard to Servia continue, my troops will not permit any act of provocation. I assure you of this, on my word of honour.

I have absolute confidence in the grace of God, and trust that your intervention in Vienna will be successful for the good of our countries and for the peace of Europe.

Very cordially yours,

NICHOLAS.

## No. 7.

*The Emperor William to the Emperor Nicholas.*

*July 31, 1914. (2.0 p.m.)*

In response to your appeal to my friendship, and to your request to come to your assistance, I undertook to mediate between your Government and the Austro-Hungarian Government.

While this action on my part was still in progress, your troops were mobilised against my Ally, Austria-Hungary; the result, as I have already told you, was that my intervention became almost illusory. Nevertheless, I continued it.



I have, at this moment, received trustworthy information concerning serious warlike preparations on my Eastern frontier as well. As I am responsible for the safety of my Empire, I find myself compelled to take similar measures in defence.

I have gone to the extreme possible limit in my efforts to maintain peace. It is not I who will have to bear the responsibility for the awful calamity which now threatens the whole of the civilised world.

Even at this moment it depends only upon you to prevent it. Nobody threatens the honour and the power of Russia, which might well have awaited the result of my intervention. The friendship for you, and for your Empire, which was bequeathed to me by my grandfather on his deathbed, has always been sacred to me, and I have been faithful to Russia when she was in trouble, particularly in your last war. Even now the peace of Europe could still be preserved by you, if Russia decides to suspend her military measures, which threaten Germany and Austria.

WILLIAM.

No. 8.

*The Emperor Nicholas to the Emperor William.*

August 1, 1914. (2.0 p.m.)

I have received your telegram; I understand that you are compelled to mobilise, but I should have to have from you the same guarantee that I have given you, namely, that these measures do not signify war, and that we shall continue our negotiations for the welfare of our two countries and the general peace, which is so dear to our hearts.

Our long and well-tried friendship ought, by the help of God, to succeed in preventing this bloodshed. I await, with confidence, a reply from you.

NICHOLAS.

No. 9.

*The Emperor William to the Emperor Nicholas.*

Berlin, August 1, 1914.

I thank you for your telegram; I indicated yesterday to your Government the only means by which war could still be averted.

Although I asked for a reply by noon, no telegram from my Ambassador containing a reply from your Government has yet reached me.

I have, therefore, been compelled to mobilise my army.

An immediate, clear and unequivocal reply from your Government is the only means of averting an immeasurable calamity. Until I receive this reply it is, to my profound regret, impossible for me to touch upon the subject of your telegram. I must ask you categorically, to give orders to your troops, without delay, not to make the slightest attack upon our frontiers.

WILLIAM.

## ANNEXE 6.

Extracts from the Russian "Orange Book," relating to the Declaration of War by Germany on Russia.

No. 76.

*Note delivered by German Ambassador in St. Petersburg at 7.10 p.m. on August 1, 1914.*

The Imperial Government has, since the beginning of the crisis, endeavoured to bring it to a peaceful solution. In deference to a desire, which had been expressed to him by His Majesty the Emperor of Russia, His Majesty the German Emperor, in agreement with England, had applied himself to discharging the part of mediator between the Cabinets of Vienna and St. Petersburg, when Russia, without waiting for the result, proceeded to mobilise the whole of her forces, on land and on sea. In consequence of this threatening measure, which was warranted by no military preparations on the part of Germany, the German Empire found itself face to face with a grave and imminent danger. If the Imperial Government had failed to guard against this peril, it would have compromised the security and the very existence of Germany. The German Government consequently saw itself compelled to address to the Government of His Majesty the Emperor of All the Russias an insistent demand for the cessation of the said military measures. Russia, having refused to concede (not having considered it worth while to answer)\* this demand, and having made plain by this refusal (this attitude)\* that her action was directed against Germany, I have the honour, in accordance with the instructions of my Government, to inform your Excellency that:—His Majesty the Emperor, my august Sovereign, in the name of the Empire, takes up the challenge and considers himself in a state of war with Russia.

F. POURTALES.

*St. Petersburg, July 19 (August 1, 1914).*

\* The words placed in brackets are in the original. It is to be assumed that two versions had been prepared in advance, and that by mistake both of them were inserted in the note.

No. 77.

*Communiqué by the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs concerning the events of the last few days.*

*August 2, 1914.*

As a distorted account of recent events has appeared in the foreign Press, the Minister for Foreign Affairs deems it to be his duty to publish the following narrative of the diplomatic *pourparlers* during the period.

On July 10/23, 1914, the Austro-Hungarian Minister at Belgrade presented to the Servian Prime Minister a note in which the Servian Government was accused of having promoted the Pan-Serb movement which had culminated in the assassination of the heir-presumptive to the Austro-Hungarian throne. Austria-Hungary consequently demanded that the Servian Government should not only condemn in solemn form the above-mentioned propaganda, but that, under the control of Austria-Hungary, it should also take a series of measures designed to discover the conspiracy, to punish the Servian subjects who should have participated in it, and to prevent for the future every attempt of this kind within the territory of the Monarchy. The Servian Government was given a period of 48 hours in which to reply to the above-mentioned note. The Imperial Government, to whom the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador in St. Petersburg had communicated the text of the note, 17 hours after its delivery in Belgrade, having observed the demands therein contained, could not but perceive that some of these demands were fundamentally impossible of fulfilment, while others were presented in a form which was incompatible with the dignity of an independent State. Considering the diminution of the dignity of Servia involved in these demands, and the tendency of Austria-Hungary to secure for herself preponderance in the Balkans, which these same demands revealed were inadmissible, the Russian Government, in the most amicable manner, intimated to Austria-Hungary that it would be desirable to submit to further consideration the points contained in the Austro-Hungarian note. The Austro-Hungarian Government did not consider it possible to consent to any discussion of the note. The moderate action of the other Powers in Vienna was likewise not crowned with success.

Notwithstanding the fact that Servia had reproved the crime, and had shown herself ready to give satisfaction to Austria in a measure which exceeded the expectations not only of Russia but also of the other Powers, the Austro-Hungarian Minister in Belgrade deemed the Servian reply to be inadequate and left that city.

Recognising the exaggerated character of the demands presented by Austria, Russia had declared some time before that it would be impossible for her to remain indifferent, without, however, refusing to employ all her efforts in order to discover a peaceful issue which would be acceptable to Austria and would not impair her dignity as a great Power. At the same time Russia made it absolutely clear that she would assent to a peaceful solution of the question only in so far as such a settlement would not imply any diminution of the dignity of Servia as an independent State. Unhappily, all the efforts exerted by the Imperial Government in this direction remained without effect. The Austro-Hungarian Government, after having adopted an evasive attitude towards all the attempts on the part of the Powers to intervene in a conciliatory sense in its conflict with Servia, proceeded to mobilise; officially declared war on Servia, and the following day Belgrade was bombarded. The manifesto which accompanied the declaration of war openly accused Servia of having prepared and perpetrated the Sarajevo crime. An accusation of this kind,



of a common law crime, directed against a whole nation and a whole State, excited by its manifest inanity the sympathies of wide circles of European society in favour of Servia.

In consequence of the action which was taken by the Austro-Hungarian Government notwithstanding the declaration by Russia that it could not remain indifferent to the fate of Servia, the Imperial Government deemed it necessary to order the mobilisation of the military districts of Kieff, Odessa, Moscow, and Kazan. This measure had become necessary, in view of the fact that five days had elapsed between the date of the delivery of the Austro-Hungarian note to the Servian Government and the first steps taken by Russia, and, meanwhile, the Vienna Cabinet had taken no steps to meet our pacific efforts half-way; on the contrary, the mobilisation of half the Austro-Hungarian army had been decreed.

The German Government was informed of the measures taken by Russia; at the same time, it was explained that these measures merely represented the consequence of Austrian armament, and that they were in no wise directed against Germany. At the same time, the Imperial Government stated that Russia was prepared to continue the *pourparlers*, with a view to a pacific settlement of the conflict, either by means of direct negotiations with the Vienna Cabinet, or, in accordance with the proposal of Great Britain, by means of a conference of the four great Powers not directly interested, namely, Great Britain, France, Germany, and Italy.

This attempt on the part of Russia, however, likewise failed. Austria-Hungary declined to enter into any subsequent exchange of views with us, and the Vienna Cabinet evaded the proposal to participate in a conference of the Powers.

Nevertheless, Russia did not abandon her efforts in favour of peace. Replying to an inquiry by Germany as to the terms upon which we would agree even then to suspend our armaments, the Minister for Foreign Affairs declared that these terms would mean the recognition by Austria-Hungary of the fact that the Austro-Servian question had assumed the character of a European question, and a declaration by that same Power that she would agree not to insist upon demands which were incompatible with the sovereign rights of Servia.

The Russian proposal was deemed by Germany unacceptable for Austria-Hungary. At the same moment, news was received in St. Petersburg, that a general mobilisation had been proclaimed by Austria-Hungary.

Meanwhile, hostilities continued on Servian territory, and Belgrade was immediately bombarded.

The non-success of our proposals compelled us to extend our military precautions.

The Berlin Cabinet, having addressed a question to us on this subject, received the reply that Russia had been compelled to begin to mobilise in order to guard herself against all eventualities.

While taking this measure of precaution, Russia, none the less, continued to seek, with all her energies, an issue to this situation, and

declared her willingness to accept every means of settling the conflict, which would be compatible with the observance of the conditions stipulated by us.

Notwithstanding this conciliatory communication, the German Government, on July 18/31, addressed to the Russian Government the demand that Russian military measures should be suspended at noon on July 19/August 1, threatening, in the contrary event, to proceed to a general mobilisation.

The following day, July 19/August 1, the German Ambassador, in the name of his Government, transmitted to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, the declaration of war.

SAZONOF.

No. 78.

*The Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Representatives of His Majesty the Emperor abroad.*

*St. Petersburg, July 20/August 2, 1914.*

It is absolutely clear that Germany is now endeavouring to throw upon us the responsibility for the rupture. Our mobilisation was caused by the enormous responsibility which we would have incurred if we had failed to take every measure of precaution, at a moment when Austria confining herself to *pourparlers* of a dilatory character, was bombarding Belgrade and proceeding to a general mobilisation.

His Majesty the Emperor had pledged himself, by his word of honour, to the German Emperor, not to take any aggressive steps so long as the *pourparlers* with Austria continued. After offering such a guarantee, and after giving every proof of Russia's love of peace, Germany could not question, and had not the right to question, our declaration that we would be glad to accept any peaceful solution which was compatible with the dignity and independence of Servia. Any other solution would have been completely incompatible with our own dignity, and would indubitably have upset the balance of power in Europe, by ensuring the hegemony of Germany. This European, not to say world-wide, character of the conflict, is infinitely more important than the pretext which brought it to pass. Germany, by her decision to declare war upon us at a moment when the negotiations among the Powers were still in progress, has assumed a heavy responsibility.

SAZONOF.





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